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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The difference between the 'practical' and the 
•theoretical' in school administration and the re­
lationship between the two is up for renewed dis­
cussion. This kind of argument used to be pretty 
much localized to exchanges between professors and 
their students. When they left the campus, many 
students felt they had escaped the ivory tower of 
theory to enter the •real' world of practice. 
This is no longer the case. 
Interest in practical theory and in sound 
theoretical practice has been widely stirred with­
in the past few years. The studies and confer­
ences of the Cooperative Project on Educational 
Administration has related practitioners and pro­
fessors directly and in great number. This re­
lationship promises to continue as the Committee 
for the Advancement of School Administration ex­
tends consideration of what is good practice and 
what is sound theory throughout the profession 
nationally. l 
The preceding statement by Van Miller seems to set 
forth accurately some important considerations by school ad­
ministrators, professors of educational administration, 
social scientists and students.of school administration. 
There is a vast range of opinions regarding the nature of 
administrative theory and of administrative practice in edu­
cation, whether there is an interdependent relationship 
lvan Miller, "The Practical Art of Using Theory," 
School Executive, LXXVII (June, 1958), 60. 
2 
between the two or if there exists a sharp dichotomy. 
The entirety of this study was a detailed examination 
of the nature and structure or theory; however, because of 
wide differences in the interpretation of theory, it seemed 
important at the outset to give some clarity to the inter­
pretation which was adhered to throughout this study. To 
clarify the position taken, some postulates are set forth in 
the following paragraphs. 
1. Theory cannot be disassociated from the human 
process of theorizing. This postulate may appear to be self­
evident; however, there is substantial evidence to suppose 
that some writers would be unwilling to accept it. Much has 
been written about administrative theory, educational theory, 
and social theory, but tar less has been written about the 
process ot theorizing. Consequently, theory has taken on a 
neutral, detached meaning, which is readily discernible from 
investigations of the various one line or one paragraph 
definitions given to theory. It could be said that theory is 
the product of theorizing by the theorist, a definition not 
as absurd as it may sound. The only absurdity is the attempt 
to communicate meaning of abstractions through short defini­
tions. Even the product or the theorist to be of maximum 
usefulness tor another person must be literally re-theorized 
by him. This discussion leads us to the next postulate 
which is related to the.first. 
2. Theorizing is� interdependent combination or 
deductive and inductive processes. This postulate is meant 
to thwart immediate engagement by the reader in mentally 
dichotomizing the two processes. Sueh a dichotomy erupts 
in various forms. The more .frequent ones being (1) "theory 
starts with deduction" versus "theory starts with indue-
tion"; (2) "theory building is a mental process" versus 
3 
"theory building is a physical (through experience} process"; 
- -
and (3) "theory building is an observational process" versus 
"theory building is a logical process." Certainly no at-
tempt was made to avoid consideration of these issues. The 
postulate is made ror the purpose of freeing the reader tor 
concentration on what appeared to be more logical considera­
tions of theory building. 
3. Theorizing is .fundamentally and primarily� pur­
poseful activity. This postulate has a host ot in.ferences 
and implications within the milieu or theory controversies. 
It seemed more appropriate, however, to draw the inferences 
and make the implications in subsequent sections or the 
study where more lo.gical relationships may be shown. The 
point was made here to eliminate the notion that theorizing 
is an activity cont'ined to the charlatan on the one hand and 
to the busy worker on the other hand. or course, there are 
degrees of quality or theorizing; thus, the purposes of the 
theorizer may be on a very low level. 
4 
4. Theorizing is .2B � continuum of space, time, and 
relevance. Some theories are more comprehensive and general 
than others; some are ot more immediate use than others; and 
some are more useful.than others. Also, there are specific 
theories of an individual act of administrative behavior, 
more general theories about administrative processes, still 
more general theories of social interaction, and finally 
theories of a broad philosophical nature. 
Here again, this postulate has some far-reaching in­
ferences in theory controversies which were postponed tor 
later treatment. Suffice it to say here that dichotomizing 
scientific theory and philosophic theory is an unfruitful, 
perhaps an impossible, activity. Of course, tor clarity, 
it is necessary to specify what it is one is theorizing 
about; but to claim a priority on theory tor the philosopher 
or for the scientist gets one nowhere. 
B. EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS A 
- . 
FOCUS OF STUDY 
With the foregoing introduction regarding the treat­
ment or theory, the next logical inquiry would be to examine 
its relevance to the study of educational administration. 
An implied concern about administrative leadership 
has existed as long as there has been concern for education, 
however, this concern historically has not been focused on 
administration. As a matter of fact, school administration 
is a fairly recent arrival in American education. 
At the midpoint of the nineteenth century very 
few communities employed superintendents of 
schools. • • • �aving just been created by citi­
zens vho had come to realize that the direction or 
education called for knowledge and skills not 
possessed by laymen, it Liehool administratioy was 
cautiously but resolutely establishing itself on 
the educational frontier. 2 
5 
The American Association of School Administrators 
{AASA) was organized in 1865; at that time the organization 
was known as the National Association of School Superintend­
ents. 3 
'!'his professional association of superintendents 
perhaps played the major role in initiating extensive studies 
in school administration. In 1947 the AASA planning com­
mittee recommended that studies and programs be initiated at 
once to instigate further protessionalization of the super­
intendency through improved training programs, refined 
standards for selection by boards of education, and more ex­
tensive participation in the activities of the profession. 
The recommendation was accepted by the AA.SA membership. 4 
2American Association of School Administrators, You 
and AASA GoinJ Places T�ether (Washington: American Assoc!ition o School A !nistrators, 1958), p. 5. 
3Ibid. 
4Ho111s A. Moore, Jr., Studies in School Ad.ministra­
tion {Washington: American Assoc!ationof School Adminis­
trators, 1957), PP• 1-23. 
6 
It was during this same year, 1947, at the annual AA.SA meet­
ing that plans were initiated tor an August meeting of a 
group, the majority ot whom were professors engaged in 
training educational administrators. The group was to dis­
cuss mutual problems encountered in preparation programs and 
the methods utilized in solving these problems. The first 
conference of professors ot educational administration ever 
held on a national scale was at Endicott, New York. Inter­
national Business Machine Corporation provided physical 
facilities tor this meeting. The National Conference of 
Professors of Educational Administration (NCPEA) meetings 
became an annual attair. 5 
It was in January, 1946, that an advisory committee 
on educational projects for the W. K. Kellogg Foundation 
of Battle Creek, Michigan, recommended to the Foundation 
that it enter the field of public school administration. As 
Hollis A. Moore, Jr. , suggests, it was, indeed, a recommenda­
tion with exciting consequences. 6 
In November, 1947, A.ASA made an official proposal to 
thew. K. Kellogg Foundation; the project called tor the 
5william R. Flescher and A. L. Knoblauch, A Decade of 
Development in Educational Leadership (The National.Conter=­
ot Professorsof Educational Administration, 1957), pp. ix-x, 
1-8. 
�oore, �· cit., p. 1. 
7 
appointment of a national commission to conduct a project 
tor upgrading the professional competence of the superintend­
ency of schools. A grant of $75,000 was requested for opera­
tion during the first year. Early the next year the Founda­
tion rejected the proposal but agreed to support a series ot 
exploratory conferences ot administrators, graduate school 
faculty members, and representatives of state and federal 
agencies to ascertain the feasibility of some national study 
and to make recommendations tor consideration by the Founda­
tion. 
Five regional conferences were jointly sponsored by 
AASA, the Council ot Chief State School Otticers and the 
National Conference of County and Rural Area Superintendents. 
Out of the recommendations ot these conferences and the· fore­
sight and ingenuity of the Foundation came a scurry of ac­
tivity throughout this country and Canada in a program known 
as the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration 
(CPEA). Instead ot a program tor studying the superin­
tendency there came a nation-wide study of every aspect of 
school administration. The Foundation invited proposals 
from universities from which five were initially selected 
and subsequently three additional ones to serve as regional 
headquarters for the exploration and research. A tive-year 
project was launched with an initial grant of approximately 
8 
$3,400,000. 7 Some of the projects were extended tor an 
additional four-year period. New institutions, particularly 
in the South and Southwest, were awarded grants for concen­
tration in the area of graduate program improvement. a 
Throughout the nine-year period, 1950-1959, Kellogg awarded 
grants totaling some nine million dollars. 9 In addition to 
the Kellogg grants, participating agencies and institutions 
contributed to the program. For example, Kellogg awarded 
some $1,025, 000 to the Southern States Cooperative Program 
in Educational Administration (SSCPEA), while participating 
institutions and agencies contributed what has been con­
servatively estimated as $1,200, 000. 10 
Two additional organizations, the Committee for the 
Advancement of School Administration (CASA) and the Uni­
versity Council for Educational Administration (UCEA), should 
be mentioned here. CASA was created in 1955 through Kellogg 
support as an agency of AASA . 
7rbid., p. 18. -- . 
8Hollis Moore, Jr. , "Things Are Happening All Over, n 
Phi Delta Kappan, XLI (November, 1959), 42. 
9naniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theo
?. 
(New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1959), p • •  
lOTruman M. Pierce and A. D .  Albright, A Profession 
1n Transition (The Southern St•tes Cooperative-Program in 
Educational Administration and The Associated Programs in 
Educational Administration, 1960), p. 180. 
The committee's job in essence was to observe 
the institutional projects as they completed 
their original plans and as they reached conclu­
sions about actions necessary to give lasting 
pro.fessional status to school. adminiatration. 11 
9 
The committee played a vital role in spearheading er­
torts at professionalization; among these were AASA's member­
ship requirement or two years' graduate study, and the com­
mittee drafted .for the National Council for the Accredita­
tion or Teacher Education (NCATE) standards .for accrediting 
graduate programs .for training s�hool administrators. 12 
One o.f the last grants by the W. K. Kellogg Founda-
tion in the national school administration program was in 
response to a recommendation or the CPEA Middle Atlantic 
Region tor the formation ot the University Council for Edu­
cational Administration. The Council, organized in 1957, 
is a corporation ot some torty institutions engaged in pre­
paring educational administrators, and is located at The 
Ohio State University Campus. The Council "has been organ­
ized to provide a means o.f inter-university cooperation tor 
improving the preparation or school administrators and for 
conducting a comprehensive program ot educational researeh."13 
42. 
11Moore, "Things Are Happening All Over," �· cit., p. 
12American Association ot School Administrators Year­
book Commission, Professional Administrators tor America's 
Schools, Thirty-Eighth Yearbook (Washington: American ,.. 
Association of School Administrators, 1960), pp. 277-278. 
13Gritti tbs, �· cit., p. 5. 
10. 
A decade ot accelerated programs of study and research 
has concluded with indications that there is still much to 
do and much will continue to be done. The AASA with its Com­
mittee tor the Advancement or School Administration, the 
NCPEA and the UCEA are still working to improve the pro­
fession. Some ot the earlier CPEA regions are still con­
tinuing cooperative efforts. 
It is or interest to note that early efforts tor 
intensively studying school administration came from AASA, 
the professional organization of school superintendents. It  
is a healthy sign when a group ot professional people are 
dissatisfied with the way they are operating and they initi­
ate a study for self-improvement. 
Another interesting thing to note is the wisdom dis­
played by the statt members ot thew. K. Kellogg Foundation 
in their insistence on a nation-wide study or the entire 
field of educational administration instead of just the 
superintendency. One can only speculate on the outcome it 
the initial AASA proposal tor studying the superintendency 
had been approved. It appears that such an approval ex­
cluding other levels of school administration would have 
been most unfortunate. 
One can only speculate on the total number mustered 
in this total CPEA study; in the Southern Region alone more 
than 35,000 persons--professors, administrators, students 
11 
and laymen--had some part in the program. 14 
C� THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AS 
A FOCUS OF S'l'UDY 
Once serious consideration was given to problems in 
educational administration, it was inevitable that ques­
tions ot a theoretical nature would be raised. Moore, re­
porting on the .first tive-year CPEA project reported that, 
"The natural next step from schematic approaches to research 
in school administration is ·the development ot a theory."15 
At the conclusion ot the nine-year project he reported that, 
"study o.t' administrative theory is currently in vogue, and 
the impact or such development is likely to influence re­
search in this .field to a marked degree. ttl6 
The .first seminar o.t' UCEA was jointly sponsored with 
the Midwest Administration Center at the U�iversity o.t' 
Chicago, November 11, 12, and 13, 1957, and was devoted to 
the role ot theory in educational administration.17 This 
14Pierce and Albright, �· cit., p. 180. 
1�oore, Studies in School Administration,!:?.£• cit., 
p. 29. 
1�oore, "Things Are Happening All Over," .2E.• cit., 
p. 44. 
17The proceedings ot this seminar were reported in 
Administrative Theory in Education, Andrew W. Halpin, editor 
(Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, 1958). 
12 
seminar was a sharing of ideas among professors ot educa­
tional administration and social scientists. Two years 
later, November 1959, the Midwest Administration Center con­
ducted another seminar which included in addition to pro­
fessors of education and social scientists, those practicing 
school administrators who expressed interest in examining 
theoretical concepts and in exchanging ideas. 18 UCEA has 
continued active promotion ot theoretical considerations in 
educational administration. 
The NCPEA membership in 19.54 approved Conference 
sponsorship ot a publication which would synthesize research 
findings in administration and generalize implications tor 
preparation programs tor educational administrators. The 
authors of this book found themselves wrestling with 
theoretical considerations. 19 
The staff and regional participants in the SSCPEA con­
centrated their efforts mainly on preparation programs tor 
educational administrators, and their first big consideration 
was to determine factors relating to effective or competent 
18The proceedings of this seminar were reported in 
Administrative Theory as a Guide to Action, Roald F. Camp­
bell and James M. Lipham,-editors\Chicago: Midwest Admin-. 
istration Center, 1960). 
19Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (eds. ), 
Administrative Behavior in Education; sponsored by the 
National Conference ot Professors ot Educational Adminis­
tration (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957). 
13 
administrators. Thus came formulation or what is known as 
the Competency Pattern. 20 A prime ingredient of the Com­
petency Pattern was a theory of educational administration; 
the other ingredients were identified as "job•• and "know­
how. "21 The relationships of these three elements or the 
SSCPEA Competency Pattern are outlined as follows: 
The job is central, and evaluation or competence is 
in terms of job performance. Theory is • • •  the 
base or the pattern and is considered essential 
since all performance is, consciously or uncon­
sciously, carried on in terms ot some theory. Re­
membering the assumption that 'a workable compe­
tency pattern can have but a single theory, ' we 
recognize that theory provides the guideposts and 
evaluative criteria needed to insure consistency 
and logic throughout the pattern. The job tasks 
and the necessary know-how must not contradict the 
basic theory. • • •  the job comprises the body 
of the pattern. It is composed or the things to 
be done and is supported by and reflected in the 
know-how essential to their doing. 22 
The totality of the Competency Pattern may, itself, be 
considered a general theory of administrative competence. 
20southern States Cooperative Program in Educational 
Ad.ministration, Better Teaching in School Administration 
(Nashville: Southern States Cooperative Program in Educa­
tional Administration, 1955). 
21An elaboration on the competency concept in educa­
tional administration with emphases on philosophical, psy­
chological and sociological bases is presented in Orin B. 
Graft and Calvin M. Street, Im�roving Competence in Educa­tional Administration (New Yor : Harper and Brothers, 
1956). 
22Grarr and Street, ibid. , pp. 45-46. 
In addition to the NCPEA publication, Administrative 
Behavior in Education, the Conference members have had "Ad­
ministrative Theory" as one ot several discussion topics at 
their annual meetings tor the past few years. 23 At the 1960 
Conference held at Macomb, Illinois, a general program topic 
was the presentation of papers and a discussion of "The Place 
ot Values in Theory ot Educational Administration. "24 
The members of the 1960 AASA Yearbook Commission con-
cluded that, "It is clear that those who have .taken upon 
themselves the scholarly study ot our protession agree that 
empirical administrative processes must give way to theory. 
• • • tt25 
In his appraisal ot research in educational adminis­
tration, Gri:f.tiths says that, "Without doubt, the greatest 
weakness or research in educational administration is the 
23This particular discussion group attracted more 
con.terence participants than any other or the eight groups 
at the 1960 NCPEA Conference held at Macomb, Illinois, 
August 21-27, 1960. 
24Professors Daniel E. Gri:ffiths and Lawrence 
Iannaccone presented_papers in support of the value-free 
nature or theory. Professors Orin B. Graff and John 
Ramseyer presented papers in support of the value-packed 
nature of theory. 
25American Association or School Administrators, 
Professional Administrators for America's Schools, Thirty­
eighth Yearbook, 1960 (Washington: American Association 
of School Administrators, 1960), p. 103. 
1.5 
lack of theory.1126 
The above paragraphs should be ample evidence that 
theory is of wide concern to those involved in educational 
administration. As was noted earlier, it was inevitable 
that with the growing concern in educational administration, 
there would appear the theory problem. An inquisitive child 
is not long content with manipulating an interesting toy, 
but soon be starts minutely examining its components, experi­
menting with new uses tor the toy, and determining what its 
capacities are. So it is in educational administration, or 
any other field, when inquisitive people become concerned, 
there results generalizations about the nature, the purposes 
and the possibilities of the area under study. 
D. THE PROBLEM 
The foregoing was a brief review ot accelerated inter­
est and concern tor intensive study in the field of educa­
tional administration, especially in the realm ot adminis­
trative theory . 
The purpose of this study was to otter a logical ex­
planation of the process of theory construction in educa­
tional administration so that wide differences ot opinion 
26Daniel E. Griffiths, Research in Educational Ad­
ministration, An Affpraisal and a Plan (New York: Teachers College, Columbia nivers!ty;-Bureailof Publications, 19.59), 
p. 16 . 
16 
regarding administrative theory may be reduced. These con­
troversial issues tend to hamper united efforts tor improye­
ment ot the profession. 
The existence ot such controversial issues among 
those engaged in the profession and concerned tor its im­
provement constituted the problem ot this study. To attack 
this problem adequately, five sub-problems were identified 
tor solution. These sub-problems are listed below with some 
explanation of their treatment in the study. 
Sub-problem !--to determine, through review of liter­
ature, some general understandings of the basic nature and 
constructs ot theory, the uses tor which theory may be em­
ployed in educational adminfstration and to identify the 
major controversial issues regarding the nature ot theory 
and its uses. 
This sub-problem was treated first in the study to 
provide a setting tor the logical explanation ot theory con­
struction in subsequent sections ot the study. Specifically, 
the sub-problem was treated to provide an explanation ot 
what theory is generally considered to be. Also, to provide 
a focal point tor the theory construction process, it was 
necessary to identity some basic constructs ot theory. 
Finally, it was deemed important to identity early in the 
study the major controversial issues regarding the nature ot 
and uses tor theory. The investigations relative to this 
17 
first sub-problem were for informational purposes so that the 
basic problem ot the study would be described clearly before 
efforts at its solution were initiated. 
Sub-problem 2--to examine systems of inquiry and psy­
chological research for the purpose of identifying the 
genesis of and the context of controversial issues regarding 
theory. 
Treatment of this sub-problem was to pinpoint the 
origin and context of different points of view regarding 
theory. The historical evolvement ot the method of science 
and the philosophical framework embodying opinions about the 
nature and uses of science were discussed in some detail. 
Sub-problem l--to examine analytically theory con­
structs tor the purpose of identifying their nature, their 
derivation and their usefulness tor educational administra­
tion. 
Sub-problem �--to synthesize the theory elements so 
that a logical relationship will ensue. 
Following the analysis of theory constructs, with the 
meanings attributed to these elements, it was possible to 
logically synthesize the elements into an organismic view 
of theory. For clarity, some mention was made or the synthe­
sis which may have resulted if different logic or a different 
frame of reference had been employed. 
Sub·-problem 2--to outline some axiomatic bases tor 
18 
intelligent theory construction in educational administra­
tion. 
These axioms are derived from the logic ot the study. 
Their validity rests on the soundness or the argumentation 
and the logical development of the study. On the basis ot 
findings in this study, these axioms were drawn to provide 
direction tor those who engage in theorizing in educational 
administration. 
E� SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
It is most refreshing to note the interest that is 
being given to theoretical matters in education and educa­
tional administration. It is a change from the "how-to-do-
itn analyses to a careful look at meanings and purposes to 
give directions tor improvement. In discussing the place 
of philosophy in educational research, Clyde V. Martin 
points out the following: 
It should be borne in mind that education 
comprehends the renewal of the very substance of 
civilization. Itseoncerns run tar beyond the 
methodological. Only at the greatest peril to 
civilization itself can education fail constantly 
.to reconsider its basic aims and functions. 
Quality is as important as quantity. Perhaps no­
where in the modern world does the latter re­
ceive more respect than in America, and considera­
tions of the former suffer more from neglect. 27 
27clyde v. Martin, "The Place or Philosophy in Educa­
tional Research," Phi Delta Kappan, XL (October, 1958), 40. 
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Martin quotes Robert Ulich regarding the sparsity of 
research geared to generalization: 
According to the bibliographies ot •Doctors • 
Theses under Way in Education • in the Journal � 
of Educational Research during the years 1930 to 
1936, more than 90 per cent ot the intended dis­
sertations were dedicated to techniques, to 
organizations, to experimental and descriptive 
forms of psychology, ·to testing and measurements, 
while less than 10 per cent were concerned with 
those problems which give to our whole educational 
endeavor its sense ot direction with values and 
aims in education and civilization, the thoughts 
and problems of the great leaders, the relation 
of education to the history of religion and phil­
osophy and to the development of literature, art, 
and the sciences, and the great human institu­
tions. 28 
Martin comments that his analysis of doctoral dis­
sertations under way during the academic year 1950-1951 con­
firm that only a small fraction ot the research in education 
is given over to studies geared to levels of high generali­
zation. 29 
Griffiths points out the sparsity of research in edu­
cational administration compared to that done in other 
fields. For example, in 1957 for some 594 published and un­
published researches in educational administration, there 
were 9,074 in psychology and 112, 000 in chemistry.JO 
28rbid., citing Robert Ulich, On the Reform of 
EducationaTResearch (Occasional Pampiiietlro. 2, Griauate 
School of Education, Harvard University, 1937), p. 22. 
2 9 rbid. 
JOoriftiths, Research 1n Educational Administration, 
An Appraisal and� Plan,�· cit., pp . 23-24. 
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The significance of a study on the structure ot adlllin­
istrative theory lies not in its being another piece ot re­
search in educational administration, but rather its signifi­
cance lies in the relationship of theory to all research in 
the profession. · All scientific investigation proceeds from 
theoretical frames of reference, whether stated or unstated, 
conscious or unconscious. 
Since the profession is young and research is limited, 
it is highly important that theoretical structures be 
minutely examined to determine their adequateness and re­
liability to engender research. Before structures can be 
built with any degree ot intelligence it is necessary that 
there be an understanding of the nature ot theory. This 
understanding can only come about through an examination of 
the process of theorizing, which is what this study purports 
to do. 
The justification for any study ot administrative 
theory, including this particular study, is invariably 
determined by two prob ing questions : 
1. What usefulness can be attached to theory in 
educational administration?  
2. To  what extent is there commonality of agreement 
as to the nature and usefulness of theory in 
educational administration? 
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Essentially, then, the importance of a topic as a 
focus tor study is gauged by its adequacy for performing 
certain functions; and, it there does appear to be some use­
fulness, are there clear understandings about the nature of 
the topic of study and the uses to which it may be put? 
The investigations of this study revealed that there 
is rather general agreement that theory will provide more 
comprehensive and deeper understandings ot educational ad­
ministration. However, there is a marked difference of 
opinion regarding the nature ot theory and the methods 
whereby it can be utilized to provide these greater under­
standings . Thus, it may . be concluded that differences on 
this second question would render agreements on the first 
of minimal validity, if not completely invalid. If it is 
assumed that theory is the means ot improvement and im­
provement is the goal of theory, then a clear understanding 
of one would require an understanding of the other, and, 
conversely, vagueness of one suggests vagueness of the other. 
There seems to be a polarity of opinion regarding 
theory, ranging from broad generality to narrow specificity, 
from the philosophical to a specific incident of scientific 
inquiry. Another polarity concerns who theorizes. Some 
would limit this activity to the scientist, some to the 
philosopher, while others would solve the dilemma and have 
everyone theorizing. Of course, these differences hinge 
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largely on different understandings of the origin and nature 
of the theory (i. e., the process of theorizing). If theory 
is necessary tor greater understandings in educational ad­
ministration, a thesis maintained in this study, then there 
is a great need tor some refined understandings of theory . 
F. CRITERIA FOR DEFINITION OF TERMS 
A very important aspect of this study was to identify 
with clarity pertinent terminology that has been used by 
theorists and to specify what meanings were intended in this 
study. 
The important thing in any communication is tor the 
recipient of the communique to get the intended message. 
It  is not always possible to communicate meaning even with 
the most specific instructions for interpretation because of 
the varied experiences and understandings of people. Even 
in de.ti.nitions and descriptions we fall into the fallacy of 
equating specificity with brevity and, conversely, ambiguity 
with prolixity. What, seemingly, has resulted is the demand 
for one-sentence definitions . Dwight Waldo, defining public 
administration, sums up this .fallacy as follows: 
The immediate effect of all one-sentence or one­
paragraph definitions of public administration is 
mental paralysis rather than enlightenment and 
stimulation. This is because a serious definition 
of the term--as against an epigrammatical defini­
tion, however witty--inevitably contains several 
abstract words or phrases. In short compass these 
abstract words and phrases can be explained only 
by other abstract words and phrase s ,  and in the 
proces s  the reality and importance ot 'it ' be­
come fogged and lost. 31 
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In the first section ot this chapter, an effort was 
made to clarity to some extent the interpretation or theory 
that was adhered to throughout the study. Of course, the 
explanation was inadequate; it it were adequate, further in­
vestigations in this study would have been unwarranted. 
Since terminology other than "theory" pertinent to this 
. . 
study are necessary tor an adequate definition ot "theory, "  
it was concluded that short definitions of those terms here 
would serve more to con!'use than to clarity. These perti­
nent terms were, therefore, defined in their logical rela­
tionships within the theory-building proces s. 
Essentially, the criteria tor definitions throughout 
the study were in keeping with those set up by_ Professor 
Ernest Bayles. He proposes that a definition should: 
( 1 )  indicate with clarity any line or action 
which may be involved; ( 2 )  difrerentiate sharply 
among alternatives; ( 3) avoid self-contradiction; 
( 4 )  be as precise as  feasible; and ( 5 ) in light 
or the foregoing, represent as much of consensus 
among probable users as is pos sible. 32 
31Dwight Waldo, The Study of Public Administration 
( Garden City:  Doubleday and Company, Inc. , 1955), p. 2. 
32Ernest E. Bayles, Democratic Educational Theory 
( New York: Harper and Bros. , 1960) ,  P • !48 . 
Criterion 1 , he tells us, was adopted from Charles 
Sanders Peirce, who thought that if between two ideas or 
thoughts there is no appreciable difference in terms of con­
sequent action, there is no appreciable difference between 
the ideas. 
Criterion 2 is important because of the practice of 
confining ourselves to the positive side. 
Criterion 3, he asserts: 
• • •  is also highly important . For selt­
contradictions cause one to be one's own enemy-­
probably one of the worst--and, in � eommunication, 
to foster frequent confusion or misunderstanding 
on the part of communicatee, if not ot communi­
cator.33 
Regarding criterion 4, he points out that "to speak 
with simplicity is promotive of understanding and it would 
seem that, if one should ever speak understandably, it 
would be in the definition ot terms . 34 
Criterion 5 is a very elusive one and is important 
only after the first tour have been complied with. 
These criteria are formulated on the assump­
tion that the purpose of having a term at all is 
to use it for communication among human beings. 
The fifth criterion is proposed , therefore,  so 
as to take advantage of whatever common usage or 
understanding has already been achieved, thereby 
reducing to a minimum the necessity of learning 
and using new terms and new meanings. But tull 
33Ibid . , p.  J.49. 
34Ibid.  
consensus is rarely achieved, even among our most 
commonly used words, so we hope only to work 
toward it rather than to achieve it. Moreover, 
consensus on a definition which would violate one 
or more of the first tour criteria would hardly 
prove satisfactory. 35 
G. METHOD OF THE STUDY 
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It was necessary in a subsequent chapter of this 
study to discuss modern scien ce so that a setting could be 
established tor showing the context and uses of theory. 
Howe�er, since the study proposes to employ the method of 
logic, it seemed necessary to explain in some detail the 
logical methods used. There are varied opinions about what 
constitutes logic in scientific investigation. 
An oft-quoted definition ot theory has its system of 
logic built in. Herbert Feigl' s definition is, "· • •  a set 
of' assumptions from which can be derived by purely logic­
mathematical procedures a larger set of empirical laws. "36 
Logic has long been allied to mathematics and to philoso­
phy . The alliance with mathematics has provded tor some 
logicians two purposes : ( 1 ) The rigidity of mathematics 
has provided a comfortable base of assurance, and (2) sym­
bolism has been convenient for showing relationships. 
35Ibid. , p. 148 • .. -
36Herbert Feigl, "Principles and Problems of Theory 
Construction in Psychology, " Current Trends in Ps1cholo
�
ical 
Theor� (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgii""°Press, 19 1) , p. 18 
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F. s. C. Northrop summarizes the method or initiating in­
quiry suggested by Descartes wherein deductive logic is  pro­
pounded because of the firm and solid foundations ot mathe­
matics. 37 Leibintz conceived the idea of symbolic logic 
• • • in which the elementary operations ot the 
process of rea soning would be represented by 
symbols--an alphabet of thought, so to spe ak-­
and envisaged a distant future when philosophi­
cal and theological discussions would be con­
ducted by its means and would -reach conclusions 
as  incontrovertible a s  those of mathematics. 
Perhaps this was too much to hope, but the actual 
achievements or mathematical logic have been 
amazing. Logic, when its power has been aug­
mented by the introduction ot symbolic methods, 
is capable ot leading from elementary premises of 
extreme simplicity to conclusions far beyond the 
reach of the unaided reason. 38 
Rather than just using �athematics to facilitate 
logic, Russell and Whitehead 
• • •  set out to examine, and if pos sible to 
prove, • • • that mathematics is  a part of logic: 
it is the science concerned with the logical de­
duction of consequences from the general premises  
of all reasoning so that a separate ' philosophy 
ot mathematics' simply does not exist. 39 
Even with the advent of new relativistic mathematics 
which do not provide a comfortable solid base, mathematics 
37F. s. c. Northrop, The Logfi ot the Sciences and 
the Humanities ( New York: �Macm liii Company, 1947},p. r. 
38sir Edmund Taylor Whitaker, "Mathematics and Logic," 
in What is Science, James R .  Newman, editor ( New York: _ 
Sim;-andSchuster, 1955 ) , pp. 48-49 . 
39Ibid . ,  p .  52. 
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is still relied on tor logical rigidit7. 
Dewey took a different approach to logic .  He said : 
Inquiry is the controlled or d irected transforma­
tion of an indeterminate situation into one that 
is so determinate in its constituent d istinc­
tions and relations as to  convert the elements of 
the original s ituation into a unified whola.40 
The indeterminate situation not only is open for inquiry but 
its constituents are not unified. The determinate situation 
is a closed, finished situation or "universe ot experience. " 
He tells us that "controlled" or "directed" in the defini-
. . 
tion "refers to the tact that inquiry is competent in any 
given case in the degree in which the operations involved 
in it actually do terminate in the establishment of an ob­
jectively unified existential system. nlµ. 
The indeterminate situation is "a unique doubtful­
ness which makes that s ituation to be just and only the 
situation it is. n42 
It is this unique quality that not only makes the 
particular inquir1 engage d in but ·that exercises 
control over its special procedures . Otherwise, 
one procedure in inquiry would be as likely to 
occur and to be effective as any other. Unless a 
situation is uniquely qualified in its very in­
determinateness, there is a condition of complete 
panic; response to it takes the form of blind and 
wild overt activities . • • • A variety of names 
Henry 
40John Dewey, Logic, �he Theor
n 
0£ Inquiry 
Holt and Company, 1938},pp. 16 -Il5"5. 
4].Ibid .,  p. 105. 
42Ib id. 
(New York : 
serves to characterize indeterminate situations. 
They are disturbed, ambiguous, contused, .full of 
conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. 43 
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It  can readily be seen that in this explanation, in­
quiry becomes a personal activity employing methods deter­
mined by the nature of the problem. So it is a problematic 
situation which initiates inquiry. 
Bayles has differentiated between these two approaches 
tor the presentation of subject-matter. This is the 
"psychological'' versus the " logical. " The "psychological" 
organization he defines as "the type which follows the logic 
of a growing mind. "44 
With reference to the above explanations of some 
differences regarding logical procedure, the method of this 
study more nearly complied with that outlined by Dewey. The 
sequence of logic was that or "a growing mind, " beginning 
with experiences and methodically progressing from one 
problematic situation to the next. Specifically, this study 
began with a look at the prob lem and employed the analytical 
method which, Bronows ki said,  is "to shift our gaze from the 
thing or event to its atructure. "45 Theory construction was 
explained in terms of a psychological sequence ot learning, 
43Ibid. 
44Bayles, �·  cit. , p. 200. 
45Jacob Bronowski, "Science as Foresight, "  in What 
is Science, �· cit. , p. 429. 
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i. e. ,  perception to conceptualization and progressively to 
behavior . '!'his system does not eliminate mathematical logic; 
quite the reverse is true. A logic of sequence implies 
orderly progression in space and time. The method . here em­
ployed does not utilize the comfortable, solid foundation of 
mathematics, nor does it employ symbols tor machine-like 
(opposed to insight) manipulations. 
The literature was examined; the criteria tor selecting 
literature were its availability, its relevance to the study 
and its compliance with the logical method utilized. 
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I provides a setting and suggests a course of 
action tor the entirety of the study. Specifically, some 
clarification is given to the interpretation which was placed 
on "theory" throughout the study;  a general background of 
the study of educational administration and theory of educa­
tional administration is provided; the problem and sub­
problems are set £orth; and, finally, justifications for con­
ducting such a study, the methods employed, and the outline 
of the study are given. 
Chapter II immediately attacks the problem of identi­
fying the constructs of theory, generalizing about the nature 
ot theory, and suggesting uses tor theory. The chapter con­
cludes with identification of some controversies about theory 
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in educational administration . 
Chapter III identities basic controversies about the 
nature of theory with the philosophic system from which the 
various points of view ensue. Opposing philosophies ot 
science are described; specifically, deterministic and rela­
tivistic notions of science are discussed. 
Chapter IV examines the p sychological bases ot theori­
zing. Since theorizing is a human process, research in per­
ceptual theory is necessary tor clearer understandings about 
this process . The theory controversies are reviewed in the 
light ot knowledges about perception, the process whereby 
knowledge is gained. 
Chapter V analytically treats the theory constructs 
and synthesizes them into an explanation ot intelligent be­
havior through theorizing. This involves a discussion ot 
(1) the formulation ot assumptions, (2) the process ot de­
ducing hypotheses, and ( 3 )  the nature ot hypotheses. The 
chapter also includes a discussion ot propositions and con­
cepts, the vehicles £or communicating me aning . 
The logic or the discussion of theory construction 
in terms or possible solutions to the controversial prob ­
lems is reviewed in Chapter VI. The chapter concludes with 
some suggested axioms tor theorizing in educational admin­
istration. These axioms are nothing more than a reply to 
the question, " It I am to engage in the business ot 
theory-construction in educational administration, what 
understandings must  I have ab out myse;f, about the nature 
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of theory, and about the nature of e.ducational administra­
tion?" The validity of these axioms is in direct proportion 
to the validity of the logic employed throughout the study. 
Different approaches to theory-construction would neces­
sarily result in different axiomatic bases for theorizing. 
CHAPTER II 
THE NATURE OF THEORY: ITS BASIC CONSTRUCTS AND 
ITS APPLICATION IN EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
A .  INTRODUCTION 
With the efforts for elevating educational administra­
tion as a profession came concomitant efforts t o  classiry 
educational administration as a science. It was at this 
point that the theory problem was introduced. The social 
scientists were called upon to assist in the formulation of 
a theory of educational administration. Heretofore, theori­
zing had been largely identified with the educational phil­
osopher. Those concerned with the science of administration 
apparently felt compelled to speci�y that their theory was a 
different theory from that of the philosopher; consequently, 
explanations of what their theory is have involved converse 
explanations of what their theory is not. The result has 
been the drawing of sharp dichotomies between the realm of 
that which is scientific and that which is philosophic. The 
ideas proclaimed by many of the administrative scientists 
were in keeping with the · logical positivistic point of view, 
seemingly in vogue among many philosophers of science. 
The philosophic and scientific derivations of theory 
controversies are discussed in Chapter III. The topic was 
introduced here to note the origin of theory controversies 
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outlined in this chapter, and to give some orientation to 
discussions regarding the general nature ot theory and its 
basic constructs. 
It would not be pos sible to sugge st a general nature 
of theory which would be universally accepted, nor was this 
feat attempted. However, some general discussion was deemed 
nece ssary so that the identification of basic constructs of 
theory could be contextually re lated. 
Discussions of theory by se lected authors were re­
viewed and abridged, and general conclusions were drawn 
regarding the nature of theory. 
B. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THEORY 
To provide a frame or reference tor this discussion, 
attention is called to the first postulate in Chapter I,  
"Theory cannot be disassociated from the human proce s s  or 
theorizing. " Thus, an explanation or the nature ot theory 
is foremost an explanation or a human proce s s. Postulate 
number tour, " Theorizing is on a continuum ot space, time 
and relevance , " implies that everyone theorize s to some ex­
tent. This implication is unapologetically acknowledged. 
Therefore, the human process or theorizing about which we 
are concerned is a process  not re stricted to any particular 
group or people nor to any particular topic to which 
theorizing is directed. Unless all of one ' s  experiences 
throughout life are to be trial and error, a complete holo­
caust or happenstance from one moment to the next, then it 
must be concluded that the individual is able to provide 
some organization and direction tor his experiences. The 
normal purposive drives ot seeking affection, tood, sur­
vival, sex, etc., are inadequate to provide intelligent 
direction throughout lite. It is the process ot purposive 
organization and direction that is attributed to theory. 
"Everyone who makes choices and judgments implies a theory 
in the sense that there are reasons tor his actions."l 
The question very properly arises regarding the con­
cern tor theory in educational administration it theorizing 
is a process engaged in by the man on the street as well as 
the philosopher, the scientist, the teacher, and the adminis­
trator. The point or concern is one ot quality ot theori­
zing which is elaborated further in Chapter v. Obviously, 
there are those who manage the organization and direction of 
their daily lives more ertectively and more intelligently 
than others. However, to deny those less effective and less 
intelligent individuals any degree or theorizing is essen­
tially pronouncing them non-existent , since survival is 
lArthur P. Coladarci and Jacob W. Getzels, The Use 
of Theory in Educational Adll.iniatration, EducationuAam!n­
I"itration Monograph No. 5 (Stanl'ord: Stanford University, 
School ot Education, 1955), p. 5. 
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dependent on a degree of expectation of the consequent. 
This argument rules out a frequently advanced one that there 
are the theorizers and there are the practitioners. It 
appears that the epitomy of a training program for educa­
tional administration would be to upgrade the quality of 
theorizing by the practitioner. 
When an administrator ' s  experiences have led 
him to believe that a certain kind of act will 
result in certain other events or acts, he is 
using theory. If the experiences of others have 
been roughly similar, his theory will not be 
unique, even though he has never formulated it 
in so many words or has never heard it stated by 
others. Those who learn from their experience 
in ways which mean revising their judgments and 
decisions (hypotheses) are modifying their 
theories in a never-ending process of self­
correction. Such people are theorizing--it may 
be poor theorizing, but it is theorizing none­
the-less. 2 
The problem tor those concerned with preparing educa­
tional administrators becomes one of improving the quality 
of theorizing by the practitioner. It would appear that a 
false trichotomy of function is promoted in the thesis sug­
gested by Professor Roald F. Campbell that the scientist is 
a producer of knowle dge ; the developer (ordinarily the pro­
fessor of educational administration) is one who must se­
lect knowledge for particular ends ; and the practitioner is 
the user of knowledge in an actual situation; and, further­
more, the practitioner who tries too hard to play another 
2Ibid. 
role "may find that spe culation or confusion dulls the edge 
of his chief instrument--de cision making. "3 It is readily 
acknowledged that each of these three categories ot indi­
viduals may theorize with varying levels of understanding, 
however, the scale is not necessarily a descending one from 
the scientist to the practitioner. 
C. THE SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION 
The topic of science needs some clarification here 
since most of the discussions of theories reviewed in sub ­
sequent paragraphs are referred to as scientific theory. 
Dewey suggests the proper relationship and differentiation 
between science as a method and science as a body of knowl­
edge: 
• • • A distinction needs to be made between 
science as attitude and method and science as a 
body of sub ject matter. I do not mean that the 
two can be separated, for a method is a way of 
dealing with sub ject matter and science as a 
body of knowledge is a product of a method. Each 
exists only in connection with the other. An 
attitude becomes p sychopathic when it is not di­
rected to objects beyond itself. What is meant 
is, first, that attitude and method come before 
the material which is found in books, journals, 
and the proceedings of scientific organizations; 
and, second, that the attitude is manifested 
3Roald F. Campbell, W. W. Charters, Jr. , and William 
L. Cragg, "Improving Administrative Theory and Practice: 
Three Essential Roles" ( Introduction by Roald F. Campbell ) 
in Roald F. Campbell and James M. Lipham, editors, Adminis­
trative Theory as a Guide to Action (Chicago: Midwest Admin­
istration Center, University of Chicago, 1960 ) ,  pp. 171-173 . 
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primarily toward the objects and events ot the 
ordinary world and only secondarily toward that 
which is already scientific subject matter.4 
Dewey continues with a discussion of the scientific 
attitude which he conceives as a quality that is manifested 
in any walk ot lite : 
On its negative side, it is freedom from con­
trol by routine, prejudice, dogma, unexamined 
tradition, sheer self-interest. Positively, it 
is the will to inquire, to examine, to discrimi­
nate, to draw conclusions only on the basis ot 
evidence. It is the intention to reach beliefs, 
and to test those that are entertained, on the 
basis ot observed tact, recognizing also that 
tacts are without meaning save as they point to 
ideas. It is, in turn, the experimental attitude 
which recognizes that while ideas are necessary to 
deal with facts, yet they are working hypotheses 
to be tested by the consequences they produce. 5 
In this framework ot science, as a method and an atti­
tude for intelligent living, the process of theorizing pro­
moted in this study is contextually oriented. The point 
that needs to be stressed is that educational administration 
is not natively a science. It is, rather, a series ot 
processes tor the attainment of certain purposes. The im­
portant thing is that these processes be subjected to 
scientific scrutiny and that those individuals engaged in 
4John Dewey, "Unity ot Science as a Social Problem , "  
International Encyclopedia of Unified Sciences, Otto Neurath, 
Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris, editors (Volume 1, Nos. l-
5. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955 ) ,  p. 29. 
5rbid. , p. 31. 
the processes operate in a scientific manner . This remove s 
science from a cold, detached world of subject matter to a 
personal attitude and method purposefully directed toward 
certain ends. 
D.  REVIEW, INTERPRETATION AND ELABORATION OF 
DISCUSSIONS ON THEORY BY SELECTED AUTHORS 
Dis cussions � Selected Psychologists and Elaborations on 
Their Points of View --- ---- -- -
For discussions regarding the nature of the ory, se­
lected writers in psychology are reviewed first. Many 
s ocial and behavior scientists, other than psychologists, 
have made contributions to the development of theories of 
social interaction and behavior. However, the psychologists 
seemingly have been more prone to investigate the nature and 
structure of theory . I t  is for this reason that the section 
here is limite d to psychologists. 
Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey describe _theory 
as "a set of conventions created by the theorist. "6 'fhis 
means that theories are not predetermined by nature or any 
other determinant source. Data gathered through observation 
and investigation may be incorporated into any ot countless 
theoretical schemes. 
6calvin s .  Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of 
Personality ( New York: John Wiley and Sons , Inc . ,  1957 ) ,  p. 
10 . 
The theorist in choo sing one particular option 
to repre sent the events in which he is interested 
is exercising a tree creative choice that is differ­
ent from the artists only in the kinds of evidence 
upon which it focuses and the grounds upon which 
its fruitfulness will be judged .  We are emphasizing 
here the creative and yet arbitrary manner in which 
theories are constructed and this leads naturally 
to the observation that we can specify how a theory 
should be evaluated or appraised but we cannot 
specify how a theory should be constructed . The re 
is no formula £or fruitful theory construction any 
more than there is  a formula tor making enduring 
literary contributions . 7 
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Theory consists ot two propertie s, a cluster of rele­
vant, systematically related assumptions, and a set ot em­
pirical definitions . The relevance ot the assumptions is 
determined by their bearing on the empirical events which 
they repre sent . Also, to permit the deduction ot empirical 
consequences trom the assumptions, it is necessary that 
there be a systematic relationship between the assumptions 
and their imbedded concepts as we ll as a clear relationship 
ot one assumption to another within a set ot as sumptions .  
The interaction 0£ concepts within a theory with em­
pirical data is accomplished by empirical definitions, fre­
quently called operational definitions. "Thus , by means of 
these definitions the theory at certain prescribed places 
comes into contact with reality or observational data . "8 
7Ibid. , p .  11. 
8Ibid. ,  P • 12 . 
Hall and Lindzey have delineated three functions for 
a theory. It should lead to the collection or observation 
ot heretofore unobserved relevant empirical relations; it 
should permit the incorporation ot known empirical findings 
within a framework which is logically consistent and reason­
ably simple; and it should prevent the observer from being 
overwhelmed by the complexity ot natural or concrete events 
by delineating relationship s about which he should be aware. 9 
In promoting a scientific theory of learning, Guthrie 
has the following to say : 
Such a theory is essential to progress tor 
several reasons. One of these is that unless 
the beads of fact can be strung in order and 
pattern on the threads ot a theory, there is a 
strict limitation upon imparting psychological 
knowledge to others. Theories are mnemonic de­
vices that make science teachable . And theories 
are the basis or working concepts. They enable 
men to confront new tacts and deal with them 
successfully. Furthermore, theories are re­
quired to direct the search for relevant facts. 
It is theories that endure, not facts • • • • 
It is theory rather than fact that leads to new 
controls over nature and e vents . From theory 
inferences can be made and new applications de­
vised. 10 
Since Guthrie places so much reliance on facts in 
theory building, it is interesting to note his discus sion 
of facts. "A tact, " he says, "has a peculiar and intricate 
9Ibid. , pp. 13-15. 
10Edwin R. Guthrie, "Psychological Facts and Psycho­
logical Theory," Psychological Bulletin, XLIII ( January, 
1946), 3-4. 
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structure. It belong� _ to two ·worlds, the world of objects 
and events, and the world ot human discourse. "11 Facts only 
become facts when they are described b y  people. "A tact is 
an event so described that any observer will agree to the 
description. "12 He hastens on to say that no tacts will 
meet this requirement. "There are, therefore, no absolute 
facts, and a universe without men and human discourse would 
be a universe without tacts. n l3 
Shoben tells us that 
A theory is a generalized statement ot something 
that we know. It is usetul because it allows us 
to understand a multitude of concrete cases 
through the application of a general principle. 14 
He goes on to say that these generalized statements are in­
escapable since understanding our world consists in general­
izing experiences in particular times and situations to 
events in other times and situations. Along with this dis­
cussion is a word of caution: 
• • •  It might be weli to belabor the obvious 
in pointing out that theories are man made. Con­
sequently, they are subject to the limitations, 
distortions, and errors that creep into virtually 
all human products. 15 
11�. ,  P • 1. 13Ibid. 
14Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr. , " Psychological Theory 
Construction and the Psychologist, " The Structure of Scien­
tific Thought, Edward H. Madden, editor (�oston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1960 ) ,  P • 153. 
15Ibid. 
Hu1116 points out that the beginnings of science 
evolve from everyday activities, and from these activities 
comes a body of observations and simultaneously a para�lel 
body of ideas or interpretations of these observations . 
The orderly arrangement of the observations con­
stitutes the empirical component of science, and 
the logical systematization ot the ideas concerning 
these observations constitutes the theoretical com­
ponent. 17 
Systematic natural-science theory properly con­
sists of three distinguishable portions: 1 ) a set 
of definitions of the critical (indispensable) 
terms employed in the system; 2 )  a set of postu­
lates concerning presumptive relationships among 
the natural phenomena represented by the terms; 
and 3) a hierarchy of interlocking theorems ul­
timately derived trom the postulates by a rigorous 
logical process . 18 
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Marxl9 makes the point that empirical me asurement in 
science, is not always possible, consequently a large number 
of theories or abstract explanatory principles have been de­
veloped.  He sets forth three basic assumptions in support 
of arguments relating to theory construction. 
His first assumption is: 
• • •  The ultimate aim of all natural science 
is explanation and understanding and not simply 
l6c 1ark L. Hull, "The Hypothetic_o-Deductive Method, " 
Psychological Theory, Melvin H .  Marx, editor ( New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1951 ) ,  PP • 218-233. 
� 
18 17Ibid . ,  p .  218 . Ibid. ,  p .  219 . 
19Melvin H.  Marx, nThe General Nature or Theory Con­
struction, " Pszcholofical Theory, Melvin H. Marx, editor New York : The Macml Ian Company, 1951 ) ,  pp. �-19. 
prediction and control in a practical sense, as is 
often assumed. • • • Theory, or general explana­
tion, is the ultimate o? jective of scienee. 20 
4.3 
His second as sumption is: " In the development of any 
scientific theory it is impos sible to avoid direct dependence 
upon empirical opera.tions. 0 21 Because ot the inevitability 
of some kind of bias in all empirical measurements, the em-
pirical and the theoretical cannot be completely separated; 
however, a plea is made tor delimiting as much as possible 
the theoretical components.  
The third assumption stresses the necessity for verbal 
communication of all scientific investigation. With the 
underlying assumptions that the ultimate aim of s cience is 
understanding, that theories are dependent on empirical 
operations, and that all scientific inve�tigation mus t  be 
verbally communicated, four general characteristics of 
theories are introduced: 
1. All theories aim at explanation, which means 
the establishment of �unotional relationships be­
tween variables • • • • 
2. A theory is both a tool and an objective. 
Which of these functions is  emphasized largely de­
pends upon the degree or confidence--or social 
acceptability, and thus 1 tactualness • --that it 
has achieved • • • •  
.3 .  Theories are always relative to the bias 
not only of the theorist, but also ot the various 
observers upon whose empirical reports he has 
depended. • • • 
20Ibid. , p. 5.  21Ibid. 
4. It .follows that alternative .theoretical 
approaches can be directly compared, scientific­
ally, only it they make dif.ferent predictions 
within the same observational .framework • • • • 22 
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To get a proper understanding of what Marx intended 
by the last two characteristics it is necessary to look at 
his elaboration ot the points. First ot all the point re­
garding the inevitability of personal bias in a theory 
(characteristic number three, above } was made to clarify the 
position that theories are not absolutely "true" or truly 
representative of "reality . "  "All problems of ultimate 
' reality' are entirely extra-scientific questions, or 
' metaphysical ' ones, as the logical positivists would say. "23 
Characteristic number tour was explained in prac­
.tically the same manner as was number three, above: 
Scienti.fically, their {theorie.!7 value is a 
matter ot empirical test_ rather than philosophi­
cal or logical test, or even practical applica­
tion. The various a priori biases which in actual 
practice account tor much ot the polemic and in­
vective generated in psychological controversies 
ought to be recognized more clearly and explicitly 
as just such, and not disguised as the •Eparent 
functions o.r purely scientitic analyses. 24 
Special note should be given to these assumptions ot 
science and characteristics or scientific theories. The 
point o.f view promoted by Marx is representative ot elabora­
tions which provide the major controversies among theorists. 
22Ibid. , pp . 6-7 . 23Ibid. , P • 7 . 24Ibid. 
These controversies are noted and elaborated in a subsequent 
section of this chapter. 
Marx suggests that theory construction depends upon 
three major elements ( types of verbal statements or proposi­
tions ) :  ( 1 ) empirical propositions--statements ot "tact" ot 
what has been observed. ( 2 )  hypothetical propositions-­
statements ot supposition, or conjecture. ot what is pre­
dicted in observation, and ( 3 ) theoretical propositions-­
generalized statements concerning functional relations among 
variables. 25 
It should be noted that the discussions on theory re­
viewed above are discussions by psychologists, comparatively 
late-comers to the realm of science. At this point some elab­
oration is in order regarding the nature of theory promoted 
by the authors noted in the preceding paragraphs. 
Hall and Lindzey26 interpret theory as a conventional 
structure of the theorist . Theory has two basic constructs, 
a set of assumptions and empirieally defined concepts. The 
punoses tor theory are to lead to a systematic expansion of 
knowledge, to consistently organize known knowledge. and to 
focus the researcher ' s  attention only on that which is per­
tinent to the theory. 
25Ibid. 
26Hall and Lindzey, �·  cit. , pp. 10-15. 
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Guthrie27 thinks of theory as a pattern and orderly 
arrangement of the bead• of facts. Facts, he suggests, be­
long to the dual worlds of ob jects and events and of human 
dis course. Theories are useful to (1 ) provide the basis ot 
working concepts, (2 ) enable men to confront and deal with 
new facts, ( 3) direct the search ror relevant facts, ( 4) 
lead to new controls over nature and events, and ( 5 ) provide 
a framework for making inferences and devising new applica­
tions. 
Shoben28 defines theory as a generalized statement 
ot something we know. Its usefulness is to provide under­
standing of many concrete eases through applying a general 
principle. 
Hu1129 contends that the theoretical component of 
science is the logical systematization of ideas or interpre­
tations of empirical ob servations. Its elements are ( 1 ) a 
set of definitions of critical terms employed, ( 2 )  a set of 
postulates concerning relationships among the phenomena to 
which the terms relate, and { 3 )  a hierarchy of interlocking 
theorems logically derived b y  the postulates. 
27outhrie, �·  cit. , pp. 1-20. 
28shoben, �· cit. , pp. 152-157. 
29Hull, �· cit. , pp. 218-233. 
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Finally, Marx30 equates theory with general under-
standing which he says is the ultimate aim of science. Ex­
planation means functional relationships between variables. 
A theory may be an objective as well as a tool if there is 
a high degree of confidence. Marx draws a line of demarca­
tion between that which is scientific and that which is 
metaphysical; theories must be empirically tested. 
It is interesting to note that Marx makes the point 
that theories are human constructs and have a degree of bias 
incorporated into them; yet, he insists that there is the 
metaphysical on one hand and the scientific on the other. 
By the standards that Marx has set up, i. e. , empirical test, 
human biases (values } lie in the realm of metaphysics. One 
is made to wonder if he has not fallen into his own trap. 
To proclaim that there is a realm outside the inquiry of 
science, yet to incorporate this realm into scientific 
theory is illogical. Many authors are -not as frank as Marx; 
they would contend that human values are not incorporated 
into this human endeavor ( theorizing } ,  thus naively assuming 
that they have ridded themselves of this perplexing problem. 
Marx identifies the three major elements of theory 
construction as empirical propositions, hypothetical propo­
sitions, and theoretical propositions. 
30 4 M arx, �· cit. , pp. -19. 
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It is quite obvious that no comprehensive agreement 
exists among these authors; yet, there are some common ele ­
ments in their works. 
1.  They would agree that theory is an integral part 
of scientific endeavor . Further, comprehensive agreement 
with the explanation drawn £rom Dewey regarding science as 
an attitude and method is unlikely. 31 
2 . They would agree that theory is a generalization 
about factual information. There are varying degrees of 
interpretation of the "hardness" of the facts. These inter­
pretation� range from Guthrie ' s  "human agreement" criterion 
through Shoben • s  assertion of that which we "know" (with 
.human limitations ) to Marx's demand for ultimate empirical 
test. 
3. They would agree that theories are constructs of 
the scientist . Here the agreement seems to end. 
Thus, among the authors reviewed the extent of general 
agreement is severely limited. There is disagreement about 
the purpose of theory . Marx would restrict it to explana­
tion, which limits its userulness ror mankind in his en­
deavors to attain goals. Shoben also emphasizes the pur­
pose of theory as understanding; however, his thesis that 
this understanding is transferable from a given time and 
31see pp . 36-38 for Dewey's discussion of science as 
an attitude and method. 
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situation to another time and situation gives theory a re­
stricted predictive role. Guthrie suggests that theory is 
functional tor communication to others, to provide as sist­
ance tor collecting and dealing with new tacts, to lead to 
controls over nature and events, and tor making inferences. 
Here, theory haa not only explanatory functions, but predic­
tive functions tor control ot consequential factors. Hull 
doe s not elaborate on the purposes ot scientific theory, 
however, he suggests that observations give rise to ideas 
(theoretical components ot science) and these ideas give 
rise to other observations. Hall and Lindzey see the de­
velopment of new knowledge as the aim of first importance. 
There is a similar lack of unanimity of opinion ex­
pre s sed on the constructs ot theory. Hall and Lindzey name 
two constructs of theory, a set of assumptions and em­
pirically defined concepts. Perhaps Guthrie would suggest 
that the constructs are concepts, but there is no further 
elaboration . Hull is very specific in his listing of con­
structs; these are definitions, postulates and theorems. 
Marx's three type s of propositions are empirica1, hypotheti­
cal, and theoretical. 
The Philosopher and Scientist 
Without elaborating further at this point on the agree­
ments and lack of agreements on the nature of theory by these 
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psychologists, a similar treatment of writings by philoso­
phers of science is presented in the succeeding paragraphs.  
Perhaps all great scientists are also great philosophers of 
science: Einstein, Conant, Bridgman, Eddington, Russell, 
Whitehead, and Bronowski, to name only a few.  It is true 
that all philosophers traditionally have not emphasized nor 
relied on the method ot science. It is most unfortunate 
that so many scientists have pegged all philosophers into 
this lot. William Jam.es • analogy of the tender-minded and the 
strong-minded has, alas, been used to describe all philoso­
phers and all scientists respectively. There is reason to be­
lieve that many of the scientists who would categorize them­
selves with the strong-minded empiricists would more properly 
fall with idealist-oriented philosophers. Those scientists 
who maintain that the realm of human values and purposes are 
alright but should not be confused with that which is scien­
tific is an admission that these areas are outside the bounds 
of scientific inquiry. The insistence by many scientists 
that there is no conflict between the fundamental principles 
of theology as well as other manifestations of idealistic 
philosophy and the principles ot science is also an admission 
that there is a realm beyond inquiry. Could these people be 
the strong minded? On the contrary, the strong minded would 
seem to be more appropriately the person who knows what his 
values are and respects the values of others. He is equally 
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willing to examine his own values, giving serious considera­
tion to alternatives, as he is to insist that others do like­
wise. Only in this scientific atmosphere can two or more 
people work together for the attainment of common purposes .  
To do otherwise is to cre ate a constant state of frustration 
trying to out guess one's "partners'" intentions. Jacob 
Bronowski properly poses the question, "Has science abandoned 
its own responsibility, because it has lost its moral judg­
ment? "32 One can come to no other conclusion regarding the 
scientists who naively assume for themselves the role of the 
man in the white coat who just manufactures a product, and 
places moral responsibilities for its use on the consumer. 
This thesis is elaborated more fully in Chapter III of this 
study, but was introduced here to properly define the philos­
opher and the scientist . 
Discussions � Selected Philosophers of Science and Elabora­
tions on Their Points of View 
F. ' s . c . · Northrop33 has an excellent discussion of 
theory, the intermediate stages of scientific inquiry. He 
reviews the contentions ot Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, 
32Jacob Bronowski, "A Moral for an Age of Plenty, " 
Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIII ( November 12, 1960 ) ,  26. 
33F. s. c . Northrop, Logic of the Science s and the 
Humanities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947}o -
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Morris Cohen and John Dewey; then he expresses  his own point 
of view. 
Bacon, he says, contends that the first thing to do 
when one initiates any inquiry is to put aside all pre­
conceived ideas or "idols" and proceed purely inductively. 
Even formal logic is rejected since it tends to stabilize 
old errors. 34 
Descartes • method is one or pure rational deduction 
depending solely on mathematics. To initiate inquiry , one 
intellectually doubts everything possible and deduces from 
the minimum that is lett. 35 
Cohen respects both the induction and deduction 
methods but he urges that hypotheses be formulated immedi­
ately to direct inquiry. 36 
According to Dewey, antecedent to any inquiry is an 
indeterminate situation--a problem. This indeterminate 
situation becomes problematic in the process of becoming 
determinate. For Dewey, inquiry does not begin with the 
collection of facts; it does not begin by rational deduc­
tion; nor does it begin by immediate formulation of an hy­
pothesis. Inquiry begins with a problematic situation. 37 
34Ibid . , p. 6. 
36Ibid. , p. 11 
35Ib1d. , P • 9 . 
37Ibid. , pp . 12-13. 
Northrop insists  that Dewey is  correct about this 
first  step in inquiry: 
Inquiry starts only when something is  unsatis­
factory, when traditional beliefs are inadequate 
or in question, when the facts neces sary to resolve 
one s uncertainties are not known, when the likely 
relevant hypotheses are not even imagined. What 
one has at the beginning ot inquiry is merely the 
problem. 38 
Some discussion is in order here regarding a point 
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on which Northrop does not elaborate. This  point is the 
matter of human purpose39 which seems to logically tit into 
a discussion or the initiation or inquiry. Plea se remember 
the postulate that theory cannot be. disassocia ted from 
theorizing . In like manner, neither can inquiry be dis­
as sociated from inquiring, nor investigation from investi­
gating. It is  important to remember that the se are human 
proces ses, and to theorize, to inquire, or to investigate 
are progres sive human processes . What happens when an indi­
vidual has a problem--is  suddenly faced with a problematic 
situation? Without elaborating here on the proces se s  in­
volved ( i.e . ;  reflection to inductive facts  or immediate 
deduction), very soon a solution is  required. The solution 
may be to minimize or to ignore the problem, which is 
38Ibid . ,  P • 17 • 
39Throughout this s tudy, "purpose, " "goal" and "ob ­
jective" were used synonymously • . The use of either <;>f - the 
three terms was determined by the customs of general usage. 
nonethele s s  a solution. This negative solution probably 
means an altered purpose, or it could mean that the problem 
was not a valid one . A positive solution to a problem would 
be to alter the method 0£ purpose attainment. In the posi­
tive approach theoriz ing is more force:fully utilized, al­
though some theorizing is used in a negative solution; in­
deed, in some instance s, all positive approaches may have 
been exhausted. So, our individual is confronted with a 
problem,  and a solution--some solution--is inevitable. A 
pertinent question is, "How did it happen that he got him­
se lf mixed· up with this perplexing problem? " The logical 
, _  
reply is that he was progre ssing through time and space, not 
aimle ssly, else the problem would not have occurred ;  but, 
rather, he was progre s sing through time and space purpose ­
tully--toward de termine d obje ctive s. With some degree of 
intelligence a method for approaching this objective had 
been worked out. Had there been no predetermined method of 
approach, there could be no objective. Under the se circum­
stances, progression through time and space would be by 
sheer chance; an ob je ctive would be what "Just happened" not 
- -
what was aought after. Now, with the ob jective (purpose ) 
be ing pursued within the contines or a pathway me thodologi­
cally charted with a certain degree of intelligence, here 
looms before the individual a problem . The problem is an 
indeterminate situation simply be cause it hovers in this 
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progressive movement in time and space between the particular 
point where the individual is at the moment and the point 
where he is going--his objective , or his determinate situa­
tion. A word ot caution is interjected here . Isolated pur­
poses are meaningrul only as sub jects tor investigation. 
Throughout lite there are an infinite number of purposes,  
a hierarchy ot subpurposes for attaining greater purposes. 
It should be noted that the methodological procedure 
tor attaining purposes, that is, a reduction of the threshold 
of chance, is the role attributed to theory in this study. 
However ,  that is not the major point intended in this im­
mediate discussion. The ma jor point ot emphasis is: (1 ) 
It all scientific inquiry begins with a problem; ( 2 )  and 
since a problem is an obstruction in the path of a purpose ; 
( 3) then, all scientific inquiry is purposerully oriented. 
This antecedent condition and the consequent conclu­
sion are vigorously supported and promoted in this study. 
Northrop agrees with Dewey regarding the initial 
step in inquiry, but he believes that Dewey hastens on too 
early toward formulating hypotheses. Northrop would place 
great emphasis on analyzing the problem. The method ot 
solution would vary with the nature of the prob lem. Analy-
sis ot a problem entails reverting to the source ot the 
problem as well as examining determinate elements or 
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it. 4° The source of the problem, any problem, is the set or 
assumptions underlying the particular goal being sought. 
Galilei and his contemporaries noted by observing the 
motion ot pro jectiles such as shells shot from a cannon that 
the pro jectiles did not act the w�y they should if Aris­
totelian physics were correct. In Aristotelian physics it 
was held that force is that which produces velocity. In the 
case of the cannon shots it was evident that the velocity 
continued after the force ceased. 
The solution to this problem of determining what was 
wrong with the Aristotelian theory of the motion of a pro jec­
tile was not obtained by gathering empirical data ( induc­
tion). Deduction from a minimum of data after vigorous 
doubting would not be profitable. Nor would immediate form­
ulation of hypotheses suffice. Galilei analyzed his problem. 
"This was accomplished by stating clearly what the problem 
was and then noting the traditional assumptions which gener­
ated it. n4l This analysis ot the problem focused Galilei • s  
attention on the theory of force, not on the motion or pro­
jectiles. The analysis led to gathering data from a simple 
observable phenomenon ( dropping a ball from his hand down an 
inclined plank to the floor). From these observed data, 
40Northrop, � cit. , pp. 19-34. 
41Ibid. , P • 23 . 
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three hypotheses were formulated. From each hypothesis de­
ductions were made to determine what might follow if the 
hypothesis were true. The deduced consequence could then be 
put to empirical test. Thus, came a new definition of force 
which is the foundation of modern mechanies.42 
Northrop' s discussion of the experimentation of 
Galilei serves to point up a very vital ingredient ot theory, 
the assumption. The idea is erroneous that scientific in­
quiry begins by empirically observing minute particles, then 
after making ample observations, generalizations of me aning 
are formulated. Rather, prior to any empirical investiga­
tion there are certain assumptions, many ot which can never 
be verified by empirical induction. Thia point is elaborated 
more fully in Chapter V. 
After the initial analytical stage ot inquiry, North­
rop introduces the second stage, that of induetion. 43 This 
process involves observation, description and classifica­
tion. Here it is important to take special note that for 
Northrop, induction is not de aling with pure empirical fac t. 
Following the immediately apprehendable facts, which are 
non-functional, come concepts and described fact. 
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that if one 
wants pure tact, apart from all theory,  then one 
�2Ibid., PP • 22-27. 
�3Ibid. , PP• 35-58. 
must keep completely silent, never reporting, either 
verbally or in writing, one's observations to one's 
colleagues. For the moment � one reports or describes 
what one has observed, one has described tact rather 
than merely observed, or immediately apprehended, 
tact. In short, one has observed tact brought under 
concepts and propositionized. And to have concepts 
and propositions is to have theory.44 
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The third stage ot inquiry tor Nothrop is that ot de­
ducing hypotheses, which is injected into the system ot in­
quiry when the assumptions are by postulation, i. e., unob­
servable data. The method ot test is from logically de­
duced hypotheses. 
The methods are well known. They involve the 
construction ot a deductively formulated system. 
The basic assumptions or postulates ot this sys­
tem designate unambiguously what is proposed to 
exist. To this proposal or hypothesis, formal 
logic is then applied to deduce theorems or con­
sequences . • • • The experiment designated by 
the theorem or theorems ot the theory is then 
performed. 45 
It should be noted that logical deduction is required 
tor theoretical systems whose assumptions consist ot con­
cepts by postulation ( unobservable data ) .  If the science 
were not advanced sufficiently beyond intuition (immediately 
observable data } ,  then the induction stage would conclude 
the inquiry. It would be unnecessary to derive theorems 
from immediately observable data because the data itself 
constitutes the test. This is a very elementary kind ot 
44Ibid. , p. 36 .  
45Ibid. , pp. 60-61. 
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scientific inquiry. Status studies in education are an ex­
ample of this kind of inquiry. Such studies are signifi­
cant when they are used to predict consequences in a more 
advanced type ot inquiry. However, even immediately ob ­
servable tact, when it is communicated becomes interpreted 
fact, not pure tact. The scientist needs to be aware of 
this. 
From an examination ot Northrop ' s  three introductory 
stages ot inquiry the elements ot assumptions ( postulates ) 
and hypotheses ( theorems ) can be pulled out. These two ele-
� . 
ments are associated by logical deduction--hypotheses from 
the assumptions, and they are themselves composed of con­
cepts. 
The propositions ot any empirical scientific 
theory tall into two groups, · termed ' postulates • 
and • theorems. ' The propositions termed postu- �  
late s are related . to those termed theorems by 
the formal logical relation of formal implica­
tion. Given the postulates, the theorems can 
be derived by
6
nothing but the rules ot formal 
logic. • • . Q.  
Northrop continues with this discussion and explains 
the roles ot each ot these two elements: 
The postulates ot a deductively formulated 
theory are those propositions which are assumed 
in the theory in question as logically un­
provable and which are sufficient to enable one 
to prove, i . e . ,  to logically deduce the theorems. 
The theorems ot a deductively formulated theory 
are all the empirical propositions in the theory 
46Ibid. ,  P • l40 . 
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other than the postulates. They have the additional 
essential property of being provable in terms of the 
postulates. Thus, if one assumes the postulates, 
formal logic requires one to accept the theorems. 
This is quite independent of the empirical, as 
opposed to the formal logical question or the truth 
or falsity of the postulates . 
A postulate or a theorem, i. e. , any proposition 
in any empirical scientiric theory, is a collection 
of concepts .47 
With regard to the purposes of theory, Northrop is 
very specific in stating that its purposes are predictive. 
It is often said that the criterion of a scien­
tific theory is its predictive power. Predictive 
power depends upon establishing connections between 
the present and the future. The more these connec­
tions between the present and . the future can be shown 
to be necessary, the greater and the more unequivo­
cal the predictive power.48 
The above is a very pertinent statement by Northrop . 
Prediction, he points out, is the relationship between the 
present and the future. Predictive power increases ac­
cordingly as this relationship can be shown to be necessary. 
It will be noted that this point of view is sub­
stantially difrerent from that promoted by the positivists 
that science only deals with what is and avoids what ought 
to be. To establish relationships between the present (is ) 
and the future (ought ) ,  the future must already be assumed 
to soma extent. 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid. , p .  115. 
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Northrop points out that a science which restricts 
itselt to directly observable entities and relations loses 
its predictive power. It tends to be merely descriptive and 
accomplishes little more so far as prediction is concerned 
than to express hope that the sensed relations between the 
entities of the particular subject matter today will recur 
tomorrow. 49 
To suppose that science deals only with what is and 
yet has the capacity to predict is indeed, as Northrop 
points out, a very weak supposition that there will be a 
recurrence tomorrow of the relationship established today. 
This hardly does justice to the scientific endeavors that 
have resulted massive technological achievements l It per­
haps could be argued that the predictive powers ot science 
are unfocused. Indeed, such has been argued; however, it 
is outside the bounds ot any logical understanding to sup­
pose that a scientist repairs to the laboratory, starts ex­
perimenting, and opens the frontiers ot knowledge! He does 
this no more than the target shooter closes his eyes, fires 
blindly and then searches to find what he hit. He fires at 
a target; so does the scientist. Accidental creations ot 
the scientist are rare, and even then, these creations are 
intermediate to activities directed toward other purposes. 
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Should the research terminate with these "accidental" cre­
ations, a change ot purpose is indicated. The scientist is 
shooting at a target; his activities are purposeful. The 
predictive power ot his activities are determined by the re­
lationship ot his "ises" and his "oughts. " It should also 
- . 
be remembered that the "is" state is so interpreted because 
ot past experiences and has within itself no validity except 
through interpretation. 
Northrop ' s discussion o� theory has been elaborated 
in great detail . This elaboration was deemed important be­
cause ot the tremendously deep insights which he possesses. 
Many ot the interpretations were indeed extrapola­
tions ot what Northrop said, however no liberties were in­
tended. From his point ot view the interpretations and dis­
cussions seemed logical. 
Some examination ot other writers who are categorized 
as philosophers and/or philosophers ot science follows in 
the subsequent paragraphs.  
Norman R. Campbe1150 describes theory as follows: 
A theory is a connected set ot propositions which 
are divided into two groups. One group consists ot 
statements about some collection ot ideas which are 
characteristic ot the theory; the other group 
50worman R .  Campbell, "The Structure of Theories, " 
Readings in the Philosorhy ot Science, Herbert Feigl and­May Brodbeck-;-iditors ( ew York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Inc. , 1953), pp . 288-308. 
consists or statements of the relation between these 
ideas and some other ideas of a different nature . 
The first group will be termed collectively the 
'hypothesis' of the theory; the second group the 
! dictionary. • 51 
It should be  noted that Campbell's use or terms are 
different from uses encountered thus tar.  The important 
thing is that this different use or terms b e  recognized s o  
that the meaning o r  his discussions will not be distorted. 
He defines an hypothesis as " ·  • • a proposition which is 
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put forward for consideration, and concerning the truth or 
falsity of which nothing is asserted until the considera­
tion is completed. " 52 He goes on to say that the word 
hypothesis necessarily implies doubt b ut it should be doubt 
of a positive nature, a s uspense ot judgment, rather than 
doub t  of a negative nature, an inclination to disbelieve. 
To interpret: Campbell has said that a theory is a 
connected set of propositions which are divided into two 
groups . One group, the hypothesis, consists of proposi­
tions about a collection of ideas characteristic of the 
theory. The other group, the dictionary, consists ot propo­
sitions or the relation between ideas composing the hypothe­
sis and other ideas of a different nature. He elaborates 
further on these two elements: 
The hypothesis is so  called, in accordance with 
the sense that has just been stated ( a  suspense of 
51Ibid. , p. 290. 
judgment ),  because the propositions composing it 
are incapable ot proof or of diaproot by them­
selves; they must be significant, but taken apart 
trom the dictionary, they appear arbitrary assump ­
tions. They may be considered accordingly as pro­
viding a definition by postulate ot the ideas which 
are characteristic ot the hypothesis. 53 
Campbell continues with a discussion of the element 
which he terms the dictionary: 
The ideas which are related by me ans of the 
dictionary to the ideas of the hn>othesis are, on 
the other hand, such that s omething is  known about 
them apart from . the theory • • • • The dictionary 
relates some ot these propositions ot which the 
truth or falsity is known to certain propositions 
involving the hypothetical ideas by stating that 
it the first set of propositions is true then the 
second se t is true and vice versa; this relation 
may be expressed by the statement that the first 
set implies the second. 54 
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It is important to note that the role of the diction­
ary is to relate one set of ideas , those comprising the 
hypothesis with another set of ideas, which Campbell terms 
concepts. Here again is a special use ot the term concept, 
which is defined: a " · • • collection of fundamental judg­
ments; and the propositions involving these ideas ,  of which 
the truth or falsity is known, are always laws. " 55 
To equate Campbell ' s ideas ot theory with the ideas 
ot Northrop may provide some clarity. Each ot them are pre­
senting structures that have considerable similarity. 
Campbell ' s  hypothese s would be synonymous with Northrop ' s  
53Ibid. 54Ibid. 55Ibid. , p. 291 . 
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assumption by postulation, i . e.,  a set ot propositions in­
capable ot proof or disproof by themselves. Campbell' s con­
cepts or laws, the ideas propositionally related to the hy­
potheses, would probably be synonymous with Northrop ' s  hy­
pothesis or theorem ( Northrop uses hypothesis and theorem 
interchangeably ) .  There may be a question ot strict rela­
tionship here. Northrop ' s  theorems were propositions to be 
tested, whereas, Campbell seems to be convinced of the soli­
darity ot his laws. At any rate, the relationship would ex­
ist in the framework of the theoretical structure. Camp­
bell ' s  dictionary is a bit more difficult to relate to  North­
rop' s structure. The dictionary is a set of propositions 
which explain the relationships between the hypotheses and 
the laws. These serve to explain relationships between the 
two. Northrop uses logical deduction to derive theorems 
from the assumptions. This is substantially different from 
just ·showing relationships. This difference is to be 
expected with the great stock which Campbell places in the 
rigidity of his laws. The laws exist independent of the 
hypothesis with the dictionary pointing our relationships. 
In Northrop' s structure, the validity of the theorems was 
. � 
dependent on the validity of the assumptions from which 
they are deduced . Suffice it to say that positionally with­
in the two structures Campbell' s dictionary and Northrop' s 
formal logic are synonymous, but they differ in function 
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because of the difference between the nature or the laws and 
the the orems of each respectively. 
It is worth noting some of Campbell's assertions re­
garding frequent misrepresentations about the nature of 
theory. First of all he decries the tendency to contrast 
theory with practice. Although this separation is justified 
etymologically, the separation is usetul for only discussion 
purposes to separate consideration by intellectual processes 
from manipulative details. 
For in this original sense ot the word all proposi­
tions are necessarily theoretical, since they con­
cern thought and not action; and in this sense all 
science , in so far as consists ot propositions, is 
theoretiea1 . 56 
The idea that there are propositions •true in 
theory, but false in practice '  has its foundation 
only in the incompetence of the uninitiated to 
understand theory, and in their habit of applying 
propositions to circumstances entirely foreign to 
the theory.· To those who have not the �ower to 
think, theory . will always be dangerous. 57 
The above statement is in opposition to the desire ot 
those whom Campbell refers to as half-educated persons to 
rely on practical conclusions rather than on the reasoning 
of the theorist . 
The views ot 'practical men ' are usually de­
rived from assumptions and arguments no less com­
plex than those on which theory is based; they are 
56Ibid., P• 288. 
57Ibid . ,  P • 289. 
more and not less liablt to error because they are 
less openly expressed. 5� 
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Other misrepresentations that Campbell takes issue 
with are ( 1) that theoretical propositions are contrasted 
from other types by the amount ot thought required; ( 2 ) that 
propositions in science are termed theories because they are 
complicated; and ( 3 )  that the more theoretical is a proposi­
tion the less should be the conviction of its truth. 59 He 
states that theory is a question of degree and science be­
comes progressively more theoretical as it progresses from 
th� elementary and fundamental judgments to the various 
ranks of propositions . 60 
J. W. N .  Sullivan61 in his excellent discussion of 
scientific ideas says that the aim ot science is the con­
struction of theories as opposed to the formulation of 
purely descriptive laws. 
Just as a law unities a group of phenomena, so 
· a  theory unifies a group of laws. A theory is, as 
it were , a central principle, rrom �hich the 
various laws belonging to it can b e  deduced. The 
58Ibid. 
59Ibid. , pp. 288 -289. 
60Ibid. , P • 288. 
61 J. w. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science 
(New York: Mentor Books, The"'Nev American LYS'rary ot World 
Literature, Inc. , 1952 ) .  
outstanding example of this is provided by the most 
celebrated ot all scientific theories, Newton's 
theory of gravitation. 6 2  
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Here, again, is an assertion of the priority of ex­
planation as an aim of science. Of course, explanation is 
important in science. An understanding of the present is 
prerequisite for inferring relationships to a future state 
or activity. The predictive purpose of theory is, however, 
acknowledged by Sullivan. 
Sullivan notes the changes brought about in scien­
tific theory with the advent of Einstein's theory of rela­
tivity . 63 Whereas, under Newton's ideas of mathematical ex­
planations from directly observable physical qualities, it 
became obvious that such things as force and potential en­
ergy are arbitrary creations . Many people had attempted 
manipulations and alterations of Newton's theory of gravi­
tation to no avail. It remained for Einstein to completely 
sweep away the entire foundations of the theory and insert 
a new structure . This destroyed the solidity of structures 
founded directly on observable physical qualities. "There 
is in science, " Sullivan concludes, '1a certain amount of use-
ful myth. But the myths are useful because they are, as it 
were, pegs on which the mathematical formulation can be 
hung. n 64 
62Ibid. , P • 4.5. 
64Ibid . ,  p. 157. 
63Ibid . ,  pp . 1.57-162. 
It is evident • • •  that a true scientific theory 
merely means a successful working hypothesis. It 
is highly probable that all scientific theories are 
wrong. Those that we accept are verifiable within 
our present limits of observation. Truth, then, in 
science, is a pragmatic affair. A good scientific 
theory accounts tor known facts and enables us to 
predict new ones which are then verified by observa­
tion. b5 
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Sullivan ' s  work is an historical chronology ot scien­
tific ideas, but his insights into theoretical formulations 
are helpful tor our consideration. The outstanding thesis 
of Sullivan regarding theory is the indeterminate nature of 
all theoretical structures. They are unprovable,  but are 
helpful tor purposes or accounting tor known facts and tor 
enabling us to predict new ones. It should be noted that 
verifiability lies within the confines ot our present limits 
ot observation, which, it will be recalled, Northrop in­
sisted are personal interpretations. 
James Bryant Conant gives great prominence to 
. . � 
theoretical structures in science. 
Science is an interconnected series or concepts 
and conceptual schemes that have developed as a 
result or experimentation and observation and are 
fruitful or further experimentation and observa­
tiona. 66 
This view attributes to science a dynamic activity 
rather than a static state, and it makes or science an 
65Ibid. , p.  158 • . -
66James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 195]:'T; p. 25. 
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activity from a theoretical frame ot reference . Conant sug­
gests that one may consider science as an attempt to lower 
the degree ot empiricism or conversely to extend the range 
of theory. 67 He defines empiricism as "The observation ot 
facts apart from the principles which explain them, and 
which give the mind an intelligent mastery over them. n 68 
So, rather than science being an activity directed toward 
.further empiricism (pure facts), science is directed toward 
lowering the threshold ot empiricism. 
Conant's �onceptual scheme, " synonymous with what has 
heretofore been called "theoretical structure, " is examined 
below. Activity baaed on a conceptual scheme is not limited 
to any particular scientific endeavor, but is typical of an 
intelligent way of life: 
Literally every step we take in life is deter­
mined by a series of interlocking concepts and con­
ceptual schemes. Every goal we formulate for our 
actions, every decision we make, be it trivial or 
momentous, involves assumptions about the universe 
and about human beings . 69 
The above is  a highly significant statement, and 
should serve as a topic tor consideration by those who 
67Ibid. ,  P • 58 . 
68James B. Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man 
(Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, Doubleday and-COmpany, 
Inc . ,  1952), p.  _41 .  
69Ibid. , pp. 135-136. 
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suppose that the realm of metaphysics is outside the realm 
of a conceptual scheme. It is always an enlightening exer­
cise to analyze the bases ot any act or behavior. Such an 
analysis always results in one of two conclusions; either 
the act of behavior is justified on the basis or assumptions 
about the nature of the universe and of mankind, or the in­
dividual concludes that· the act of behavior was a very fool­
ish one because or a lack of consistency with basic assump­
tions held. These assumptions of an instance or behavior, 
whether conscious or unconscious, are indeed providers of 
our frame of reference in acts of behavior. The conceptual 
schemes are evolutionary in their comprehensiveness and in 
their reliability. Citizens today take for granted things 
which their ancestors never dreamed possible. Our concep­
tual scheme must not only be composed of current knowledges 
but, as Conant has suggested, they must be "f'ruittul of 
.further experimentation and observations. "70 Conant quotes 
from William James a passage describing man ' s  construction 
or a conceptual order: 
The intellectual lif'e of man consist·s almost 
wholly in his substitution of a conceptual order 
for the perceptual order in which his experience 
originally comes. , • • Every new book verbal­
izes some new concept, which becomes important in 
proportion to the use that can be made of' it , 
Different universes of thought thus arise, with 
specific sorts of relation among their ingredients . 
70conant, Science and Comm.on Sense, 2.E.• cit. , p. 25. 
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The world ot comm.on sense ' things • ;  the world ot 
material tasks to be done; � the mathematical world 
of pure form; the world of ethical propositions; 
the worlds of logic, of music, etc. , all abstracted 
and generalized from long-forgotten perceptual in­
stances, from which they have as it were flowed 
out, return and merge themselves again in the par­
ticulars of our present and future perception • • • • 
Percepts and concepts interpenetrate and melt to­
gether, impregnate and fertilize each other. 
Neither, taken alone, knows reality in completeness. 
We need them both as we need both our legs to walk 
with. 71 
Man must be constantly at work improving his concep­
tual order, thus lowering the threshold of empiricism. 
A conceptual scheme when first formulated may be 
considered � working hypothesis � �  grand scale. 
From it one can deduce, however, many consequences, 
each of which can be the basis or chains ot reason­
ing yielding deductions that can be tested by ex­
periment. If these teats confirm the deductions 
in a numberor instances, evidence�cumulates 
tinaing to confirm the working hypothesis on a 
grand sciie, which soon becomes accepted asa-new 
conceptual scheme.7-Z--
- - --
A close correlation can be detected between Northrop's 
theoretical structure and that of Conant. Conant's working 
hypothesis on a grand scale would correspond with Northrop's 
postulations. Both authors depend on deductive reasoning as 
the next step, and both require experimentation to veri� 
the deductions. Conant identifies three elements in modern 
science: (1) speculative general ideas, (2) deductive 
71Ibid. , p. 32, citing William James, The Philosophy 
ot WilliaiiJames, Drawn from His Own Works. Introduction by 
H. M. Kallen (New York: The Modern Library, 1925). 
72Ibid. , P • 47 . 
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reasoning, and (3)  experimentation . 7 3 It will be recalled 
that Northrop ' s  three stages ot scientific inquiry were: 
( 1 ) analysis or problematic situation, which involves cheek­
ing the assumptions; (2) induction ; and ( 3 ) logical deduc­
tion or theorems tor testing. 
Discussions !!Z Selected Authors in Educational Administration 
and Elaborations on Their Points or View 
The preceding discussion by psychologists and philos­
ophers or science regarding the nature or theory gives rise 
to a pertinent question : "What does this have to do with 
educational administration?" This section of the chapter is 
devoted to reviewing and interpreting selected writers in ad­
ministration who have concentrated on the problem or admin­
istrative theory . 
In Chapter I or this study, mention was made of the 
work at SSCPEA in administrative theory. This work was 
first reported in Better Teaching in School Administration,74 
' . 
which was followed by Professors Graff and Street's compre-
hensive treatment of the theory or administrative competence 
73 Ibid. , P.• 49 • 
74southern States Cooperative Program in Educational 
Administration, Better Teaching in School Administration 
(Southern States Cooperative Program in Educational Adminis­
tration, 1956 ) . 
74 
in Improving Competence in Educational Administration. 7 5  
The final report of the nine-year program, A Profes sion in 
Transition, 76 discus ses activities of the group , including 
their efforts with theory. 
Those working in the SSCPEA program concluded that a 
theory ot educational administration is es sential tor compe­
tent task performance and that a major role of a training 
program tor educational administrators is to provide oppor­
tunity for the student to develop a sound theory. They pro­
posed some guides for a preparation program that may provide 
this opportunity tor theory development. 7 7  
It is obvious that one does not get a theory 
s imply by memorizing principles of educational ad­
ministration. He must internalize important con­
cepts about individuals and groups ,  democracy as a 
way of lite, education, and administration. These 
concepts become values and beliefs by which he 
lives and works. They indicate what is i�grtant 
and how he should act as an administrator. , 
The above statement is a forceful endorsement of the 
importance of theory and its importance to the administrator. 
7 5orin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street , Improving Com­
petence in Educational A dministration ( New York: Harperand 
Brothers;-1956. 
76rruman M. Pierce and A. D. Albright, A Profe s sion 
in Transition ( Southern States Cooperative Program in Educa­
tional Administration and Its Succes sor, Associated Programs 
in Educational Administration, 1960 ) . 
77 southern States Cooperative Program in Educational 
Administration , Better Teaching in School Administration, � ·  
cit. , pp. 17 8-194. 
- · 
78Ibid. , p. 178. 
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It is contended that " theory houses the fundamental logic or 
justification behind all administrative actions. n79 The 
composition ot a theory or educational administration is dis­
cussed in the following quotation: 
A theory or educational administration is, 
broadly speaking, a collection or concepts or prin­
ciples that define what educational administration 
is and that give directions to an indiTidual at­
tempting to be an educational administrator. It 
is conceivable that a theory of educational admin­
istration would include concepts relating to the 
nature of individual and group life, the major 
tenets or American democracy, the purposes ot pub ­
lic education , the nature of the administrative 
process, aud the functions of educational admin­
istration. HO 
It will be apparent that the use ot the term " theory" 
- -
by the SSCPEA work groups corresponds with Conant's "working 
- . 
hypothesis on a grand scale" or Northrop's "postulations. " 
This element ot any theore tical s tructure is the framework 
tor deducing hypotheses. Although " theory" as used by  SSCPEA 
does not in clude the e ntire conceptual scheme, it does, in 
fac t ,  include the theoretical element or the s cheme. That 
is, this use of theory does not include the element of logi­
cal deductive relationships from the assumptions to the hy­
potheses, or theorems, or the element of hypothesis or 
theorem. However, since it is synonymous to the assumptions 
or postulates of a scheme, it is that element which provides 
79Ibid., P • 51. 
BOibid. , p. 47 . 
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the base for interpretation or phenomena; in brier, it is 
the theoretical element. As has already been pointed out 
the validity or any hypothesis or theorem ( or law, tor those 
who insist on this stronger term) is proportional to the 
validity of the assumptions from which it was deduced. Con­
ant called to our attention that every act of human behavior 
involves assumptions about the universe and about man. 
Rather than be content with unexamined assumptions, the 
SSCPEA group proposed that these assumptions which dire ct 
our behavior - be sub jects tor investigation and improvement. 
It appears to be a valid expectation that preparation pro­
grams would be concerned with behavioral determinants. To 
concentrate on the administrative acts without concern tor 
the framework from which the particular situation was inter­
preted, and the particular act selected, is to concentrate 
on the symptoms and ignore the causes. 
There are those who would be offended by introducing 
metaphysical elements into a discussion or theory. Wolfgang 
Kohler in discussing the tendency of behavioristic psychology 
to maintain that human thinking as an experience is irrele­
vant because science, to be objective is only concerned with 
tacts observable from the outside, poses a question which is 
pertinent to the discussion here: "Is  it not the business 
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of science to destroy evidence?"81 One gets the impression 
that the attitude is, "Let ' s ignore it and maybe it will go 
away. '' The question is clear. Shall metaphysical assump ­
tions be honestly stated and subjected to examination, or 
shall they be furtively and/or reluctantly avow ed with the 
naive insistence that these directors of behavior make no 
difference. 82 
In discussing the foundations of the competency 
pattern, Professors Graff and Street assert that: 
Since competence is so completely bound up in 
living and acting in the 'right ' way, clearly that 
• right ' way will depend upon a particular point of 
view, which will provide an entree into one or the 
important problems of competent behavior (philo­
sophical assumptions ) and will establish a refer­
ential basia for further examinations regarding 
com.pa tence. tj 3 
This use of the term tttheo:ry" by those individuals 
working in SSCPEA to refer only to the set of assumptions of 
a conceptual scheme does not mean that they were unconcerned 
about the other elements of the scheme. The competency 
pattern is itself a comprehensive theoretical structure with 
81wolfgang Kohler , "Gestalt Psychology Today, " The 
American Psychologist, XIV (December, 1959 ) , 732. 
-
-
82For the complete statement of the postulations 
undergirding the competency pattern, see: Southern States 
Cooperative program in Educational Administration, Better 
Teaching in School Administration, .2.£• cit. , pp. 117-124. 
83oraft and Street, ££• cit. , p. 103. 
( 1) assumptions--the theory element, (2) logical inrerences, 
and (3 ) working theorems--tasks and skills. Major emphases 
were placed on the set of assumptions which directed the 
selection of consistent job tasks and the concomitant skills 
required tor their execution. 
Since the purpose of this study· does not require the 
examination of particular theories, but rather the examina­
tion of theoretical structures, no further explanations of 
the competency pattern need be elaborated. 
The following discussions are concentrated on ideas 
expressed by contributors to the seminar devoted to adminis­
trative theory sponsored by UCEA and the Midwest Adminis­
tration Center, held at the University of Chicago, November 
11, 12, and 13, 1957.
84 Professor Halpin introduced the 
discussion of theory by making the following observations 
regarding its construction: 
The construction of a theory demands an act of 
creative imagination. This is a tough assignment, 
and not many of us are equal to it, nor can we get 
help from a ' how-to-do-it ' manual. Theories can 
not be produced on demand; they evolve, and they 
evolve in many shape s and in many different de­
grees of precision. The building blocks of which 
they are composed--the constructs, the postulates, 
the assumptions--may be molar or molecular • • • •  
A theory may be broad and eclectic in its range, 
or narrow and specific. • • • The components of 
84Proceedings were published in: Andrew w .  Halpin . 
(ed. ), Administrative Theory in Education ( Chicago: The 
Midwest Administration Center;-1958). 
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a theory may also differ in the ease with which 
testable hypotheses can be adduced from the postu-
lated model. 65 
Although theory possesses all of these characteris ­
tics of flexibility , Halpin is disturbed with the wide uses 
ot the term, theory. It is his opinion that this condition 
is especially complicated in educational administration be­
cause some writers tend to use the term in the sense of 
value-theory, i. e. , how administrators ought to behave 
rather than how they do behave. He says that there is a 
need for normative standards, but they cannot be secured 
through the methods used tor constructing scientific theory. 
In short, the description of events and their 
evaluation must be kept distinct. To state the 
issue: the immediate purpose of research is to 
enable us to make more accurate predictions of 
events , not t2 prescribe preferential courses ot 
human action. 66 
Another problem in developing a theory of educational 
administration is the tendency to be preoccupied with taxo­
nomic methods. A third problem is the molar-molecular 
problem which particularly means the difference between the 
comprehension of administration qua administration or a 
restriction to educational administration. 87 
85Andrew w.  Halpin, "The Development of Theory in 
Educational Administration, �  in Halpin , � ·  cit. , p. 5. 
86rbid. , PP • 6-7. 
87Ibid. , PP • 9-10. 
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James D. Thompson, in his discussion of modern 
approaches to the theory88 sets up a set of criteria for a 
usable theory. These criteria are listed below with abridged 
explanations. 
1. The variables and constants for such � theory 
will be selected for their logical and operational proper­
ties rather than tor their congruence with common sense. 
Common sense terms should .be used in systematic 
theory only if they possess the precision and clarity for 
ordering experience, otherwise new terms must be invented 
or adopted. 
2. An adequate theory !.!!,! be generalizable, hence 
abstract. 
A theory is more powerful as the range of events which 
it explains become broader. A theory should encompass all 
aspects of administration. 
An adequate theory cannot be limited by time or place. 
It would be equally applicable in any country at any time. 
3. The values capable ot being attached to education 
and to administration will not be incorporated into the 
theoretical system itself; instead, the system will treat 
such values as variables. 
88James D. Thompson, "Modern Approaches to Theory in 
Administration, '! Halpin, �· _ cit. , pp. 20-39. 
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An adequate theory should be applicable equally in 
countries which prize democracy and those which prize other 
political ideals. Similar application would be made to 
profit -oriented administration and nonprofit-oriented ad­
ministration. The value factors would be treated as vari­
ables instead of being incorporated in the theory . 
4. An adequate theory or administration will be 
rooted in the basic social and behavioral sciences. 
The subject matter of the fields of social and be­
havioral sciences have manifestations in administration. 
5. The focus of _!E, adequate theory will be .2!! 
processes rather than � correlations . 
Correlations within performance are inadequate un­
less there is an explanation of how the relationship 
oecurs. 89 
In their discussions or the development of a theory 
of educational administration, Halpin and Thompson share 
. . 
some common £ears. They are both troubled with the matter 
of human values, and they are insistent that these values 
be kept out or the structure itself . They are both con­
cerned about the generality or a theory. Thompson urges 
that the more general the theory the better. 
One is led to inquire about human purposes in a theory 
89Ibid., PP • 29-33 • 
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ot univeral applicability. The development of a theory 
applicable in any political ideology and at any time would 
be quite a feat l This would be the theory to end all 
theorizing. Can all the aims, aspirations, purposes, and 
goals or mankind be universalized into a common denominator? 
This would hardly fit into our ideal or the "potential worth 
and dignity of every individual." But, then ., this is an 
ideology that must not be included in the theoretical scheme, 
except as a variable. What then could be included in the 
scheme? We are raced with the thorny task or developing a 
theoretical scheme for explaining and predicting human be­
havior, and people have a unique way . or behaving in a manner 
that will contribute to the achievement of purposes. But 
here again is an element of purpose that mustn ' t  be in­
cluded in the theory. Another thorny problem is that any 
theory, including educational administration . is a human con­
struction--a human who, incidentally, has a purpose. What is 
left for a theory of educational administration? It makes 
the chore a bit easier to symbolize the theory, e . g. ,  if 
"A,"  then "B ."  But when the transposition or "A"  and "B " 
is made to human processes, then the · problem recurs . Either 
it will be necessary to remove theory construction from 
human handicraft and its application from human processes 
( or perhaps, it would be possible to assume that people act 
irresponsive to purposes), or take an alternative course or 
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action and admit human purpose as the core or any s uch 
theoretical scheme. It this alternative course ot action is 
adopted--and it is strongly recommended in this study--it 
will be unneces�ary to assert "that ' s my theory; it ' s  not to 
be believed in, just to be used. " A more acceptable ad­
mis sion would be that any theoretical scheme is based on cer­
tain assumptions. It could have been based on alternative 
assumptions, but the ones used were selected because or  per­
s onal values. To use the theory fruitfully will require that 
similar assumptions be held by the user; otherwise the scheme 
must be remodeled. Similar hypotheses neces sary tor use in 
educational administration proces ses can never be logically · 
deduced from conflicting assumptions. So the theorist must 
assume e qual responsibility with every practitioner tor the 
results derived from the scheme. This makes it mandatory 
that an adequate theory of educational administration or any 
other theory have the assumptions clearly defined rather 
than maintain that they are not a part of the theory, thus 
being most unscientific. 
These remarks which take iss ue with Halpin and Thomp­
son, it should be noted, are logical derivations from the 
postulations outlined in Chapter I ot this study. 
Daniel E .  Griffiths90 discus sed the structure of 
90naniel E. Griffiths, "Administration as Decision­
Making, " Halpin, �· cit . , pp. _ 119-149 . 
theory at the seminar, but his ideas are elaborated more 
fully in his book, Administrative Theorz91 which is dis­
cussed in the following paragraphs. 
Griffiths clears the negative slate by explaining 
what theory is not: 
84 
1. Theory is not a personal affair. "It is appar­
ently believed by many that theory is a rather personal 
matter--that each person works out for himself a theory of 
administration. tt92  The administrator should not suppose he 
has developed a theory when he forms opinions about what 
will work as he faces his problems . 
2. Theory is not a dream, a flight or fancy, or a 
daydream. 
3. Theory is not a philosophy. Here, Griffiths 
supports the development or a philosophy but would place it 
outside of his theory. 
It can be  seen easily that when one develops 
a set of values he necessarily involves the other 
areas of philosophy. • • • As imperative as is a 
sound philosophy, theory is something else again. 
Just how does philosophy differ from theory? This 
is commonly discussed as the ' is-ought¥ dicbotomy. 93 
This line of reasoning, Griffiths suggests, has its 
origin in logical positivism, a philosophy which is discussed 
91Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc . , 1959 ) .  
92Ib1d. , p. l.4 . 93Ib1d. , p. 15. 
85 
in detail in Chapter III ot this study. 
4. Theory is not a taxonomy. Here again, Griffiths 
acknowledges the values of a taxonomy and states that 
. . • One could probably make a very good arguement to sup-
port the contention that any science begins with a taxon­
omy. "94 He labels the competency pattern as a taxonomy. 95 
Griffiths, before discussing the nature of theory, 
appropriately considers some characteristics of science. 
Science seeks to accomplish three things:  description, 
explanation, and prediction. The characteristics proposed 
are: objectivity, reliability, operational definitions, 
coherence or systematic structure, and comprehensiveness. 96 
Objectivity, we are told, means not only that the 
science must be tree from bias and prejudice but it must 
be capable of testing by any intelligent person who has 
the necessary technical equipment for making the observa­
tions. 
Reliability is concerned with confirmation by others 
working . on the same problem. 
Operational definitions are discussed as follows:  
"The concepts which are used in a science must be defined 
94Ibid. , p .  17. 
95Ibid. , PP • 13-19. 
96rbid. , pp. 21-24. 
by a series of operations which permit the perception and 
identification of the phenomena referred to by the con­
cepts . n97 
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Coherence or systematic structure means: "Not a mere 
eollection of miseellaneous items of information, but a 
well-connected account of the facts is what we seek in 
science. n98 
Comprehensiveness is a plea for abstract concepts. 99 
Next, Griffiths proposes a set of criteria tor a 
theory ot administration. lOO The first criterion is, 
"Theory as a guide to action. nlOl 
Unless a theory can provide guidance t or the ad­
ministrator when he needs to act,  it is a poor 
theory indeed. The help which an administrator 
gets from theory . is not in terms ot what he ' ought' 
to do. Guidance in this area comes trom his � value ­
system. The help he gets from theory is in terms 
of what will happen if he does a certain thing. 
In other words, theory deals with the consequences 
ot action. • It the administrator does this, then 
this will happen' is, in brief, theory in action. 10 2 
The second criterion is, "Theory as a guide to the 
collection of facts. "103 Theory provides a relationship of 
facts one to another, and, thus, is useful tor insuring that 
97Ibid. , 
99rbid. , 
101:rbid. , 
103Ibid. 
p. 23. 
pp. 21-24. 
p. 25. 
98Ibid. , p. 23. 
l00 1bid. , pp. 24-27. 
l02Ibid. 
only related facts are gathered. In building a theory, facts 
are sought which bear upon the concepts devised, and once the 
theory has been written, tacts are sought which are suggested 
by the theory or are needed tor its validation. 
"Theory as a guide to new knowledge tt l04 is the third 
criterion. Theory guides the researcher to new knowledge by 
testable hypotheses which it suggests . 
Finally, "theory to explain the nature of adm.inistra-
tion, " is suggested as a criterion. A theory of adminis-
tration should help in understanding what administration is. 
In summary, a theory ot administration must provide 
guides for action, tor collecting tacts, for suggesting new 
knowledge and for explaining the nature of ad.ministration. 
Griffiths recommends that Feigl 1 s definition ot 
theory be adopted: 
In order to provide for a terminology which 
will not constantly involve us in a tangle ot 
contusions, I propose to detine a ' theory ' as a 
set of assumptions from which can be derived by 
purely logico-mathematical procedures a larger 
set of empirical laws • • • • 105 
Theory, in this sense, is essentially a set of assump ­
tions from which empirical lava can be deduced b y  logico­
mathem.atics. 
104Ibid. , p. 26. 
105Ibid. , p. 28, citing Herbert Feigl, "Principles 
and Prob leiiisot Theory Construction in Psychology, " Current 
Trends in Payeholofieal Theors ( Pittsburgh: Univer sity ot Pittsb urgh Press, 951) , p. 1 2 . 
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In building a theory it is s uggested that the observa­
tional approach be used tor describing human behavior in 
organizations. "All theory building starts with observations 
ot some sort or other . "106 These observations are to be re­
ported in the form ot tacts. They should be collected by 
someone not involved in the event reported, and they must be 
reported in detail in clear, understandable language. 
The tirst and major task in constructing a theory is 
the development ot a set ot concepts to des cribe the admin-
istrative situation. Any theory is based on a set ot con­
cepts relevant to the theme of the theory. 
A concept is simply a term to which a particular 
meaning has been attached. Once the meaning has 
been attached to the term, the term should always 
be used with this particular meaning; and, con-
. verse�y, whenever a particular meaning is intended, 
the same term should be used. 107 
The recommended approach to be used in proper concept 
tormation is operationism. Operationism means that concepts 
are given their meaning by the methods of observation or 
investigation employed to arrive at them and concepts have 
no me anings apart from these operations . 108 
Griffiths ' point of view about theory development out­
lined in the foregoing paragraphs is briefly elaborated on 
106Ibid. , p. 36. 
107Ibid. , PP • 38-39 . 
108Ibid. ,  PP • 40-42. 
here. His works were referred to frequently throughout 
other sections of the study. 
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First of all, Griffiths delimits the activity ot 
theorizing to a small minority ot people. The administrator 
is only an applier of theory developed by administrative re-
searchers.109 Theory is .tu.rther delimited by divorcing it 
from philosophy and human values, 110 and the insistence that 
theory is not a personal matter. 111 Furthermore, all con­
cepts of a theory must adhere to operational detinitions. 112 
Even though theory is defined as being a set of assumptions, 
it is still maintained that all theory building starts with 
observations which are reported in the form of tacts. 113 
The similarity of this beginning ot theory by observations to 
Bacon's "inductive" process described earlier will be noted. 
The thesis promoted by Griffiths is a good example ot 
the position maintained by the logical positivists regarding 
the nature of science and scientific theory. Differences 
between this and other philosophies appear to set forth the 
genesis of fundamental differences regarding the nature ot 
theory. 
109Ibid. , P •  24. 110Ibid. , PP • 14-17. 
lllibid. , P •  14. 112Ibid. , PP • 38-42 . 
113Ibid. , P • 36. 
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From the various discussions ot the nature ot theory, 
a common set ot constructs could not be drawn. The dis­
cussions have, however, given general descriptions ot the 
structure or theory that have been most usetul in the de­
velopment or constructs proposed for analysis. The con­
structs proposed are: ( 1) assumptions, (2) logical deduc­
tions, and ( 3) hypotheses . 
Assumptions are a generally recognized ingredient of 
any theory; however, there are disagreements about what con­
stitutes an acceptable set of asswnptions, or what takes 
place in the process ot assuming. The development of an 
appropriate set of assumptions would for some be tree crea ­
tions, while others would insist on a statistical average of 
observable facts. 
Logical deductions are also quite generally attributed 
a place in any theoretical structure, but here again the 
process may be one of mathematics or one of many less formal 
(but not necessarily less logical ) methods. 
Hypotheses are not always included in a theoretical 
structure. They sometimes are placed outside the structure 
as being derivations from the structure itself; that is, it 
is held by some that hypotheses begin where the theory leaves 
ort.  It is maintained here, however, that hypotheses are 
vital ingredients ot the structure. They are essentially the 
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link between the idea and the act .  That is, an hypothesis, 
derived logically trom a set of assumptions, is an expecta­
tion ot the consequent . It is a projected look into the 
future. "If I pe rform this act,  then, on the basis ot my 
assumptions, the purpose which I em seeking to achieve will 
probably be accomplished . " 
These constructs are analyzed and described in detail 
in Chapter V of this study. 
Some mention should be made of other constructs often 
attributed to theory. These are propositions and concepts. 
All theories should be subject to verbalization and descrip­
tion . When this is done, the structure is formulated into 
propositions. The propositions are compilations of concepts. 
These two elements, propositions and concepts, were dis­
cussed in the analytical section of the study. 
F .  THE PURPOSES OF THEORY IN 
. .  
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
The purposes of theory in educational administration 
are no different from the purposes ot any theory except tor 
differences in the nature and purposes ot the particular 
process or activity to which theory is applied. To be more 
specific, the fundamental purpose ot any theory is to make 
accurate predictions. But it should be remembered that pre­
dictions are the drawing ot relationships between the present 
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state or activ�ty and a future state or activity. This 
means that the future state has already been identified and 
is thus synonymous with a purpose. Purposes are always 
future-oriented. However, the very fact that they are identi­
fiable means that they are important {of value) to the indi­
vidual . This sense of importance has developed from the 
individual ' s  experiences. Thus, in the process of theorizing 
there is a consideration of past experiences for explanation 
of the present and delineation of possibilities for the 
future. 
All other purposes which can be attributed to theory, 
such as description, explanation, delimitation of facts, 
understanding, et cetera, are all by-products ot or prepara­
tion for the .fundamental aim of attaining purposes {predic­
tion) . 
This means· that efforts to categorize educational ad­
ministration with the ad.ministration of other organizations 
is an unfruit:rul venture. First or all the purposes of edu­
cational administration must be speci�ied . These purposes 
will always be dependent on assumptions held about the nature 
of man, the nature of society, the nature of education, and 
the nature of educational administration. Only af'ter the 
purposes have been clearly formulated can the processes and 
activities be defined and the characteristics ot the admin­
istrator be specified. After this has been done, then, and 
9.3 
only then can comparisons with the administration of other · .  
organizations be made. Ot course, there will be many common 
elements. Preparation programs tor educational administra-· 
tors should take advantage of experiences ot preparation pro­
grams tor other administrators to avoid unnecessary duplica­
tion ot etforts. But to adopt the experiences ot another 
program without first delineating purposes is an invitation 
for frustration and despair. 
G. MAJOR CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES AMONG THEORISTS 
There are many ditferences of opinion about the nature 
ot theory, the purposes of theory, the constructs ot theory, 
and the several techniques and processes of formulating 
theory. Such differences ot opinion are more likely when 
dealing with abstractions such as theoretical structures 
than when dealing with routine matters. They are not neces­
sarily a serious detriment. As a matter of fact, they are 
oftentimes responsible for progress that could not be possi­
ble with old w�ys ot doing the job. 
On the other hand, differences are not always healthy; 
they can be exceedingly detrimental to progress and they can 
deter new developments indefinitely . It is the opinion ex­
pressed here that some controversies among theorists fall in 
this latter category. These are basic differences of serious 
import. It has been erroneously supposed by some that the 
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faculty members in a preparatio.n program should be representa­
tive of different philosophic systems so that the students 
will not develop a philosophic bias. This is a grave error. 
It is founded on premises incompatible with what is known 
about teaching and learning experiences. The student must 
be motivated in a problematic atmosphere .to consider alter­
natives and develop his own beliefs after carefully con­
sidering others. This differs from the premise that the 
student is the object ot the wares peddled by the professors 
and he must get a balanced diet ot idealism, realism, and 
pragmatism. Understanding can never be the ultimate aim of 
scientific endeavor . All of the understandings possible can­
not insure intelligent behavior. Rather, the ultimate aim ot 
scientific endeavor must be to point the way toward new and 
exciting experien ces in the future so that man may be able 
more and more to control his destiny. "United we stand , 
divided we fall" is a truism of history and was never more 
important than it is now. It is not proposed here that there 
be commonality of opinion regarding the several administrative 
processes and methods of operation. The plea is made , how­
ever, that there be unification ot opinion about the purposes _ 
ot educational administration . 
It has already been stated that most ot the major con­
troversial issues among theorists have roots in different 
philosophic beliefs . It is tor this reason that Chapter III 
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is devoted to an examination ot · these beliefs . 
Some major controversies about theory which have 
potentially serious import are stated below in the torm ot 
questions . It will be noted that many ot these controversies 
have already been aired in the preceding sections of this 
study and a firm s tand expressed. No apologies are offered 
for this. The major po stulations of this study were ex­
pressed at the beginning so that there could be no question 
about the point ot view held. This is the plea made tor all 
· theorists in educational administration, that they open th� 
linen closet ot beliefs and opinions and place them on the 
table for inspection. Since these asswuptions and beliefs 
direct acts ot behavior, everyone in the profession has a 
right to know what they are. Otherwise, we are constantly 
engaged in a game ot "hide and seek. " The issues listed be­
low are re-examined in Chapter VI in the light of findings 
in the analytic end synthetic sections of the study. 
1. Are theoretical structures tree of human values? 
It should be emphasized that this question has refer­
ence to the structure itself and is not restricted to vari­
ables.  This encompasses a similar question regarding 
whether theory is a public or private matter . 
2 .  Are theoretical assumptions necessarily generali­
zations ot inductive facts? 
This question could be stated, "Are assumptions always 
empirically testable? '' There are some who insist that the 
tails at both ends are anchored to empirical facts. One 
wonders about the fruitfulness ot a structure that is tied 
to the ground at both ends. 
3. Are all concepts necessarily empirically detin-
able? 
This controversy is closely related to number two. 
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This question could be phrased, "Are operational definitions 
possible tor all concepts in a theoretical structure, when 
operational definitions are restricted to relationships with 
empirical reality. 
Grif�iths indicts the formulators ot the competency 
pattern with misuse of the terms "operational" and "theory.nlJ.4 
As has already been discussed, whether or not " theory" is 
misused depends on what theorists one has been reading . There 
are indications that Sullivan, Conant, Einstein, and . Northrop 
would not consider it a misuse. As for the term "operational," 
the reference ot misuse probably refers to Bridgman ' s  round­
ing of the school of thought known as · operationism. After 
reading Bridgman ' s  more recent work, Reflection or � Physi­
cist, 115 the ace�sation or misuse may more properly be made 
or the positivists. The question becomes one or identifying 
114Grirtiths, �· cit. , P • 53 .  
115p . w. Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist ( New 
York : Philosophical Library, 1955) . 
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the reality for anchoring the operational relationship . It 
the anchor is sought in empirical observations and physical 
matter, then Griffiths • indictment is correct. However, if 
the operational relationship is anchored in human values, 
then the indictment is most incorrect. The formulators or 
the competency pattern used the term tor identifying opera­
tional belie:fs, one aspect or "know-how . "116 
4. Is the usefulness of theoretical structures re ­
stricted to explanations ot what is? 
'!'his is a challenge of the traditional "is-ought" 
dichotomy. It is likewise a challenge or the premise that 
the fundamental purpose or theory is to increase under­
standing. 
H .  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose ot this chap ter was to investigate the 
nature of theory, to define some basic constructs or theory, 
to determine the fundamental purposes or theory and to point 
out major items or controversy among theorists. 
The focus ot attention on theory in educational admin­
istration became increasingly more intense as efforts were ac­
celerated to make educational administration more professional 
and to label the profession as a science . Controversies 
llosouthern States Cooperative Program in Educational 
Administration, Better Teaching in School Administration, ££ ·  
cit. , pp. 124-177. 
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about theoretical structures bees.me apparent as efforts were 
made to divorce s cientific theory from philosophic theory . 
The point was stressed in the chap ter that the phil­
osopher, the scientist, the administrator, and the man in 
the street all theorize as they perform daily acts or b e­
havior. It may be  poor theory, but is is nonetheless, 
theory. Theorizing is contextually oriented to a scientiric 
attitude. 
Expressions about theory by behavioral scientists, 
philosophers or science, and authors in educational adminis­
tration were reviewed and discussed. From the premises of 
postulations stated in this study, many points made by 
authors were challenged, many were endorsed, and extrapola­
tions were made from some. The element or pur�ose in 
theorizing was vigorously stressed . 
Characteristics or the philosopher and the scientist 
were discussed in some detail. 
The basic constructs or theory were identified as 
assumptions, logical deductions and hypotheses . Elementary 
elements or these constructs were identified as proposi­
tions and concepts. 
The ultimate purpose attributed to theory was "pre­
diction. " Prediction was described as the relationship be­
tween the present state or activity and a future state or 
activity. Other purposes of theory are either by-products 
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of, or preparation tor, this fundamental purpose. 
Equating educational administration with administra­
tion of other organizations can only be accomplished after 
purposes have been clearly defined. 
The major controvers ial issues regarding theory are 
philosophically grounded. These major issues were identi­
fied around the questions of (1) the place of human values 
in a theoretical structure, (2 )  the free creative or the 
restrictive aspects of assumptions, ( 3 ) the empirical defi­
nition ot all concepts, and (4)  the validity of the "!s­
ought" dichotomy. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORY FOUNDATIONS IN PHILOSOPHIC AND 
SCIENTIFIC SYSTEMS OF INQUIRY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Theory has traditionally been associated with inquiry. 
A thesis ot this study is that this association is correct, 
and discussions of theory, to be meaningful, must clarify 
this association. The prevalent lay notion that theorizing 
is an activity in which impractical men engage themselves 
stems from the association of theory with rationalistic 
philosophy. On the other hand, efforts to restrict theory 
to a context of inductive science is another association 
with a system of inquiry as well as an attempt to break the 
prior association with rationalism. 
Because of these associations, major differences 
about the nature ot theory are fundamentally difference s 
about the system of inquiry with which the theory is associ­
ated. There may be minor differences about mechanical or 
technical aspects of theory, but f1:l,lldamental controversies, 
such as those listed in Chapter II of this study, surpass 
controversies about theory per se; they are more basic con­
troversies about the nature of the system ot inquiry. 
Perhaps some explanation is in order about what is 
meant by "systems of inquiry. " The systems have specific 
reference to science and philosophy. Any search tor new 
knowledge or tor truth is necessarily an examination into 
what is beyond that which is now known, thus inferring a 
future state. It may be contended, and indeed has been, 
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that philosophy is not oriented toward inquiry. It is a con­
tention here that from the most rationalistic form of ideal­
ism to the most inductive form of empiricism, these systems 
are primarily ones ot tuturistic inquiry. The level of in-
quiry, certainly, will always vary with the quality ot the 
investigation and the loftiness ot the pui,,oses sought. It 
has alre ady been noted that many behavioral scientists with 
positivistic orientation insist that the fundamental purpose 
of s cience is explanation . The same thing has been said 
about rationalism, only the soundness ot the methodology has 
been questioned--and very appropriately so. A position al ­
ready stated is emphasized here; i. e., explanation is mean­
ingless unless the phenomena being explained have predictive 
significance. When man searches tor deeper understandings 
and more comprehensive explanations he does so in order that 
control may be exhibited on a future consequential act. 
"Why" questions either encompass or point toward questions 
- -
" ot what significance." As Jacob Bronowski puts it: "All 
living things act to anticipate the future . This is what 
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chiefly distinguishes them from lifeless things. "1 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly outline the 
historical evolvement ot modern science. It will be shown 
that major controversies about theory are specific indica­
tions ot differences among theorists about the nature of 
scientific inquiry. Major attention is paid to science as 
it is perceived in a context of determinism and as it is 
perceived in a context ot relativism . 
B.  A DETERMINISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
A deterministic philosophy is one that presupposes a 
fixity beyond the capacity of man to give it resilience. 
I 
�rard De Gre, in expressing his own assumptions of science 
gave what appears to be the general tenets of determinism: 
• • •  ( 1 )  that a real world exists independently 
ot our knowledge of it ; ( 2 )  that this real world 
is to an extent knowable through a process of 
approximation ;  and ( 3 ) that knowledge is true to 
the degree to which it approximates or is iso-
morphic to the structure of reality. 2 
These tenets were held by the early realists, and 
there is no evidence of their abdication by modern 
1Jaeob · Bronowski, "science as Foresight, " What is 
Science, James R.  Newman, editor ( New York: Simonaiid­
Schuster, 1955 ) ,  P • 427 . 
2 Gerard De Gr;, Science as a Social Institution, 
Short Studies in Sociology ( Garaen-City: Doubleday and 
Company, Inc. , 1955 ) ,  P • 37 . 
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empiricists,  the logical positivists. An attempt has been 
made to create an anchor or absolute objectivity tor all 
thought and activity. 
The physical scientists ti�st adopted the idea of 
absolute objectivity, perhap s as a revolt against dictates 
by the church hierarchy and proponents of Aristotelian 
dogma. 
Frederic Lilge points out that this course or science 
began in the German universities about 1820 as a revolt 
against forms ot id�alistic philosophy: 
Since idealism in its various forms was all the 
philosophy German scientists had known, the rift 
was indeed in•vitable. Yet it was unfortunate. 
Scientists might honestly think that philosophy 
was irrelevant to their work, an idea which con­
tinued concentration on the foreground or tact and 
experiment gradually turned into a fixed belief. 
But actually science rested on certain assumptions 
and employed conceptions which it never proved, and 
these constituted nothing less than a metaphysics  • 
• . • 3 
Regardless  or the cause, the reliance on induction 
ror the formulation of scientific theory is still widely 
maintained. "Gathering the tacts" is  a phrase used with 
pride by many scientists , apparently without recognition 
that the human being has been reduced to a technician who 
collects and sorts tacts. 
The vast majority of social and behavioral scientists 
3Frederiek Lilge, The Abuse of Learning ( New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 19IilfT, PP • 62-63. 
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have utilized deterministic concepts ot science tor their 
own work. Prescott Lecky tells us that 
The fallacy of ob jective valuation in psychology 
is an over-simplifying tendency similar in many 
respects to statutory law . In both cases the at­
tempt is made to eliminate the question or motive 
by declaring it to be of no consequence .4  
Without further generalizations on the deterministic 
philosophy of science, logical positivism, the modern-day 
expression of determinism is examined. 
Logical Positivism 
Just as it would be impossible to define any particu­
lar philosophic or theological point of view to the liking 
of all who pay allegiance to it, so is it equally impos sible 
to define a particular point of view about science . such as 
logical positivism, to the liking of all its proponents . 
It is, however, possib le to point to some generally he ld 
tenets of this idea. More important, it is po s sible to look 
at some consequential products of the promotion of and ad­
herence to this philosophy. 5 Modern positivism has developed 
from a union of many spe cific ideas such as operationism, 
4Prescott Lecky, Self-Consistency, A Theory of Person­
ality (New York: Island-i5re°sa, 1945} , pp .-10-ll . -
5"Philosophy" is used throughout this study to refer 
to broad points of view. It is not used as an antonym ot 
" science. " When references are made to rationalistic brands 
ot philosophy, the se particular philosophic systems are re­
ferred to by name or more generally as rationalism . 
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phy•icali8Dl, scientific empiricism, psychological behaviorism., 
reductionism, and analytic philosophy. Some of these have 
been pursued more vigorously than others and have retained 
their identity; however, positivism borrows from all and has 
subsumed most of them. 
Logical positivism as it is now known was formally 
organized in 1928 by an impressive group of scientists known 
as the Vienna Circle. 
The principle aims were to provide a secure founda­
tion ror the sciences and to demonstrate the meaningless­
ness or all metaphysics. The method utilized to attain 
these aims were the logical analyses of all concepts and 
propositions . 6 
The two most fund8lllental doctrines of logical posi­
tivism according to Weinberg are: " ( l )  That propositions 
of existential import have an exclusively empirical reference, 
and (2 ) that this empirical reference can be conclusively 
shown by logical analysis. "7 The meaning of every proposi-
tion is reduced to atomic tacts. It should be noted that 
although the propositions are said to have empirical refer­
ents, the methodology (logical analysis) does not have an 
6J. R. Weinbert, An Examination of Logical Positivism 
(Paterson, New Jersey : tittlefield, Adams and Company, 1960 ) , 
P •  1 .  
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empirical anchor. This is explained away by the assertion 
that the method is onl1 used to conne ct meanings, not infer 
them. 
Levi summarizes positivism into six doctrinal theses : 
l. The function of philosophy is logical analy-
sis. 
2. All cofnitivelt significant ( meaningful ) dis­course "Is9dlv sible w thout remainder into analytI'c 
or synthetic propositions. 
--
3. A1y 1roposition that purports to be factual or emlir ca has meaning only if it iapossible in princ ple to describe � method tor its verification. 
4. All metaphysical assertions, being neither 
analytic !!£!: synthetic proposition, .!!:.! meaningless. 
5. There is a single lan8yage for all science; it is slmilar1n-torm to the angu.'"ige ot physics ,  
andall synthetic!?roposit!ons are reducible to 
elementary experiences expressible in this iaiigu­
age. 
6. All normative assertions, whether positinf moral, aesthetic or religious values, are sclent tic­
llJ unverifiable-,-and are therefore tobe classified 
orms of �-cogii!tiiEtd!scourse. S--
-
An examination of the above theses makes possible some 
very interesting generalizations. First or all, philosophy 
has been stripped of all functions save that of analysis • 
• • • It should analyze all pretensions to 
knowledge so as to clari�y the meaning of terms 
and the logical relationships between ideas. In 
the end this will mean that philosophy has become 
8Albert William Levi, Philosophy and th& Modern World 
( Bloomington : Indiana University Presa,�.59)"; pp. 343-345. 
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the logical analysis of science through the syntacti­
cal analysis of scientific language. 9 
This, of course, is a very narrow concept of philoso­
phy. It is used as a formal deduction for transposing mean­
ing. The value world of mankind for the application of 
meaning has been omitted from positivism. 
Me aning is not vested in the individual, but rather 
it rests in empirical referents and relationships . All 
"meaningful" discourse is either analytical or synthetic. 
The formal sentences of logic and pure mathematics, with­
out empirical referents, can be used to stipulate defini­
tions, rules or syntax . The synthetic discourse is termed 
the factual language ·of science where propositions can be 
judged tor tl'Uth and falsity. Since, it is held, meta­
physical assertions do not fall in the two categories of 
analysis and synthesis , then they are me aningless . The con­
tention is that metaphysical assertions have supposed 
existential import, yet they are non-empirical . They are 
not reducible to elementary propositions verified in experi-
ence. 
With the emphases given to language, many inadequacies 
were found in the multitude ot different ways of expressing 
similar me anings. So, a single language was found to be 
. 9Ibid. , P • 344. 
necessary. Levi defines this necessity as follow s: 
Any empirical science should rest on a base of 
sensory perception and should be intersub jectively 
verifiab le. To meet these requirements and to 
unity the various special sciences requires the 
formation of a universal language of science in 
which propositions from the most various sciences 
might be combined in a single body. Such a lan­
guage would be a thing-language consisting of defi­
nite quantity-quality descriptions tor definite 
space-time values. 10 
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A new language was the topic of investigation by 
Rudolph Carnap; he was primarily responsible for refinements  
in positivism, known as  physicalism (sometimes called radi­
cal physicalism). 11 
The last thesis mentioned by Levi, that all normative 
assertions are forms of non-cognitive discourse, puts the 
role of human purpose outside the realms of a positivistic 
science. It is contended that an analysis of normative 
assertions 
• • • will always reveal them to be either socio­
logical descriptions of moral phenomena, psycho ­
logical descriptions of moral beliefs ,  emotion­
laden · expres sions of moral sentiment or impera­
tive statements seeking to compel activity. 12 
A point of view about meaning on which the positivists 
have leaned heavily is operationism. The tenets of 
10 �,. r1. Ibid. , p. ,+;, • 
llFor example, see:  Rudolph Carnap, The Logical �­
tax of Language (London: Routledge and Kegan'Paul; New 
York: Humanities . Press, 1937). 
12tevi, �· cit. , P •  345. 
,' 
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operationism are explored in the subsequent section. 
Operationism 
Operationism { sometimes called operationalism) is an 
attempt to establish a criterion ror meaning. Accurate re­
porting has always been important in science. The work or 
one scientist, to be meaningful to another for further ex­
perimentation, must b e  accurately reported. In describing 
one's experimentation,  the choice ot terminology is impor­
tant. What does one mean when he uses a particular term? 
Professor Percy W. Bridgman has been credited with origi­
nating operationism. 13 He described his thesis as follows: 
11 In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set 
of operations; the concept is synonymous with the correspond-
ing set ot operations. "14 To Bridgman, a physicist, concepts 
were derined in the set of operations that necessitated their 
use. Hempel outlines the basic tenets of operationism: 
1. •�eanings are operational. • To understand 
the meaning or a term, we must know the operational 
criterions ot its application, and every meaningful 
scientific term must therefore permit of an opera­
tional definition. Such definition may refer to 
certain symbolic operations and it must ultimately 
make reference to some instrumental operation. 
· � · · · l3pe.rey W .  Bridgman, The Logi e of Mode rn Physi c s  
(New . York: The Macmillan Company, 92Bj. 
14Ibid. , p. 5. 
110 
2. To avoid ambiguity every scientific term 
should be defined by means of one unique opera-
tional criterion • • • •  
3 .  The insistence that scientific terms should 
have unambiguous, specifiab le, operational. meanings 
serves to insure the possibility of an ob jective 
test for the hypotheses formulated by means ot 
those terms. Hypotheses incapab le of operational 
test or, rather, questions involving unte s�ab le 
formulations are rejected as meaningles s. 1/ 
The above explanation ot meaning is obviously an ef­
fort toward the elimination of ambiguity through anchoring 
the meaning of concepts to ob servable operations; meaning 
is anchored to physical empiricism. To what extent Bridgman , 
intended that this criterion be applicab le to sciences other 
than physics is not clear. Whether it was intende d or not, 
psychologists adopted it !_!! masse to give some stature to 
their budding science. The behaviorists found rich support 
. . 
tor their point of view. 
For the empiricists, here was an explanation of 
meaning to rid themselves tor good of the perplexing prob lem 
ot metaphysics . 
To say that Bridgman was displeased with the inter­
pretations given to his book is quite an understatement. In 
1953 , at the American As sociation for the Advancement of 
15carl G. Hempel, "A Logical Appraisal of Operation­
iam, " The Validation of Scientific Theories, Phillipp G .  
Frank, 'editor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956, copyrighted by 
American As sociation for the Advancement of Science ) ,  pp. 
53-54. 
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Science symposium, while reviewing the current state ot opera­
tionism he was prompted to state : 
• • •  I feel that I have created a Franken­
ste in which has certainly got away trom me . I 
abhor the word operationalism or operationism, 
which seems to imply a dogma, or at least a thesis 
ot some kind. The thing I have envisaged is too 
simple to be dignitied by so pretentious a name ; 
rather, it is an attitude or point ot view gener­
ated by continued practice of operational analy­
sis. So far as any dogma is involve d here at all, 
it is merely the conviction that it is better, be ­
cause it takes us further, to analyze into doings 
or happe1J.ings rather than into objects or e n­
titie s. lb 
To those who perceived here the ultimate in empiric­
ism, Bridgman clarifies his position very clearly: 
In general, I think, that there need be no 
qualms that the operational point of view will 
ever place the slightest restriction on the free­
dom of the the oretical physicist to explore the 
conse quences ot any free mental construction that 
he is ingenious enough to make. It must be re­
membered that the operational point of view sug­
gested itselt from observation of physicists in 
action. 17 
After Bridgman clari�ied his position in lectures and 
publications subse quent to his original book on the subject, 
the more empirical-minded advocates of some of the othe r 
sciences were content to judge him ( Bridgman) as a physicist. 
The psychologists were espe cially disturbed by his acknowl­
edgment ot the scientist as a personality who freely creates 
16Perey W. Bridgman, Reflections of a Physicist ( New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1955) ,  p. n>o7 
17rbid. , p. 166. 
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and influence his research. 18 
In positivism and its chief supporting ideology, 
operationism, it is apparent th.at the role or science is re­
duced to explanation.  This stems from traditional realist 
notions dating at least as tar back as Francis Bacon. The 
universe, it is assumed, has a fixity that lends itself to  
discovery . When applied to human behavior, this same 
rigidity of habit is assumed. 
There is an alternative to positivism which is ex­
plored in the fo llowing section. 
C .  A RELATIVISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
It seemed important to examine an alternative point 
ot view about scientific investigation. The discussion here 
was correlated with points di·scussed regarding determinism 
to show clearly b oth sides of the philosophical issues. No 
doubt, many scientists and philosophers with positivistie 
orientations will resent the implication that positivism is 
a deterministic philosophy of science. The break from 
rationalism was an effort to get from under the supernatural 
universal laws. The contention by  the positivists that 
science is seeking not for truth or falsity, but usefulness 
or lack of usefulness is commendab le. But such strides 
18s. s. Stevens, "Psychology and the Science of 
Science, "  Psychological Theory, Melvin H. Marx, editor 
( New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951 ) ,  p .  25. 
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toward relativism are belied by the insistence upon empiri­
cal referents for meaning . So long as  this insistence is 
maintained, words about relativism by _ the positivists have a 
hollow ring. 
There are two general areas in which relativism has 
had revolutionary effects . These areas are physical matter 
and physical measurement . These, of course, originated in 
the natural sciences ; however, like determinism there are 
basic applications in the social sciences . 
Quantum Theory 
The advances in quantum mechanics during this century 
are staggering to the imagination. The early Greeks specu­
lated that matter was composed of small particles which they 
called atoms to suggest their basic, individual nature. 
"Today, based not on speculation but on ingenious, indirect 
experiments we know that atoms exist; we even know their 
sizes and shapes with accuracy, although they are invisibly 
sma11. nl9 The only similarity between the atom speculated 
by the Greeks and the atom as we now know it, is that the 
name "atom" has been retained. The atom itself is not a 
mas s, but the nucleus of the atom is thought to contain mass. 
19nonald s. Hughes, "The Elusive Neutron, " Adventures 
of the Mind Series, The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIV 
(February 4, 1961), � --
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The minuteness of the dimensions of an atom amazes the non­
scientist. It would take at least one million atoms to 
cross a very tine line, one-tenth or a millimetre wide. In­
side the atom, which may be considered as a zone, electrons 
rotate. In the center or the atom is one nucleus which is so 
small that there would be room tor a billion in one atom. 20 
Wuesthotr illustrates the minuteness ot the mass as follows: 
Just imagine an iron cube JO feet high by 30 
feet wide by 30 feet deep. This would be a block 
ot iron about the size of a small house. It it 
were possible to squeeze together all the atomic 
nuclei, that is to say all the points at which 
the mass is concentrated, then all the atomic 
nuclei from these 27, 000 cubic feet ot solid iron 
would only occupy the space of a pin head. 21 
Scientists have made the nucleus a subject for in­
vestigation, and of its two parts, the neutron which is not 
electrically charged and the positively charged proton, the 
neutron has been singled out for investigation. Inside the 
neutron, rapidly moving mesons have been found, and ·it is 
conjectured that there may be other smaller particles. 22 
Hughes pose s the question tor us: 
• • • Are there fundamental particles? Will 
we ever find the ultimate particle? With the 
20Freda Wuesthott, " Atomic Energy and Peace, " Lecture 
given at the First Meeting of the Stuttgart Peace Circle, 
March 22, 1947. Printed by the Society for the Scientific 
Study of Peace, Geneva, 1957. 
21Ibid. , pp. 12-13. 
22Hughes, .££•  cit. , pp. 22-23; 75-77. 
enormous accelerators now building or in the 
planning stage will we be able to split the meson 
only to find new submesonic members of our family 
of • elementary ' particles? At the present time 
no scientist or philosophe·r has a valid b asis for 
answering this question. 23 
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This discussion of quantum mechanics was intended to 
point out how unrealistic it may be to lean tor support on 
physical reality. 
In addition to the minuteness of the subatomic realm, 
the shape of these particles and the rate of motion are also 
factors which amaze even the physicists. These subatomic par­
ticles simultaneously behave as waves, such as ripples on a 
pond, and as particles such as rolling marbles. Also, at 
variance with common sense is the speed of these particles, 
which is not uncommon at about the speed of light, 186, 000 
miles per second. And, as the speed increases, so does the 
weight or the particle, which accounts for the equivalence 
of matter to energy. 24 
Wuesthoft suggests that these new developments in 
physics pose some real responsibilities: 
Any physicist who looks out on the world today 
and views with open eyes the present position of 
the natural sciences cannot but feel an over­
powering sense of responsibility. He knows that 
the developments which have taken place very 
recently in the field of physics have set in 
23Ibid. , p. 77. 
24Ibid., p. 75. 
motion revolutionary changes of a most tar­
reaching character, which will descend like 
5 avalanches on all fields ot human activity. 2 
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Physicists found themselves in a quandry trying to 
conduct experimentation when there were evidences that physi­
cal systems behave like particles and like waves. Northrop 
describes the method of escaping this predicament as follows: 
When exactly described, it [E'he methog' may 
be called the method or acting as if one does not 
know what one does know. For the benefit of those 
who insist upon an abstract and more dignified 
title we shall call it the method ot simulated 
ignoranoe . 26 
This method, described by Northrop, appears to be an 
appropriate one not only for physicists but for all who seek 
intelligent behavior . It is a way or subjecting our own 
values and beliefs to scientific scrutiny . 
It seems that these new knowledges have implica-
tions for challenging traditional reliance on physical matter 
in a theory or knowledge. Levi suggests that, "A type of 
physical theory which would be congruent with both cosmologi­
cal and subatomic measurements seems, therefore, to require 
a reinterpretation or the categories or time, space, sub­
stance, and causality. "27 
2?Wuesthoft, �· cit. , p. 9. 
26F. s .  c .  Northrop, The Logic or the Sciences and 
the Humanities ( New York: The Macmillan Company, 19471,p . 
202 . 
27Levi, �· cit. , P • 247 • 
The situation has been summed up well by J. H. 
Faurot: 
• • • The axioms ot mathematics were at one 
time thought to be self-evident; and until fairly 
recently, the laws of Galilean physics, although 
not considered self-evident, were believed to be 
an exact transcription of the structure of nature. 
Today among advanced scholars, the view is prac­
tically universal that these truths are not abso­
lute. We approach some sub jects in terms of 
postulates, assuming what is never capable of being 
proved. Other subjects, we approach in terms ot 
hypotheses, sub ject to varying degrees of proba­
bility . And most ot our knowledge is viewed in the 
context o� function : a given proposition is true 
for certain purposes, and no proposition is true 
except these purposes be understood. 
Our problem is to live with this new under­
standing of knowledge • • • •  28 
Experimentalism 
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John Dewey is largely responsible tor promoting the 
philosophic system of experimentalism which is not in con­
flict, but rather complements these new knowledges . As a 
matter of tact this philosophy preceded many of these new 
scientific developments. Two fundamental elements of this 
philosophy are intertwined. These are : ( 1 )  the individual 
is the focal point ot all activity and behavior, and (2 ) the 
meaning of an idea is dependent on its consequential re­
sults. 
These tenets have a number of important implications. 
28J. H. Faurot, ttTruth and Responsibilit1, '' The 
Journal of Higher Education, XXX (January, 1960 ), _ 3-;--
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In the first place, responsibility is removed from the laps 
of the gods and .from the inherent nature of the "facts.'' 
Each individual has responsibilities .for his own behavior 
and exercises control over his environment. This makes it 
mandatory that people, .from the international level to the 
smallest groups ,  work together .for mutual benefit. Every 
individual must be as sured ot freedom for his own selt de­
velopment, but inherent in every guarantee of freedom is the 
expectation that responsibility will be assumed neces sary to 
guarantee the freedom of others. The realization that man 
is responsible tor his own behavior and tor his own develop­
ment within a social frame of re.ference is comforting to some 
but horrifying to others. Our educational programs have a 
major role for assisting each individual in his own develop­
ment so that he will not be seeking ways of shifting re­
sponsibility. 
The tenet that meaning rests with consequential re­
sults is closely allied with the notion of individual rree­
dom and responsibility. This tenet is also basic to the 
notion of theory that has been advanced in this study . It 
was maintained that the purpose of theory is primarily that 
of prediction--as sociating the present with the future with 
past experience interpreting both . When a problem is en­
countered, an inte lligent person will analyze his assump­
tions and project pos sible problem solutions. Whether or 
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not a projected solution will work cannot be finally known 
until it is tested. However, knowing that responsibility 
tor the results ot this proposed solution rests in the sound­
ness of the assumptions, an individual is forced toward 
intelligent behavior. 
These remarks about in�ividual behavior throw open 
the whole issue of morals and values for investigation. 
The matters can be thrown out of science so long as reliance 
tor confirmation of meaning is placed in physical reality. 
But when the individual assumes responsibility himself, 
these things must be examined. So long as it is contended 
that there is a realm of science and there is a realm of 
philosophy, and "ne ver the twain shall meet, " except 
possibly on a very limited scale for analyses, then it is 
comforting tor man to justify a dual lite. Dewey saw an im­
perative need for unification: 
When· the consciousness of science is fully im­
pregnated with the consciousness ot human value, 
the greatest dualism which now weighs humanity 
down, the split between the material, the me chani­
cal, the scientific and the moral and ideal will 
be destroyed� Human forces that now waver because 
of this division will be unified and reinforced. 
As long as ends are not thought of as individual­
ized according to spe cific needs and opportunities, 
the mind will be content with abstractions, and 
the adequate stimulus to the moral or social use of 
natural science and historical data will be lacking. 
But when attention is concentrated upon the diversi­
fied concretes, recourse to all intellectual ma­
terials needed to clear up the special cases will 
be  imperative. At the same time that morals are 
made to to eus in intelligence, things intellectual 
are morali zed. The vexatious and wasteful con­
flict between naturalism and humanism is termi­
nated. 29 
Dewey suggests tour considerations necessary to do 
away with this dualism. "First ; inquiry, discovery take 
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the same place in morals that they have come to occupy in 
sciences of nature . "30 This eliminates complete reliance 
on past de cisions and old principles for justifying a course 
ot action. Also, a purpose in a definite case is not final, 
but is he ld as a working hypothe sis until results confirm 
its rightness. 
Mistakes are no longer either mere unavoidable 
accidents to be mourned or moral sins to be ex­
piated and forgiven. They are lessons in wrong 
methods of using intelligence and instructions as 
to a better course in the future. They are indi­
cations of the need of revision, development, re­
adjustment. Ends grow, standards of judgment are 
improved. Man is under just as much obligation to 
develop his most advanced standards and ideals as 
to use conscientiously those which he already 
posses ses. 31 
The second consideration advanced is summarized by 
Dewey as follows: 
Anything that in a given situation is an end and 
good at all is of equal worth, rank and dignity with 
29John Dewey, "Reconstruction in Moral Conceptions, " 
The Structure of Scientific Thought� Edward H. Madden, 
editor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 353-
354. 
30�. ,  P • 354. 
31Ibid. 
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every other good of any other situation and de-
serves the same intelligent attention.32 
The third consideration has to do with the removal or 
fixed moral standards for everyone. 
The good man is the man who no matter how 
morally unworthy he has been is moving to become 
better. Such a conception makes one severe in 
judging himself and humane in judging others.33 
Finally, " ·  • • the process of growth of improvement 
and progress, rather than the static outcome and result , be­
comes the significant thing. »34 
D. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THEORY 
OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that 
fundamental points of view about theory are imbeddad in 
points of view about systems of inquiry. The major contro­
versial issues identified in Chapter II were centered around 
the questions of (1.) the place of human values in a theoreti­
cal structure, (2 ) the free creative or the restrictive 
aspects of assumptions, (3) the empirical definition of all 
concepts, and ( 4 )  the validity of the "is-ought" dichotomy. 
- -
It is quite apparent that these issues are fundamental ones 
32Ibid. 
33Ibid. , PP • 354-355. 
34rb id . , P • 355. 
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in the larger philosophical considerations explored in this 
chapter. Those who adhere to a deterministic interpretation 
ot the universe and human behavior obviously must look upon 
theory from a significantly different vantage point than 
those scientists who do not perceive their roles as map­
makers35 but as creators with human strengths and weaknesses. 
Dwight Waldo, in his excellent discussion of public 
administration in The Study of Public Administration, 36 sum­
marizes the possib le _effects or logical positivism when 
applied to public administration. His discussion, which is 
pertinent to educational administration, is abridged in the 
following paragraphs preceded by an abridgment of his analy­
sis of the value problem in public administration. 
Until the 1930 1 s a separation between polities and 
public administration was acknowledged, with politics identi­
fied primarily with the legislative body and administration 
with the departments and chief executive. So long as the 
separatism was accepted, the value problem did' not appear, 
since value was assigne d to polities in deciding a course of 
35James B. Conant says that science is not an ex­
ploration of the universe. "To my mind, the analogy between 
the mapmaker and the scientist is false. A scientific theory 
is not even the first approximation to a map; it is not a 
creed; it is a policy • • • •  " James B. Conant, Modern Science 
and Modern Man ( Garden City: . Doubleday Anchor Books, Double­
day and Company, Inc. , 1952 ) ,  P • 97 . 
36Dwight Waldo, The ��$fY or Public AdministratiOn 
(New York: Random House;-1 · • -
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action directed toward a goal, and administration was only a 
means for realizing the goal in the moat etticient and eco­
nomical way.  
In a broader perspective the value problem is a philo­
sophic one. Perhaps the most important philosophic movement 
of the twentieth century in Western countries has been toward 
separating the categories of tact and value, ot the "is" and 
the " ought." This movement is associated with logical 
positivism, however, some idealist philosophers in reaction 
to the materialist ethos in modern science have promoted 
this movement by contending that attention to the "is"  of 
facts cannot determine the good or right. 
The positivists maintain that values are unveritiable 
and do not belong in the realm of science. Some arguments 
against positivism are as follows: 
1. Logical positivism equates distinctions in logic 
with distinctions in lite. 
2. What is presented as an instrument ot analysis 
becomes a program ot action with Un.fortunate results. 
( a ) The separation of fact and value, often identified 
with logical distinctions between tact and preterence state­
ments, encourages the divorce of me ans and ends. Ends are 
taken for granted; the organization is absorbed into a tech­
nological context, and leadership is dispensable. If leader­
ship assumes no creative role in formulating ends when the 
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situation requires it, then leadership will fail leaving be­
hind a history of uncontrolled opportunistic adaptation. 37 
( b )  Logical positivists may be naive about their own 
value premises. Values have entered in the back door, since 
what the �o�itivists are researching is valued or it would 
not be res�arched. 
(c) Research by the positivists lends itself to the 
bias or uses of elitism s ince positivism i s  value blind. 
That is, the positivists have value systems but they are ac­
cidental since they are unrecognized. 
3. The value neutrality of means asserted by the 
positivists is false. 
4. Even though positivism has a firm commitment 
to the ideal of science, the effect may b� to retard actual 
scientific advance because or eliminating a wide realm or 
experience. 
5. Positivism is a present-day extension of rational­
ism which a�tords aid and comfort to the mystic. The phil­
osophy is usually associated with agnosticism but some 
religious people £ind it congenial s in.ca their faith can be 
£itted comfortably in the area or nonveri!'iable values. 38 
37Ibid. , pp. 63-64, citing Philip Selznick,  "Adminis ­
tration arur!nstitutional Leadership. " ( Unpublished manu­
script. ) 
38rbid. , PP · 60-66. 
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In educational administration, theorists have en­
countered the same problems as Waldo defines above in his 
discussion or public administration. The question is largely 
one or values which are ignored in a deterministic philosophy 
or science. Also, there is the question of means and ends, 
the resolution of which depends again on the philosophic 
point or view. The determinist would virtually ignore ends 
and purposes, while the relativist would gauge all behavior 
by them. An example or the tendency to ignore ends can be 
seen in educational administration. There are many who con­
tend that administration is  the same wherever it is found 
regardless or the organizational purposes. 
It would appear that progress in the profession of 
educational administration demands that every member or the 
profession shoulder his share or responsibility. This 
challenge is appropriate especially to those who propose 
theoretical structures, since their structures shape the 
direction of research by others. 
E .  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter attempted to show that controversial 
issues in theory are fundamentally issues in larger philo­
sophic points of view. 
A deterministic philosophy or science was reviewed 
with special investigations into modern expressions of 
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determinism--logical positivism and operationism. The 
tenets of a relativistic philosophy of science were also 
examined. Special examples were cited and described in 
quantum mechanics and experimentalism. 
All of the controversial issues in theory were found 
to be fundamental issues in the two alternative philosophies 
of science. 
Determinism seems to be of questionable validity in 
the light of new scientific knowledges; a more tenable posi­
tion seems to be one that insists on individual responsi­
bility. Progress in the profession of educational adminis­
tration is dependent on the assumption of responsibility by 
all members of the profession. 
CHAPTER IV 
PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The discussions thus far have been largely from a 
philosophic frame ot re�erence, noting scientific develop­
ments in support of the thesis advanced. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to  take a look at developments in psychology 
that have special significance for intelligent theorizing. 
Theorizing has been discussed as a human intellectual 
process, which makes it especially pertinent to examine the 
psychological bases ot theorizing--not in addition to, but 
in conjunction with the philosophical and scientific context. 
The specific investigations of psychology must be 
interpreted within the context of a larger problem with 
which psychologists and philosophers have struggled since 
the beginning or recorded history, the mind-body problem. 
Early philosophers regarded the mind and body as two 
different substances . This is no longer assumed; however, 
the perplexities have not subsided. These perplexities of 
differentiating the physical from the mental, such as private­
public, quality-quantity, purposive-mechanical, have caused 
many behavioral scientists to concentrate on the physical, 
assuming the mental as non- or extra-scientific. The argu­
mentation of specific points about the mind-body can be 
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detected in the several theories of perception presented in 
this chapter. 
Psychology has undergone a metamorphosis within this 
century. The trend has gone from. a concept of the "empty" 
organism to a " cognizing" organism. "1 Cognition has ad-
vanced from the early Gestalt idea of c losure to the notion 
of a very active organism which structures its stimuli and 
environment. 
Indeed, the time honored adage • to see is to 
believe • seemed frequently better restated • to be­
lieve is to see. ' Learning seemed to be not only 
a conne ctive and� cognitive, but an effective --an 
emotional--process .  The model of the 'empty 
organism' that had been transforme d into a model of 
the • cognizing organism' was transformed yet again-­
thisr time into a 'dynamic ' or 'personalistic 1 organ­
ism. 2 
This newer concept of the organism is of concern to 
perceptual psychologists. Boring3 gives an historical 
chronology of perception from early sensationism to later 
perceptual theories. His remarks are abridged in the subse ­
quent paragraphs.  
lJacob w. Getzels,  "Theory and Practice in Educational 
Administration: An Old Question Revisited, "  Administrative 
Theory as a Guide to Action,  Roald F. Campbell and James M. 
Lipham, ed!tors (Ch!cago : Midwest Administration Cente r, 
1960), PP • 37-58. 
2Ibid. , P • 50. 
3Edwin G. Boring, Sensation and Perception in the 
History of Experimental Ps
}
chology (New York: Applet"on=­
Century-Crofts , Inc., 1942 , PP• 3-4 5. 
B .  THE HISTORICAL EVOLVEMENT OF PERCEPTUAL THEORY 
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He believes that the concept of sensation became im­
portant in human thought by way of philosophical empiric­
ism: knowledge comes to the mind by way ot the senses. This 
is an old doctrine that at least dates back to the fifth 
century B.C. Heraelitos s aid that knowledge comes to man 
through the door ot the senses ,  and Protogoras maintained 
that the entire psychic lite consists only of sensations. 
Other early Greeks also had a theory ot perception that 
still haunts the present.� It was supposed that objects give 
oft from their surfaces or pores effluvia (an invisible eman­
ation) , which act upon the senses  to transmit knowledge of 
the outer world. Democritos (ca . 460-ca . 370 B. C.) and 
Epicuros (ea . 341 - 270 B. C. )  described the se projections as 
taint images  ot the objects which, through conduction give 
the mind acquaintance with the objects which they represent. 
Empiricism came into prominence in the seventeenth 
century with Thomas Hobbes who wrote that all conceptions 
in man ' s  mind were at first ,  totally or by parts, begotten 
upon the organs of sen se. After Hobbes came John Locke 
who depicted the mind ·a s  a piece of white paper upon which 
experience writes. The mental element was the idea, which 
comes from experience by sensation or reflection. It was 
the aspect of retlecti�n, the belief that the mind knows 
what it is doing, that tended to prevent empiricists from 
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becoming full-fledged sensationists, from assum.ing that all 
knowledge comes from the outside. 
For Locke, ideas were such entities as white­
ness, motion, elephant, army, sheep, murder, grati­
tude; and of the se, whiteness is a simple idea, 
whereas sheep and gratitude are compound, formed, 
as Locke presently put it, by the association or 
simple ideas. Such a psychology is an empiricism, 
an associationism and also a partial sensationism . 
Sensation is in it the primary source of knowl­
edge .4 
Thomas Reid, who rounded the Scottish school ot 
faculty psychology, helped to establish the primacy of sensa­
tion in psychology, even though he was principally concerned 
with preserving the . God-given perceptual faculties from re­
duction to mere sensation. Psychological sensationism tor 
the next 150 years may well b e  said to have begun with Reid, 
even though its materialist nature echoed the defeat of his 
fundamental purpose. 
Through the work of Charles Bell in 1811, Magendie 
in 1822, Miller in 1826, and others, physiologists became 
actively engaged in sensationism because or the dichotomy 
of nervous action into sensory and motor. About the middle 
ot the nineteenth century the sense-physiology of the 
physiologists and the sensationistic psychology ot the phil­
osophers were ready tor synthesis . 
Regarding the question ot what has become of sensa­
tion in .modern psychology, Boring points out that tor some 
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psychologists it disintegrated into attributes (i. e. , an 
associationistic sensationism). For Ge stalt psychologists 
it was ab sorbed into perception. · But for othe rs it was 
translated into discriminative behavior which became the 
psychology or behaviorism invented by John Watson in 1913 
through his experimentation with animals .  In his work with 
animals, Watson grew tired of asking a.rter e ach experiment 
was finished: "What sensations and other mental processes 
must this animal have it he makes these discriminations, it 
he behaves a s  he does? "  The tacts of discrimination seemed 
to him enough. 
It is important to this discussion to pay special at­
tention to what Boring has to say about what became of be­
haviorism.  
Behaviorism ultimately disappeared, in part be­
cause in the 1930 1 s it got to be accepted as psy­
chology, and in part because modern positivism be­
came the sophisticated substitute tor it. The 
older positivism ot Mack and Karl Pearson--the view  
that the basic data of s cience are the immediate ob­
servations and not the entities (light, electricity, 
sensation, attention) inferentially derived from 
them--was superseded_ in the 1930 1 s by the positivism 
of the Vienna circle under Schlick--the view that an 
entity derives its meaning from an understanding of 
the operations by  which it is observed and any term 
its meaning by analysis or the language which . gives 
it significance . The doctrine was called logical 
positivism 1n 1931 and is founded on the faith that 
meaning is secure d for a concept by its reduction 
to simpler, more fundamental, common terms. Before 
1931, however, the physicist Bridgman had undertaken 
(in 1928 ) to resolve the dilemmas of modern rela­
tivity theory by insisting that physical entities, 
like space, can be understood only in terms of the 
operations for ob serving them. 
All this was good gospel to the behaviorists, 
once they learned about the movement. Tolmon, 
the behaviorist, now became an operational be­
haviorist. Others, not Bridgman, coined the term 
operationism and used it in psychology • • • •  
Sensation became nothing more than the operation 
by which it is got, that is, to say, discrimina­
tion. • • • Gestalt psychology, of course, wanted 
to keep immediate experience in psychology, where­
as, the operationists wanted to reduce immediate ex­
perience to behavior. The logical positivists rec­
ognized this principle when they coined the word 
behavioristics. S 
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Boring says that this controversy represents a funda­
mental temperamental difference in scientific values and is 
not yet cool enough to be handled in an historical text such 
as his own. It is interesting to note that the history ot 
sensationism had fruition in the psychology ot behaviorism 
and is ultimately embraced by logical positivism. The posi­
tivist, faced with explaining sensation, simp ly translates 
it into discrimination. 
This leads to a consideration of perception in a 
larger, perhaps more meaningful context . Thomas Reid first 
insisted upon the distinction between sensation and percep­
tion. Perception, he said , although it depends upon sensa­
tion, is nevertheless much more than sensation, for it in­
cludes both a conception ot the object perceived and also 
an immediate and irresistible conviction ot the object ' s  
present status. Boring reports that this idea evolved into 
Srbid. , pp. 12-13. 
John Stuart Mill's enlightened notions ot the s ub ject in 
1856 . 
Accepting the evanescent and changing sensa­
tions as the immediate data ot mind, he was trying 
to explain how our belier in an external world and 
in permanent objects arises. An object is, after 
all, subjective, a creation of the mind. John Mill 
laid down as his premise the principle that the 
mind is capable ot expectation. Then he pointed out 
that though sensations may disappe ar, their possi­
bilities remain present to the mind. It one sees, he 
said, a piece of white paper on the table and then 
goes into another room, the sensations disappear, but 
their possibility remains, as  is evidenced by their 
recurrence it one returns to the room to look again 
at the table. Sensations are figurative and transi­
tory, but the 'permanent pos sibilities of sensations' 
are enduring. - That is  why the physical objects of 
the external world are stable, even though generated 
from changing sensations. They a�e simply the Perma­
nent Pos sibilities ot Sensations. b 
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The next event of importance was Titchener • s  context 
theory in 1909. He maintained that there were two stages to 
perception. A new perception must be supported by  appropri­
ate imagery ( i. e. ,  a new face to be recognized must be sup­
ported by a name or some other addition to the context ot 
the visual core). 
Such a thesis leads into field psychology which sug­
gests that perception has loosed the bonds or synonymity 
with sensation. With this historical background, some con­
temporary ideas about perception are reviewed. 
6rbid. , p. 15. 
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C.  PERCEPTUAL THEORIES 
Allport7 reviewed thi�teen theorie s and proceeded to 
formulate another ot his own. 0 1 Neil8 categorizes the im­
portant views into three groups, discrimination theories, 
phenomenalist theories, and judgmental theories. 
Discrimination will be recognize� as the camp of the 
behaviorists and positivists. O'Neil does not limit this 
category to these theorists, however. Those placed here are 
ordinarily realists (i. e . ,  the stimulus is real, not phenome­
nal). "There is a marked tendency to pack as mueh as 
pos sible into the stimulus which is scarcely distinguished 
conceptually from the cause of the response. "9 
The attractions ot this type of theory are many: 
Foremost amongst these is  the scope provided by 
rigorous theorizing and rigorous experimentation. 
Another, of les s  certain value, is the avoidance 
�t the bothersome problem ot introspection. As 
the aim of perceptual experiment within this 
theoretical cont�xt is the testing of limits ot 
discrimination and the seeking ot invariant rela­
tions between stimuli and discriminative response s, 
it does not matter what th� responses be  • • • • 10 
7Floyd Allport, Theories of Perception and the Con­
cept of Structure (New York : John Wiley and Sons,-r9'5517 
8w. M. O'Neil, ''Basic I ssues in Perceptual Theory, " 
Psychological Review, LXV (November, 1958), 348-361. 
9Ibid. , p. 352. 
18Ibid. , p. 353. 
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O ' Neil reports the drastic shift from discrimination 
to phenomenalist theories. He tells us that a psychological 
history of phenomenalism would begin with Muller's doctrine 
of the specific energies or the sensory nerves which stated 
that we are aware not or the external objects, but of the 
states they produce in our sensory nerves. His explanation 
of phenomenalism is important in that it provides a frame 
of reference tor the evolvement or modern perceptual notions. 
Within this doctrine a veridical ( real ) knowledge 
of external objects would be attained to the extent 
that there is  some parallelism or isomorphism between 
the external objects and the states they produce. 
When that parallelism breaks down we have error or 
illusory perception. But how anything about parallel­
ism or its absence can be discovered is a puzzle. 11 
Bor1ng12 attributed to the Gestaltists the essence of 
phenomenalism. This, no doubt, is justified with respect to 
the early Gestaltists, Koffka, Kohler, et al. One is led to 
speculate, however, it this phenomenalist trend was not a re­
bellion again st the sensationists of that era. Hamlyn said 
that Gestalt theory itself was a reaction against the sensa­
tionalist and as sociationist theories of the nineteenth cen­
tury. 13 
York: 
11Ibid. , P • 354. 
12Boring, .2£• cit. , PP • 3-45. 
13n. w. Hamlyn, The Pa
i
cholo
ff 
o� Perce
;
tion (New 
The Humanities Press ,  nc., ffi, P • 3 . 
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Regarding the judgmental theories, O ' Neil as serts 
that they have been propounded most o:rten by the philosophi­
cally minded . However, in his discussion ot the is sue s  in 
perceptual theory, he tells us : 
• • • Some of the is sue s  are epistemological but, 
as the psychologists attempt .to shelve such issues 
as non-psychological have proved unavailing, it is 
better to face them without too much apology . 14 
Judgmental theorists seek to provide balance to the continuum 
ot the realist ' s  contention that the perceived ob ject has ab­
solute reality within itself, and the phenomenalist's point 
of view that neural processes produce a unit in the phenomenal 
field . 
Such a theory ( judgmental } can acconnnodate some 
distinction ot the sort attempted in the contrast 
between the real and the phenomenal, and at the 
same time preserve some ot the advantages ot ob­
jective reference attained by discrimination 
theories; it may well be the type ot theory the 
psychologist will find best adapted to his needs. 15 
Functionalism 
O • Neil's conclusion introduces a whole new era ot 
perceptual psychology known as :functionalism which tocuses 
attention on the perceiver in the perceptual process . 
Hamlyn very appropriately points out that "the psychologi­
cal theories of perception of today all have their roots, in 
14o • Neil, £1?.• cit. , p. 348 . 
15rbid . , p .  355. 
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one way or another, in Gestalt theory. "
16 This fact will be ­
come obvious as these theories are examined. The functional­
ists find no contentment in the notion that perception is a 
passive process wherein something is done to the observer;  
rather they maintain that the perceiver has a very active 
role in his perceptions. It is not intended  to imply that 
all contemporary perceptual research is functionalist; how­
ever, this definitely appears to be a positive trend. Bruner 
and Postman17 made this observation in 1949: 
The study of perception during the past decade 
has . been moving along two converging paths • • • • 
One approach ( formalist ) to perception is pri­
marily concerned with pe rception in and of ·itself, 
without primary regard tor the manner in which per­
ception is imbe dde d in the other, ongoing activities 
ot the perceiver. There is relatively little con­
cern with the role or pe rception in the adjustment 
of the organism. The functional relations between 
the dimensions of the stimulus and the attributes 
or experience and the determination of these rela­
tions by sensory me chanisms concern some exponents 
or this approach. Others stress the intrinsic laws 
of perceptr!1 organization ( e. g. , the law of Pragnanz ) . 
In research involving the first approach the formal labora­
tory techniques are utilized,  since it is crucial to control 
and hold constant the learnings, maturations, and other 
16Hamlyn, �· cit. , P • 3. 
17Jerome s .  Bruner and Leo Postman,  "Perception, Cog­
nition, and Behavior, " JournaL of Peraonali ty, 18 ( Se ptem­
ber, 1949 ) ,  14-31. 
18Ibid. , p. 14. 
138 
personal attributes of the sub ject • 
• • • He {Ehe sub jec!7 is assumed to have a 
basically neutral attitude toward the stimulus, 
wishing neither to eat, destroy, cares s, nor in 
any manner to use the stimulus presented to him.. 
It is merely a something to be seen, heard, touched, 
smelled, or sensed . 19 
On the other hand: 
The second approach (functionalist ) attempt s to 
treat perception in a broader behavioral context. 
For its primary concern is with the manner in 
which perceptual functioning is imbedded in and 
interacts with other forms of psychological func­
tioning. Perception is viewed as instrumental ac­
tivity. Those who take this approach to perception 
hope to add to and to go beyond the variables and 
relationships discovered in the formal study of 
perception • • • •  For a .t'ull understanding of the 
perceptual process  it is necessary to vary not only 
the physical stimulus and the sensory state of the 
organism b ut also those central conditions--motives, 
predispositions, past learnings--which have largely 
remained out side the formal limits or the perceptual 
system . 20 
Here are two patterns in perceptual research ; each 
pattern, perhaps to the dismay ot the b ehaviorists and posi­
tivists, is concerned with factors which are central to the 
sub ject . As an introduction to the examination 0£ the se 
central factors, another look should be taken at the stimu­
lus, or the perceived ob ject . "What is it that we see? " is 
, _  
a very important question in perceptual psychology. 
Whitehead warns us that "we must not slip into the 
fallacy ot assuming that we are comparing a given world with 
l9Ibid. 
20Ibid. , pp. 14-15. 
given perceptions ot it. The physical world is in some 
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general sense of the term, a deduced concept. "21 It is im-
portant to note that contemporary perceptual research has al­
most completely advanced beyond the historical sensationism 
of the behaviorists and positivists , and has adopted a more 
sophisticated approach than the historical neural phenomenol­
ogista. This is to say that the importance of the intellec­
tual capacity of the perceiver has come into prominence. 
Earl C. Kelley22 commenting on the Hanover Institute 
experiments in perception points out that the reality of an 
object is what the perceiver attributes to it. 
It [i. boo!r' only has reality and validity as you 
and I assign them, and its only importance lies in 
what we make ot it • • • •  
• • • I call it a book because I have book ex­
perience. If I had no book experience, I would not 
call it a book. So whatever we have that is  real 
in the whole situation comes from e ach ot us ( our 
past as experiencing organisms), and varies with 
each of us. 23 
Robert E. Billa, in the bulletin, "About People and 
Teaching, "24 sets out his use ot the term -"reality": 
21Alfred North Whithead, The Aims ot Education ( New 
York: Mentor Books, 1949), p. 1'607 -- --
22Earl C. Kelley, Education tor What is Real (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) .  -- --- -- --
23Ib id. , pp. 36-37 . 
24Robert E. Bills, "About People and Teaching, " 
Bulletin of Universit
� 
of Kentucky Bureau ot School Services, 
XXVIII ( December, l95 );-2. 
The term ' reality • will be used throughout the 
bulletin to designate the perceptions most people 
seem to hold in common. That there is such an 
overlapping of perceptual fields of different 
people is seen in our ability to communicate with 
them. Without overlapping, communication would be 
impos sible. But we should keep in mind that a 
major portion of this overlapping exists by agree­
ment. For instance, we agree on certain names tor 
objects and our numbering system which was not dis­
covered, only agreed upon. The dittieulties in com­
munication which come about when we use a different 
system ot naming or language are apparent. 25 
Ot course, Bills is commenting on perception in 
social psychology, but it has significance tor the individual 
perceiver. Kelley comments on the overlap of perceptual 
fields as follows : 
Our perceptions do not come simply from the ob­
jects around us, but from our past experience as 
functioning purposive organisms. We take a large 
number of clues, none ot which is reliable, add 
them together, and make what we can ot them. All 
that this gives us is an estimate ot our surround­
ings. It is never exactly right. It is never the 
same tor different individuals. It . is like a 
statistical average, a useful device tor making a 
prognosi3, but always wrong in any particular in­
stance. 20 
This is not to say .that an ob ject of perception does 
not exist. "There would be no perception but tor the object. 
• • • What it is :functionally, however, comes rrom us , and 
does not reside in the object itselr. 27 
25Ibid. , p. 13. 
26Kelley, �· cit. , P • .34. 
27Ibid. , p. 40 . 
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D. PERCEPTUAL. DETERMINANTS 
Enough has been said regarding the physical object ot 
perception to point out that apart from meaning given by the 
observer it has no functional significance, and even along 
with the perceiver it has relative significance postulated 
on the central factors within the organism . 
What are some of these central factors that are con­
tinuously at work in the continuous process ot perception? 
Bills names six important perceptual determinants: beliefs ,  
values, needs, attitudes, self-experience, and threat.28 
Kelley, after reviewing perceptual experimentation of the 
Hanover Institute gives evidence to support that we select 
what we choose to see. 
We do some interesting things with the percep­
tio�s which come to us. To begin with, we do not 
pay attention to all ot them, or even a good frac­
tion ot them. We select the coincidences in nature 
which we choose to register. Given the same scene 
or nearly so,  no two people pay attention to the 
same factors in it. 29 
Bills calls attention to two very important factors 
that cause us to be selective, past experience and purpose. 
28Robert E. Bills , "Believing and Behaving: Percep­
tion and Learning, " Learning More about Learning, A
. 
lexander 
Frazier, editor (Washington: ASCD, National Education 
Association, 1959 ), pp. �7-62.  
29Kelley, � ·  cit. , P • 45. 
Now you may want to raise the questi on as to why 
a person sele cts what he does to pay attention to 
out ot his surroundings, and why he classifies them 
in his own way. It is easy to show that no two 
persons do this alike. We have said that we bring 
our past experience to bear upon it but this does 
not seem to be adequate to account tor the whole 
performance. In any ordinary scene, we have past 
experience with practically everything in it, but 
we do not pay attention to everything . Our selec­
tion, therefore, must be based on something in addi­
tion to experience. 
It apparently is a combination of past experi­
en ce and what we call purpose. The human being is 
a purposive creature. The drives ne cessary . to sur­
vival, food, sex, etc., . are fairly simple. But 
they seem to be only part of the purpose of the 
total organism, which has value at the core ot it. 30 
Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies31 report that perceptual 
sele ction is dependent not only upon primary determinants ot . 
attention but it is also a servant ot one's interests, needs, 
and values. 
Can one lean on the slender reed of 'limited 
span of attention • and its primary determinants to 
explain the selectivity ot perception? That there 
is a limited span can hardly be denied. But to in­
voke it in an explanation of itself leaves unex­
plained the differences in the perceptions of indi­
viduals faced with the same stimuli and all hampered 
by a 'limited span ot attention' and governed by 
common primary determinants . 32 
30Ibid. , pp. 46-47• 
31Leo Postman, Jerome S .  Bruner and Elliott McGinnies, 
"Personal Values as Selective Factors in Perception," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social . Psychology, XLIII (April, 
1948) ,  142-154. 
32Ibid. , p. J.4,2 . 
Ross Stagner also calls attention to some ways in 
which the organism contributes to the nature ot the external 
object as perceived: sensory modalities, sensory de­
ficiencies, past experience, expectancies, group influences, 
and inner needs. He concludes that all perception is ulti­
mately purposive in character. 33 
It is readily admitted that many of the central 
determinants overlap and some may be synonymous. Without 
attempting to categorize or further differentiate among 
these factors, to further support this discussion two fac­
tors are selected tor further examination. These are 
"values" and "purposes. " 
Values !.!. Perceptual Determinants 
The positive role of values as perceptual determi-
nants was demonstrated in a study conducted by Postman, 
Bruner, and MeGinnies in 19�8 which they report under the 
title of "Values as Selective Factors in Pereeption . "34 
The hypothesis of the study was that personal values are 
demonstrable determinants of what the individual selects 
perceptually from his environment. 
33Ross Stagner, Psychology ot Industrial Conflict 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. , 1956) , pp . 20-29 • 
.34Postman, Bruner, and McGinnies, loc .  cit. 
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Twenty-five subjects, students at Harvard and Rad­
cliffe, were shown thirty-six words, one at a time in a ta­
chitoscope. The words were unanimously chosen by judges to 
represent the six values me asured by the Allport-Vernon 
Study ot Values--theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, 
political, and religious. The final list, comprising six 
words tor each value was balanced tor length ot words, and 
insofar as possible, an attempt was made to select words ot 
equal familiarity. The thirty-six words were shown to the 
subjects in random order with each word exposed three times 
for . 01 second, . 02 second, . 03 second, etc. , until recog­
·nition occurred. A full record was kept of all the sub jects' 
recognition responses. 
To obtain an independent measure of personal value 
orientation, the Allport-Vernon Study ot Values was adminis-
tered individually to each sub ject either some weeks in ad­
vance ot the perceptual experiment or a�ter the experiment. 
The finding ot the study was that certainly viaual 
inspection indicates that, for the sample as a whole, time 
ot recognition varies as a function of the value. The 
findings were statistically significant. These psycholo­
gists concluded their findings as follows: 
The experimental evidence le ads us to the formu­
lation of three mechanisms to account for the inter­
relationship of these phenomena in perceptual be­
havior. Value orientation makes tor perceptual 
sensitization to valued stimuli, leads to perceptual 
defense against inimical stimuli, and gives rise to 
a process  of value resonance which keeps the person 
responding in terms of objects valuable to him even 
when such objects are absent from his immediate en­
vironment. These processes of selectivity must be 
considered in any perciptual theory which lays claim 
to comprehensiveness. 3J 
Related research has supported the above findings. 36, 37 
Purpo ses !.! Perceptual Determinants 
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Kelley reminds us that valueful purpose is  not easy to 
demonstrate in the laboratory. 
But it can be conclusively demonstrated • • •  
that the selective nature ot perception cannot be 
accounted for in any other way. This is common and 
respectable scientific proof. No one has ever seen 
an electron, but the chara.cteristics of matter under 
certain conditions cannot be accounted for in any 
other way, so we accept their existence. In fact, 
no one questions their existence any
8
more than he 
does those things which he can see. 3 · 
It seems logical to conclude that it reliance for per­
ceptual selectivity rests solely on past experience, then we 
would be in a static state dwelling in the past. With the 
3 5Ibid. , p. 154. 
36J. Bruner and c .  Goodman, "Value and Need as Organ­
izing Factors in Perce:etion, " Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, XLII ( 1947 ) ,  33-44. 
37R. Levine, I. Chein, and G. Murphy, " The Relation 
of the Intensity ot a Need to the Amount of Perceptual Distor­
tion: A Preliminary Report, " Journal of Psychology, XIII 
( 1942 ) ,  283 -293 . 
38Kelley, �·  cit. , p. 47 . 
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factor of purpose interjected into the process, our past 
experiences tend to point the way toward reconstructing and 
improving perceptual selectivity. This, if acceptable, gives 
perception the primary role in our growth and learning. 
This is another way of s aying that the primary perceptual 
determinant is purpose. This point of view constitutes a 
new aspect of perceptual psychology. It is  an attempt, 
through recognition of the purposeful organism, to inte­
grate fragments of psychology--i. e. , perceptual theory, per­
sonality theory, learning theory, motivation theory, etc . -­
into a general theory of behavior. 
E .  EFFORTS TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY 
OF PERCEPTION 
Hochberg and Gleitman39 review the experimentation of 
those engaged in pointing out the relationship between motiv-
ation and perception . The experimental conditions of the 
psychological laboratory, they said, are seldom if ever 
encountered in the ordinary life of an organism . They sug­
gested that the fundamental law of Pragnanz, the closure of 
incomplete circles, continuation of figures, etc. , points 
toward a much larger equilibration process. Disequilibria 
39Julian E. Hochberg and Henry Gleitman, " Perception-­
Motivation Dichotomy, " Journal of Personality, XVIII ( Decem-
ber, 1949 ) ,  180-191 . 
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occurring between isomorphic representations of objects or 
stimulus con.figuration in the perceptual field is comparable 
to the organism moving about in the environment until per­
ceptual equilibration (i. e. ,  goal attainment ) is brought 
about. 
Within the Ge stalt theoretical framework here 
adopted, this type of equilibration corresponds 
to what is generally called goal-directe d be­
havior. From such a point of view, the • motiva­
tion ' is neither superimposed from above � nor in­
jected in from below, pgt is an attribute or the total field situation. 4 
Bruner and Postman voice similar pleas for an inte­
grated psychology . They propose the following objectives as 
tasks for the future: 
. • • ( 1) To �elect central, nonperceptual vari­
ables, changes in which can be shown to bring about 
systematic changes in perceptual functioning; { 2) 
to select these variables from various theoretical 
systems--le arning theorie s, motivational theories, 
theories of personality--so that these theories may 
be made continuous within the body or perceptual 
theory; { 3) to postulate and then study those inter­
vening mechanisms which account tor the changes in 
perception which occur when we change the central 
state of the organism; and ( 4) tinally, to emerge 
with a unified theory of behavior which treats the 
organism as an organized whole and which contains 
laws stating the manner in which perceiving is an 
instrument of adjustive activity. 41 
40ibid. , pp. 186-187. 
41Bruner and Po stman, �· cit. , p. 16. 
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Other psychologists have been concerned with the de­
velopment of an integrated psychology. Lecky, 42 Bills, 43 
and Combs, 44 all propose psychological theories of self­
organization founded on the purposive nature of the indi­
vidual perceiver. 
The Perceptual Theory of Transactionalism 
There is one theory of perception that deserves spe­
cial attention: (1) because of its comprehensiveness, and 
(2) because of its significance to this study. This is the 
theory of transactionalism. Many characteristics of trans­
actionalism have been incorporated into prior discussions, 
however, full attention is directed to those characteristics 
here. Hamlyn said that the view which has been called 
"transactionalism" is derived chiefly from the work of Adel-
- -
bert Ames, Jr. (although its philosophy stems from Dewey) 
and · work by Kilpatrick. 45 Let us examine some characteristics 
42prescott Lecky, Selr Conaistencl: A Theori or Personality (New York: Island Presa, l9�5) . -
43aills, "About People end Teaching,'' loc. ei t. 
44Donald Snygg and Arthur W. Combs, Individual Be­
havior (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949) . 
45Hamlyn, �·· cit. , p. 1.02. 
of this theory of perception discussed by Ittelson and Can­
tri1. 46 
·-
There are three features ot perception which de­
serve special attention with regard to human per­
ception. First, the tacts of perception always pre­
sent themselves through concrete individuals dealing 
with concrete situations. They can be studied only 
in terms of the transactions in which they can be 
observed. Second, within such transactions, per­
ceiving is always done bJ a particular person from 
his own unique position in sp ace and time and with 
his own combination ot experiences and needs. Per­
ception always enters into the transaction from the 
unique personal behavioral center ot the perceiving 
individual. And, third, within the particular 
transaction and operating from his own personal be­
havioral center, each of us, through perceiving, 
creates tor himself his own p sychological environ­
ment by attributing certain aspects ot his experi ­
ence to an environment which he believes exists inde­
pendent ot the experience. This characteristic ot 
perception we can label externalization. 47 
. The problem of perception is defined as follows: 
The major problem of perception has been formu­
lated as the study of the process by which we achieve 
correspondence, or lack of correspondence, between 
the significances which we experience as existing 
apart from us and the significances which we experi­
ence as a consequence of action--that is, p1tween 
what we externalize and what we encounter. 4� 
In the section of the booklet dealing with the de­
velopment of perception, the important classes of significances 
46william H. Ittelson and Hadley Cantril, Perception, 
A Transactional Approach (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 
Inc. , 1954). 
q.7�. ,  p. 2. 
48Ibid. , p. 9. 
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are identified. Following are the clas ses or significances 
with abridged explanations : 
1 .  "Thing" signi.ficanees. This term re:fers to the 
world of ob jects and people in so far a s  we experience them 
as entities apart from ourselves pos sess ing their own charac­
teris tics and spatial-temporal locationa. 
2. Sequential signi.ficances . The world o.f objects 
does not exist passively and statically .for our observation. 
Very rarely, i:f ever, do we contemplate a completely un­
changing world where all sights, all sounds, all touches, 
tastes, and smells are static, frozen, and .fixed. Rather, 
events ot one kind or another are constantly occurring 
around us, new events following the previous in a never­
ending series o.f sequences. 
3. Action significances. Although we all do oc­
casionally pas sively ob serve sequential events from the out­
side, more frequently we enter into the sequence at some 
point as active participants. 
4. Evaluative significances .  As a rule, in any con­
crete situation into which we enter as active participants, 
each of us is constantly faced with alternative courses of 
action. Evaluation among these alternatives is made on the 
basis of the relative probability that each possible course 
of action will lead to the desired sequence s, will produce 
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the desired results. 49 
Earlier, "values" and "purposes'' were isolated as 
being central factors in the perceptual process that are 
especially relevant to this study. Ittelson and Cantril 
specifically note these factors . Under the category of eval­
uative significances they say:  
There are two main categories ot this kind of 
evaluation which can be separated tor descriptive 
purposes although in concrete experience they are 
completely interwoven and almost never encountered 
independently. ( 1) What-for evaluations involve 
selection among alternati�goals on the basis of 
which goal· offers the greater probability of pro­
viding us with the value satisfactions we seek out 
ot life . This kind of value judgment • • • enters 
at least implicitly into every perception • • • • 
( 2 )  How-to-do evaluations enter more explicitly 
into theperceptual process. , They involve the 
selection among alternative courses of action once 
the immediate goal has been decided upon . 50 
The final section of the booklet is devoted to a dis­
cussion of purposes . 
We have discussed perception so far primarily as 
a present experience with its roots in the past. 
This time-orientation is in accord both with naive 
observation and with the traditional approach of 
psychology. Perception certainly seems to be of the 
world as it is right now, or perhaps, as it was a few 
minutes ago. Indeed the definition of perception 
freque ntly appears in psychology texts as 'The aware­
ness of immediately present objects. ' But -again naive 
observation and tradition are both inadequate • . • • •  
If we were to close the study of perception where 
we left it at the end of the last section, we would 
49r�id. , PP • 19-22. 
50ibid. , pp. 21-22. 
then have missed at least halr of the problem, or 
more correctly, the problem would still be dis­
torted in such a way that it could not be solve d .  
For 1ust � past perceptions !!!.!:! �  present per­cept ons, so every present perception is in a sense 
the anticipated future of a past experience. The 
1roce s s  � which the present becomes the pafj of the uture is basic to perception. As Laoti sa ,'What 
is is tne � of what shall be . •'51 ( italics min;r-
Ittelson and Cantril conclude: 
The human being as all living organisms, cease­
lessly attempts to cre ate an environment within 
which to carry out his purposes. And in every oc­
casion of living, perception-in-operation is a 
never-ending process or prediction in the tace of 
uncertainty for action on the basis of faith. 52 
F .  PERCEPTION AND AMINISTRATIVE THEORY 
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In Chapter III, controversial issues regarding theory 
ot e ducational administration were received in the light ot 
discussions about science and philosophy. The examination of 
perceptual theory seemed  to substantiate further the postu­
lations ot this study. These new knowledges in psychology 
shed additional light on the controversial issues.  These 
issues are re-examined with ·additional clarirication from 
psychological and philosophical tram.es of reference. 
Valuation in Theorizing 
The first issue, questioning the inclusion ot human 
values in theoretical structures ,  is e specially clariried 
51Ibid. , p. 27. 52Ibid. , p. 31. 
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from the preceding discussions. Research in perceptual psy­
chology has taught us that the perceiving organism inter­
prets his perceptual tield in a context of all that he is at 
the time--his values, his purposes, the sum total of his ex­
periences. Even the scientist cannot rid himself of this 
fact in the rigors of his laboratory experimentation. Theory 
must be predicated on what the theorist perceives to be im­
portant. The significance of personal points of view in 
theory construction has ironically troubled perceptual theor­
ists who interestingly enough have sought objectivity in 
the study of subjective perception. Bakan tells us that 
• • • clearly the beliefs entertained by the in­
vestigator can determine the complexion of a theo­
retical formulation. These beliefs determine what 
the scientist regards as the events requiring ex­
planation, what he regards as stimulus, and what 
he regards as response. 53 
In his discussion ot the importance of beliefs ot the 
scientist in determining the stimulus, Bakan continues: 
The scientist should, therefore, recognize the 
limitations inherent in a theoretical system in 
which the stimulus is an important concept and in 
which it must be defined, either implicitly or ex­
plicitly. For the definition of the stimulus in 
any theoretical context is influenced by certain 
as sumptions made by the theorist concerning what 
aspect of a total situation is · the stimulus. The 
scientist constitutes a conceptual stimulus with 
which he hopes to approximate a 'real stimulus. ' 
53Paul Bakan, "Current Theoretical Approaches to 
Perception, tt Present-Day Psychology, A. A. Roback, editor 
( New York: Philosophical Library, 1955 ) ,  P •  73. 
But his stimulus is a construct and not an en­
tity. 54 
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Northrop vividly points up the fallacy of depending 
on the facts to speak for themselves • 
• • • The only way to get pure facts, independent 
of all concepts and theory, is merely to look at 
them forthwith to remain perpetually dumb, never 
uttering a word or des cribing what one sees, after 
the manner of a calf looking at the moon. For the 
moment one reports what one observes, at a meeting 
of historians or in a book written for sociologists, 
at that moment one has not pure facts but facts 
brought under concepts, and hence theory. Thus, 
the social s cientist ' s  or the historian's aim at 
pure fact is a snare - and a delusion . What one gets 
are not facts, but facts brought under some often 
uncritically examined, unconscious, theoretical 
assum£�ions of the sociologist or historian in ques ­
tion . 57 
The valuation exhibited by the scientist is unavoid­
able. Man is a valuing creature. Reichenbach states the 
matter very clearly: 
In some sense, every human activity serves the 
pursuit of a goal . . • • In all such activities, 
however, there are moments when a choice is to be 
made; it is here that behavior exhibits valuation. 
The valuation need not be explicitly stated, nor 
achieved through reflection and comparison; it may 
be performed in the spontaneous impulse • • • •  
But in the decisions made we express  our prefer­
ences and thus indicate through our behavior the 
valuational orde
5
i which contributed the background 
of our actions . 
54Ibid. 
55F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and 
The Humanities ( New York : �Macmillan Company, 1947/,pp. 
317-318.  
56Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy 
( Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPres s ,  1951),  pp. 313-14. 
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It appears that the efforts toward eliminating values 
from administrative theory result only in substituting one 
value for another . 
Assumptions, Concepts, and Induction 
The second issue, questioning the empirical b ases of 
assumptions, is also further clarified. An organism that 
interprets and gives meaning to his environment is  not one 
that anchors every act ot imagination on empirical reality. 
Closely allied is the question or concept definition. 
Operationism and functionalism are quite incompatible. 
Since these questions are elaborated in Chapter V, they are 
not belabored here. 
The "Is-Ought" Dichotomy 
To get an understanding of this problem, it will be 
helpful to refer to an elaboration of the issue by the late, 
great historian, Carl Becker. 57 In pointing up the fallacy 
of assuming man knows only the present to the exclusion of 
the past and future, he has the rollowing to say:  
We are apt to think of the past as dead, the 
futµre as nonexistent, the present alone as real; 
and prematurely wise or disillusioned counselors 
have urged us to burn always with a 'hard, gem­
like flame • in order to give ' the highest quality 
to the moment's sake. ' This no doubt is what the 
glowworm does; but I think that man, who alone is 
57carl Beeker, "Everyman His Own Historian, " in 
Edward H. Madden, The Structure of Scientific Thought { Bos­
ton: Hougton MiffI!ii Company, 19b0 ), 176-187 . 
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properly aware that the present moment passes, can 
tor that very reason make no good use of the present 
moment simply tor its own sake. Strictly speaking, 
the present doesn ' t  exist tor us, or ls at best no 
more than an 1nt1nitesimalp0iiit intime;-gone bi"= 
tore wi'riote it as present. Nevertheless, we must 
have apresint; and so  we create one � robb!ngtlie 
p g,-.ez holding on to nie most recentevents ancfpre­
t in
� 
that thez a1rbilong to � immediate pe"rceE­
t!ons. 8 ( italics mine) 
Using the philosophical terminology of "specious 
present" to describe this past, present, future orientation, 
Becker makes clear that the past is  not the only contrib utor 
to interpreting the present. 
The extent to which the specious present may thus 
be enlarged and enriched will depend upon knowledge, 
the artificial extension ot memory, the memory of 
things said and done in the past and distant places. 
But not upon knowledge alone ; rather jEOD knowledge 
directed £I purpose. 59 { italics mine 
The individual who insists on sticking with the present 
as the only meaningful experience is  the kind of unintellec­
tual individual that we hope to avoid through improving man ' s 
capacity for theorizing. This whole problem is placed in 
perspective by Graft: 
We probably cannot s uecess:t'ully cope with the 
• was -is-ought • trichotomy without assuming that 
all behavior is  moving through a t ime continuum. 
This is precisely what the modern physicist doe s 
assume with respect to the behavior ot matter; 
and it is also an assumption of modern perceptual 
theory re the behavior of human beings. In the 
�a a 7 Ibid. , pp. 179-1 O. 
59rbid. , p. 180. 
case of people, however, there is the tremendously 
complicating factor or purpose. If this factor or 
purpose were the same tor all individuals, it would 
constitute no problem. But it isn • t . For each 
person it is a control on his interpretation or the 
past ( the • was • ), a selector of present stimuli ( the 
• is'), and � a proposed re-direction or behavior moving 
through time ( the 'ought • ). Thus human values, in 
the form of human purpose, are always present in the 
• was, ' and 'is, ' and the • ought. • 
It should be noted that the control of purpose 
over human behavior seems directly proportional to 
the amount or intellectual effort involved. Since 
the act or the ory building is a highly intellectual 
affair, it seems obvious that purpose is a main con­
sideration . The notion that theory has a quality of 
• oughtness' about it seems unavoidable to me. 60 
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Research in perceptual theory can leave little doubt 
about the untenable position of those who would insist that 
administrative theory, or any theory, must conrine itself to 
what is and avoid what ought to be. Normative considerations 
are what man sets for his own pursuits that determine whether 
he behaves intelligently or in the manner or Becker's glow-
worm. 
G .  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter was an investigation into the psychologi­
cal foundations ot theorizing. Since theorizing has been 
described as· a human process, psychological research has a 
special significance tor explaining this process. 
60orin B. Graft, "Administrative Theory and Human 
Values , " Address at the National Conference or Professors ot 
Educational Administration, Macomb, Illinois, August 24, 1960, 
pp. 21-22. ( Mimeographed. ) 
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Efforts to solve the perplexing mind-body problem 
seem to encompass specific research efforts and to give some 
meaning to controversial issues in theory. 
The historical evolvement of modern theories of per­
ceptual psychology was traced from early Greek sensationism 
which gained signiticance through philosophical empiricism . 
Sensationism was embraced by behaviorism and reached fruition 
in logical positivism. 
Perceptual theories of today are �unded in Gestalt 
psychology. The evolution from sensationism--which has be­
come known as discrimination theory--has progressed through 
recognizing the individual as a cognitive organism to recog-
-�izing the individual as an organism which structures the 
stfmuli and environment. 
Functionalist theories of perception are concerned 
with the central factors of the organism--needs, purposes, 
values, ete. --which act as perceptual determinants. Values 
and purposes of the individual have been demonstrated 
through research to be active determinants of what the in­
dividual wishes to perceive and how he interprets what he 
sees. 
Much progress may be possible toward formulating an 
integrated theory ot personality by perceptual research . 
The perceptual theory of transactionalism seems to 
be of special importance tor theorists to examine. The role 
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of the individual as a creator o.f his environment in 
carrying out his purposes are portrayed in this theory . 
The controversial issues regarding theory in educa­
tional administration were re-examined in the light of per­
ceptual research .findings with .further discussion of the 
philosophic issues. 
Research in perception seems to discount such notions 
as " theory is value-.free, " and " theory is con.tined to the is 
at the exclusion of the ought. " 
CHAPTER V 
THE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS OF 
THEORY CONSTRUCTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The constructs of theory identified in Chapter II of 
this study were as sumptions ,  logical deductions and hypothe­
ses. Although different terms have been used to describe 
these elements ot a theoretical structure, there is general 
agreement among writers who have dealt with the subject that 
these three constructs do constitute the vital elements or a 
theoretical structure. There are wide differences of opin­
ion, however,  on the nature or these three constructs. Be­
cause of these differences , an analytical examination of the 
constructs is highly significant. 
Not only are there wide differences of opinion about 
the nature of theory constructs , but there is lack or agree­
ment on the meaning of analysis and synthesis. In the dis­
cus sion of logical positivism in Chapter III, analysis was 
described as the method of showing relationships , and syn­
thesis was the method or inferring meaning through reduction 
to atomistic elements of experience. Obviously,  the posi­
tivist's use ot these terms is different from uses of the 
terms in this study . Analysis , as it is used in this study, 
is  the scientific process  ot breaking down a complex 
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structure into simpler units. The purpose of this method as 
describe d by Bronowski is H to shift our gaze .from the thing 
or event to its structure. "1 Bronowski goes on to say that , 
"We understand a process, we explain it, when we lay bare in 
it a structure which is like one which we have me t else­
where.  "2 
The analytic section of this chapter treats e ach of 
the thr�e constructs individually. Since theorizing has 
been described as a human process, the individual constructs 
are therefore parts of this process • . It is helpful to think 
of the three constructs, not as assumptions, logical deduc­
tions, and hypotheses, but rather as assuming, logically de­
ducing, and hypothesizing. Such a consideration makes them 
more vividly a part of the process of theorizing. 
The synthetic section of the chapter relates the three 
constructs to each other. The total structure is then shown 
to be meaningful, not through re duction to atomistic ele­
ments of experience, but through its capacity for insuring 
intelligent behavior, including scientific experimentation. 
1Jacob Bronowski, " Science as Foresight, " What Is 
Science, James R. Newman, editor (New York: Simoii"andSchus-
ter, 1955 ), P • 429. 
2Ibid. 
B. THE ANALYSIS 
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The breaking down ot complex structures into simpler 
units can be very dangerous. The danger lies in the distor­
tions which may arise when viewing any unit out ot its usual 
context. Even though the theoretical constructs are examined 
individually in this study, their function in the total 
structure should be kept in mind. Contrary to a determinis-
. tic philosophy ot s cience, knowledge is not gained by pro­
gression from atomistic elements to more universal relation­
ships. Rather, progression is trom universal assumptions to 
atomistic elements tor testing, and, thus, to more refined 
universal assumptions. The question then arises about the 
method of formulating universal assumptions. This problem 
is dealt with in the examination or the first theory con­
struct, a set of assumptions. 
The Nature or Assumptions 
The elements ot theory generally termed the assump­
tions are frequently known by other names. Northrop pre­
ferred to call them postulat1ons3; Campbell called them 
hypotheses. 4 No doubt, Sullivan was referring to these 
3F. s .  C. Northrop, Logie ot the Sciences and the 
Humanities ( New York: The Macm11Iin--C0mpany, 194'7)'; �140. 
4Norman R. Campbell, "The Stru cture of Theories, " 
Readings in the Philosophy ot Science, Herbert Feigl and May 
Brodbeck,ed!lors (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 
1953 ), P •  290. 
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elements when he said that science has a certain amount or 
userul myth on which mathematical formulations can be hung. 5 
Assumptions are synonymous with Conant ' s  working hypotheses 
on a grand scale. 6 Many writers, including Graft and Street7 
refer to this collective construct as the the�ry. 
Most theoretical structures have many assumptions. 
Since they must be internally consistent and logically re-. 
lated they are generally referred to colle ctively as a set 
of assumptions and as a si�gle theory construct. The number 
of assumptions would decrease as the theory became more ab­
stract and general. Conversely, the number of assumptions 
would increase as the theory became more specific and con­
crete. 
This examination of assumptions is concerned with 
(1) determining the function of assumptions in a theoretical 
structure, and (2 ) to investigate methods tor formulating 
assumptions. 
5J. w. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science (New 
York: Mentor Books, The New American Library ot World Liter­
ature, Inc. , 1952), p. 157. 
6James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, l9;IT, P • 47 . 
7Qrin B. Graff and Calvin M. Street, Improving Co�a•­tence in Educational Ad.ministration (New York: Harper an 
Brothers, . 19 56. 
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Ennis describes tour different uses ot assumptions: 
(1 ) deprecatory use, (2 ) concluding use, ( 3 )  premise use, 
and ( 4 ) presupposition use. 8 The deprecatory use e ncompasses 
the charge that very little or no evidence is available . An 
example of such usage is, "Oh, you are only assuming; you 
don ' t  really know. " The concluding use also suggests some 
weakness in the e vidence. An example would be, "I assume 
that you are going out, since you have on your dark blue 
cap. ,, 9 In the premise use, a conclusion or point of view 
is justified in terms of the assumption which stands as a 
premise. The presupposition use me ans that the assumption 
must be true before an utterance can be considered to be 
correct. An example would be, "The present Oakwood Latin 
teacher is a graduate ot Illinoi�. 1110 The statement pre­
supposes that there is a Latin teacher at Oakwood. 
Assumptions in -a theoretical structure most nearly 
approximate premise-type · assumptions. In a theoretical 
structure there is a set of assumptions and there is a set 
ot hypotheses which is logically deduced from the assumptions. 
8Robert H. Ennis, "Assumption-Finding, " Languafe and 
Concepts in Education, B. Othanel Smith and Robert H . nn!i; 
editors (Chicago: Rand. McNally and Company, 1961 ) ,  pp. 161-
178. 
9Ibid. , p. 163 . 
lOibid. , p. 164 . 
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The reasonableness  of the hypotheses i s  premised on the 
reasonableness  of the as sumptions. Of course, the hypothe­
ses are s ub ject to rigorous testing; however, no amount of 
testing can verity an hypothesis independent of the as sump­
tions from which it was deduced. 
It is difficult to choose which theory construct is 
mos t  important, since all are vital. However, assump tions 
are preliminary to any investigation or act ot behavior. 
To this extent, they are ot most importance. Also, assump­
tions give more trouble to the theorist--and everyone is 
to some extent a theorist--than any of the other cons tructs .  
Northrop maintains that as sumptions are the under­
lying source of all problems s ubjected to examination. 11 
Campbell describes this element of theory as being a set of 
propositions setting forth a collection of ideas character­
istic of the theory. 12 Sullivan would use this element as 
pegs on which he would hang mathematical formulations. 13 
For Conant, this element would be the basis tor deducing 
consequences for experimentation. 14 
llNorthrop, �·  cit. , pp. 19-34. 
12campbell, �· eit. , p. 290. 
13sullivan, loc. cit. 
l�conant, loc. cit. 
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It has been maintained throughout this study that 
every act of intelligent behavior and scientific experimenta­
tion presupposes a theory. It is further maintained that 
the fundamental presupposition is a set ot assumptions which 
gives rise to hypotheses. 
There are implicit assumptions as well as explicit 
ones . The explicit assumptions offer little difficulty 
since they can be readily investigated for logical internal 
relatedness and consistency. Also 1 the tact th.at �hey are 
explicit makes it likely that they have been carefully 
s crutinized . The implicit assumptions 1 however, are un­
usually problematic since they frequently have not been 
intellectualized. The rise of a deterministic philosophy 
or science has contributed to the failure of many people to 
examine implicit assumptions or even to admit that they 
exist.  The advocacy of a kind of s cience intended only to 
explain what is and of a kind of theory purported to be 
free from human values perpetuates encouragement for ignoring 
implicit assl.'Ullptions. Many people become furious and highly 
defensive when implicit assumptions are suggested in explana­
tion of some statement they have made or some act of behavior 
they have exhibited • . Such a reaction is typical of those 
who prefer to compartmentalize their lives into the s cien­
tific realm and the metaphysical realm.. These individuals 
would likely insist that it is nobody's busine ss what they 
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believe. 
Wrapped up in the notion of implicit assumptions are 
individual beliefs, values and purposes. For example, an 
assumption about administrative behavior in education pre­
supposes assumptions about education, assumptions about a 
society which would promote particular kinds of educational 
opportunities, and assumptions about man, the individual 
unit of society--his nature, his purposes. Also, there are 
implicit cosmological assumptions. 
It is not advocated here that implicit assumptions 
always be stated in a scientific theory, but that they be 
understood. It is advocated, however, that every individual 
be constantly engaged at defining his own implicit assumptions. 
A well-orde�ed lire demands that a person know what he be­
lieves. The alternative would result in an inconsistent, 
frequently manipulative and opportunistic individual. This 
argument does not imply that a person's beliefs never change. 
It is possible constantly to evaluate beliefs and revise 
them only when they are identifiable. A scientific venture 
limited to an examination or what is can result only in a 
massive accumulation of me aningless data. Whitehead once 
said : 
• • • No science can be more secure than the un­
conscious metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes. 
The individual thing is necessarily a modification 
of its environment, and cannot be understood in 
disjunction. All reasoning, apa�t from meta­
physical reference, is viscous. 1/ 
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How, then, are assumptions formulated? Ideas about 
the nature of assumptions would influence points of view 
about their formulation. Griffiths, in taking issue with 
the normative nature ot assumptions, describes his own ideas 
about how assumptions are formulated. 
We can say • • • that a theory is essentially 
a set or assumptions from which a set ot empirical 
principles may be derived. Since the principles 
are empirical they must be statements or veri­
fiable fact. Since it is logically impossib le to 
derive empirical statements from value assumptions, 
the assumptions of a theory must be restricted to 
factual or empirically verifiable statements. The 
assumption of a theory ot administration cannot 
be value statements . lo 
Griffiths insists that assumptions must be restricted 
to factual or empirically verifiable statements. This 
method of formulating as sumptions would depend on induction-­
gathering the facts. An alternative me thod for formulating 
assumptions in the science of physics was expressed by Albert 
Einstein : 
15Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas ( New 
York: Mentor Books, The New Amer!ean Libraryof World Liter-
ature, Inc. , 1958 ) , p .  158. 
i6naniel E. Griffiths ,  "The Nature and Meaning of 
Theory" ( Paper read at the National Conference or Professors 
ot Educational Administration, Macomb, Illinois, August 24, 
1960). 
There is no inductive method which could lead to the 
fundamental concepts ot physics . Failure to under­
stand this tact constituted the basic  philosophical 
error ot so many investigators ot the nineteenth 
century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Physics constitutes a logical system 0£ thought 
which is in a state ot evolution, and whose b asis 
cannot be obtained through distillation by any in­
ductive method from the experiences lived through
! but which can only be attained by tree invention. 7 
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Perhaps this fundamental question ot whether assump­
tions are generalizations ot accumulated tacts or whether 
they are tree creations ot the mind constitutes a basic 
focal point of fundamental controversies regarding theory. 
Around this question hinges the "is-ought" dichotomy, 
the philosophy-science conflict, and the question ot human 
values in theoretical structures . 
The position advanced here is that there are assump­
tions which can never be empirically tested. An assumption 
which is made a subject of investigation may be tested; how­
ever, the validity of the test rests on other assumptions 
which are not empirically verifiable. In other words, the 
foundations ot science rest on tree creations ot the human 
intellect . 
Popper points up the logical fallacy ot relying on 
induction: 
17Albert Einstein, Out of � Later Years ( New York: 
Philosophical Library, 1950},pi):" 78, 96. 
Now it is far from obvious, from a logical point 
_of view, that we are justified in inferring uni­
versal statements from singular one s, no matter how 
numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may 
always turn out to be false: no matter how many 
instances of white swans we may have observed, this 
does not justify the conclusion that all swans are 
white. 18 
-
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Continuing his argument, Popper uses the principle of 
induction to disprove itself :  
For the principle of induction must be a uni­
versal statement in its turn. Thus ir we try to 
regard its truth as known from experience, then 
the very same problems which occasioned its intro­
duction will arise all over again. To justify it, 
we should have to employ inductive inferences; and 
to justify the se we should have to as sume an in­
ductive principle of a higher order; and so on. 
Thus the attempt to base the principle of induc­
tion on experience breaks down, since it must lead 
to an infinite regress. 19 
Efforts to tie all assumptions to the "facts" not only 
are illogical, but re search in perceptual psychology dis ­
proves the validity of such contentions .  The individual 
interprets  his environment. As Northrop so ably put the 
matter: 
• • •  The social scientist ' s or the historian ' s  
aim at pure fact is a snare and a delusion. What 
one ge ts are not facts, but facts brought under some 
often uncritically examined, unconscious, theoreti­
cal as sum�tions of the sociologist or historian in 
question. 20 
18Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
( London: Hutchinson and Company, Lta. , l959 ) ,  p • . 27 . 
19Ibid. , p. 29. 
20Northrop, �· cit. , pp. 317 -318. 
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Northrop defines the problem regarding formulation ot 
assumptions, in promoting his thesis that once facts are com­
municated, they are interpreted facts , not pure facts • 
• • • In fact, metaphysics, when unambiguously 
defined, is the thesis that there are concepts by 
postulation 3nterpretatio!!7 as well as concepts 
by intuition L'fmmediately apprehendable factif; 
positivism, conversely, is the thesis !hat there 
are only concepts by intuition • • • • 2 
No matter how vigorously man tries to define his re­
sponsibilities out of existence by  reliance on the "facts, " 
in the final analysis , the facts are of his own .making, and 
the responsibility is his � As Professor Bridgman described 
it, more revolutionary than the discoveries of Galileo, New­
ton, or Darwin is the realization by scientists that it is 
impossible to transcend the human reference point. 22 
Logical Deductions 
The second construct of theory has been identified as 
the process of logical deduction. Logical deduction is the 
process of inferring relationships, primarily between- the 
set of assumptions and the set of hypotheses, but also 
internal relationships among the assumptions and among the 
hypotheses. That is, the assumptions and the hypotheses 
21Ibid. , p. 87.  
22James B.  Conant, Modern Science and Modern Man 
( Garden City: DoubledaI and . Company, Inc:-;-1952), pP:-86-87, 
citing P. W. Bridgman, Philosophical Implications of PhysicsJ' 
American Academr 
or Arts and Sciences Bulletin, III, No. 5 
(February, 1950 . 
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must be logically related and internally consistent. As a 
theory construct, however, the chief concern in this investi­
gation was to treat the process of logical deduction as the 
connecting link between the set of assumptions and the set 
of hypotheses. Even though the process is isolated for ex­
amination, its relationship to the · other constructs must be 
kept in mind. 
Hull refers to this theory construct as a set of 
definitions of critical terms employed. 23 Marx would prob­
ably e quate logical deduction with his theoretical proposi� 
tions--generalized statements concerning functional rela­
tions among variables. 24 Hall and Lindzey 1 s empirically de­
fined concepts, which they maintain bring the theory into 
contact with reality, are similar to this construct. 25 
Northrop ' s  third stage in initiating inquiry was to logi­
cally deduce hypotheses. 26 His terminology is the s ame as 
that used in the study and the process is identical. Camp­
bell refers to this cons truct as the dictionary of the 
23c1ark L. Hull, "The Hypothetico-Deductive Method, "  
Psychological Theory, Melvin H. Marx, editor (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1951 ) , p. 219. 
24Melvin H. Marx, "The General Nature of Theory Con­
struction, tt PaychologicaL Theor�, Melvin H. Marx, editor (New York: The . Macmillan Company, I 51 ) ,  p. 7 .  
25calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories ot Per­
sonality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Ine. , 1957),p.--r-2. 
26xorthrop, �· cit. , pp. 60-61. 
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theory. 27 Griffiths would accomp lish the logical deduction 
task through operational concepts. 28 
It is frequently said that, " This is logical, or that 
is illogical. " What is meant by such assertions? What the 
theorist is trying to do is to attain correspondence between 
the assumptions and the hypotheses.  What every individual 
in every act of behavior is trying to do is t o  attain corre­
spondence between his value framework and the ob jective 
world which he believes exists independent o.f' himself. 
Lecky explains this predicament o.f' the individual as follows: 
Immersed in an environment which he does not 
and cannot understand, the individual is forced 
to cre ate a substitute world which he can under­
stand and in which he puts his faith. He acts in 
consistency with that conception, derives his 
standards or  values from it, and undertakes to al­
ter it only when convinced by further experience 
that it !'ails to serve the goal of unity. Since 
this self-made scheme of life is his only guarantee 
of security, its preservation so·on becomes a goal 
in itself . He seeks the type of experience which 
confirms and supports the unified attitude, and re­
jects experiences which seem to promise a disturb­
ance of this attitude. 29 
The above exp lanation is not unlike Dewey ' s  conception 
· of logic as being the transformation of an indeterminate 
27campbell, �· cit. , p. 290. 
28Daniel E. Griffiths, Administrative Theory ( New York: 
Appleton-Century-Cro.f'ts, Inc. , ,. 1959 ), pp • .38-42 . 
29Pres eott Lecky, Self-Consistency A Theory of Person-
ality { New York: Island Press, 1945) ,  p .  ;o . -
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situation into a determinate situation,30 or Ittelson and 
Cantril ' s  theory ot transactionalism whereby 
• • •  each of us, through perceiving, creates for 
himself his own psychological environment by attribu­
ting certain aspects ot his experience to an en­
viroilillent which he believes exists independent or 
the experience • • • • 31 
Logic, then, for the individual is the attainment of 
correspondence between his own interpretations ot his en­
vironment (from his value frame of reference) and the en­
vironment as he experiences it. Proponents of this point ot 
view have been criticized for denying the existence of an 
external world; this criticism is unwarranted. It is readily 
admitted that there does exist something, but the it ot ex­
ternal reality has no functional significance except as 
significance is given to it by the interpreting individual. 
As Whitehe ad so vividly put it: 
• • •  Philosophers have known for centuries 
that our senses are no reliable testimony to the 
existence of the outside world. • • • There 
was absolutely no reason to infer the existence 
or external reality from any evidence brought in 
to us by our senses. It is all subjective. The 
outer world may not be . there at all. And yet, as 
a matter of tact, the only human beings who do 
not assume the existence of that outer world as a 
reality are in the lunatic asylums • • • • 32 
30John Dewey, Logic, The Theor
! 
of Inguirz ( New York : 
Henry Holt and Company, 1938],pp. lO -Io'5. 
31William H. Ittelson and Hadley Cantril, Perception, 
A Transactional Approach (Garden City : Doubleday and Company, 
Inc . , 1954) , p . 2. 
32tucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead 
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The individual who behaves inte lligently is one 
whose correspondence between his interpretations and the 
world which he supposes is external or him are closely 
correlated. The external world does not provide meaning; 
the individual infers meaning. The only public meaning is 
through common agreement on private me anings . 
The variance of the point ot view herein expres sed 
from the point ot view or deterministic philosophers or 
s cience is quite apparent. Reliance ot the positivists 
on operational definitions and corrnnon concepts is an effort 
to confine meaning to operations and empirical matter out­
side the individual's own capacity to bestow meaning. Such 
ambitious efforts are noteworthy, but unfruitful. Northrop 
exposes the impossibility of attempting to operationally de­
fine all concepts in theory: 
There is no justification, from an analysis or 
scientific method itself, nor is there any other 
reason,  for supposing that it is necessary to re­
duce every concept in one's deductively formulated 
scientific theory to the type of meaning which 
only those who think merely with their hands can 
understand. In the case or most scientific 
theories only some ot the theoretical concepts by 
postulation have operational meanings and denota­
tively given epi stemic eorrelates . 33 
( New York: Mentor Books, The New American Library of World 
Literature, Inc. , 1954), P • 297. 
33Northrop, �· cit. , p .  124. 
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There must, however, be some way of insuring a degree 
of common understanding among scientists who are pursuing 
similar experimentation. One convenient way tor doing this 
is operationally defining some of the concepts. We should 
not be deluded into thinking, however, that meaning in such 
operations is anything more than personal meaning attributed 
by each scientist; the meaning becomes public only through 
common agreement of the . scientists. 
It is at the stage of logical deduction that mathe­
matics has been relied on heavily and the use of machines 
for this operation has been invaluab le to the researcher. 
However, neither mathematics nor machines can ever replace 
the ingenuity of the scientist. So long as science can be 
confined to induction (gathering the facts) and to manipu­
lating the facts,  then machines are far superior tor these 
operations than is man. These devices are only tools for 
the scientist to make his busy-work lighter. The prime func­
tion ot science , that of predietion--anticipating and con­
trolling the future--rests with the scientist who must assume 
full responsibility for his explorations. The caution of the 
great mathematician, Norbert Wiener, is especially appropri­
ate for those who would reduce all science to machine-like 
manipulations: 
If we use, to achieve our purposes, a mechanical 
agency with who se operations we cannot efficiently 
interfere once we have started it, because the 
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action is so fast and irrevocable that we have not 
the data to intervene before the action is com-
plete, then we had better be quite sure that the 
purpose put into the machine is the purpose which 
we really de�ire and not merely a color.tul imita-
tion of it.3� 
The factor of human purpose is ever-present, and the 
scientist can no more absolve himself of responsibility than 
can the consumer of scientific technology. 
There is one further aspect of logical deduction that 
requires examination. It has been asserted that logical de­
duction as a theory construct is the corresponding link be­
tween the set of assumptions and the set of hypotheses. Im­
plicit assumptions have been equated with normative consider­
ations--that is human purposes and values. On the other hand, 
hypotheses are deduced for empirical testing. ( The nature 
of hypotheses is discussed more fully in the next section of 
this chapter. ) The question arises about the method of 
logically relating normative considerations with empirical 
considerations. That is, how are metaphysical propositions 
connected with empirical propositions, or the ought with 
the is? 
Northrop defined the process of joining an un­
observed component ( anything designated by a concept by 
postulation ) to its directly inspected component ( anything 
34Norbert Wiener, "Some Moral and Technical Conse­
quences of Automation, '' Science, CXXXI ( May 6 ,  1960), 1358. 
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designated by a concept by intuition) as epistemic correla-
tions. . . . An epistemic correlation joins a thing known 
in the one way to what is in some sense that s ame thing 
known in a different way. " 35 An example in physics is cloud­
chamber experimentation whereby the principle of ionization 
is epistemically correlated with ·the inspected paths of the 
ele ctrons as they collide with gas molecules. 
The task or the deductive scientist • • •  is to 
begin with the postulated entities and relations 
of his deductively formulated theory and to find 
directly inspected data with which certain of his 
postulated entities can be epistemieally corre­
lated, so that the existence of the latter en­
tities can be put to an experimental test. 36 
The joining of untestable propositions with testable 
propositions does not prove the truth or falsity of the un­
testable propositions. Only the relationship or the two is 
shown. For example, if A and B represent the assumptions and 
hypotheses respe ctively, then the argument would be: if A, 
then B. B is the case. Therefore, A' is the case. 37 It 
is quite obvious that the argumentation is illogical. The 
existence of B does not logically prove the existence of A . 
The propositions by postulation ( assumptions) are still un­
verified. Through the process or inferring relationships, 
35Northrop, £E· cit. , p . 119 . 
36Ibid. , p . 121 . 
37Ibid. , p .  108 . 
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however, the reasonableness of the assumptions becomes more 
firmly fix.ad. For example, a democratic way of life has not 
proven to be superior to other ideologies. We firmly be­
lieve it is superior, but its superiority is still an assump­
tion. A classroom atmosphere where the individual students 
are given some freedom to plan certain phases of their edu­
cational program and are expected to assume responsibility 
for the results of such planning is logically related to the 
democratic ideology . Such clas sroom practices tend to make 
our allegiance to the democratic ideal more firmly fixed ; 
however, it still is not proven to be superior. Even if 
it is conclusively proven that students learn better in such 
an atmosphere, while our ideal becomes more firmly fixed, 
it is still an assumption. Its propagation and advancement 
rests with the value frame or reference of all. Parenthetic­
ally, to degrade implicit assumptions by asserting that they 
are only assumptions, is to degrade the fundamental directive 
of all intelligent human behavior. 
Hypotheses 
Some examination of the nature or hypotheses was 
necessary in the prior discussions of assumptions and logical 
deductions. However, they are more .fully examined in this 
section. A set of hypotheses is that construct of theory 
which is deduced from a set of assumptions. Hypotheses differ 
from assumptions in that they have the additional 
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characteristic of being testable in terms of the assumptions. 
They also tend to be much more speciric and concrete than 
are assumptions. Hypotheses have not been given a place in 
the theoretical structure by some theorists. In such cases, 
it is maintained that a good theory must be productive of 
testable hypotheses. It is true that the number of hypothe­
ses possible from a highly general set of assumptions is un­
limited. The testing of one hypothesis may give rise to 
many others. However, a theoretical structure is incomplete 
without the inclusion or some hypotheses. Such will become 
apparent as the nature of hypotheses is investigated. 
Hull's hierarchy or interlocking theorems ultimately 
derived from the postulates is  similar to the construct which 
has been delineated as a set of hypotheses. 38 Northrop like­
wise used theorems synonymously with hypotheses. He also 
referred to them as consequences. 39 Marx calls them em-
pirical propositions--statements of fact of what has been 
observed. 4° This construct or theory for Campbell would be 
concepts or laws, the truth or falsity of which would always 
be known. 41 Conant, like Northrop, equated this construct 
38Hull, loc. cit. 
39Northrop, ££· cit. , p. 140. 
4-0Marx, loe. cit. 
4lcampbell, �· cit. , p. 291. 
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with consequences which are sub ject to testing. 42 
Perhaps the nature of hypotheses can be understood 
better by examining the simulated problem situation posed 
earlier in the study. A problematic situation for the in­
dividual is an obstruction blocking his way as he progresses 
through time and space toward the attainment of a speci£ic 
goal . The method ot attaining the goal had been pre-planned 
from the same value frame of reference that had formulated 
the goal. The problem which has disrupted the plan for 
attaining the goal mus t  be dealt with. Here is an indetermi­
nate situation which the individual endeavors to make determi­
nate. The first step in the solution is to analyze the 
as sumptions which engendered the goa1 and made it seem worth 
pursuing. Let us suppose that an examination of the assump­
tions reinforced the worthwhileness  or the goal. Projections 
are then made for solutions to the problem--pos sibilities for 
attaining the goal. These projections are hypotheses. Any 
one of several hypothese s may accomplish the purpose ; on the 
other hand, any one of them may fail as did the original one . 
In deducing the hypotheses , they must be logical 
derivatives from the assumptions. This is especially impor­
tant, else the battle may be won at the expense of all we 
hold dear l Whether or not an hypothesis will work must be 
42conant, Science and Common Sense, loc. cit. 
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determined by testing it--that is , anticipating the conse-
guent. The acid test for the hypothesis which was chosen 
is whether or not the goal was attained. In a sense, an 
hypothesis undergoes a double cheek, first its consistency 
with the set of assumptions and then, its fruitfulness in 
attaining the goal. 
It can easily be seen, by examining the above situa­
tion, how hypotheses are used synonymously with theorems and 
consequences. In a theoretical structure.  whether for a 
scientific experiment or an intelligent act of behavior, the 
three constructs--a set of assumptions , logical deductions 
and a set of hypotheses--are mandatory. The absence of 
either renders the theory invalid . In the absence of a set 
of assumptions, there is no recognizable problem; in the ab­
sence of logical deduction, there is no direction for prob­
lem solutions ; in the absence or hypotheses, there can be 
no active involvement in problem solving . It is maintained 
far too frequently that the method of science is the testing 
of hypotheses. Actually this process takes place · in the 
last stages of scientific method. 
The explanation of hypotheses as being an anticipa­
tion of the consequent is not unlike the tenet of experi­
mental ism that the meaning of an idea rests with its conse­
quential results. Charles S .  Peirce put it thus: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our 
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conception to have. Then, our conception of these 
effec�§ is the whole of our conception of the ob ­
ject."i-::S 
It is imperative that we never lose sight of the 
fundamental anchorage of hypotheses in the assumptions. 
They are testable only in terms of the assumptions. The 
central focal point remains the value frame ot reference of 
the individual who must assume full responsibility tor his 
theory or theories. 
C. THE SYNTHESIS 
An effort was made throughout the analytic examina­
tion of the theory constructs to maintain the relationship 
of each of the three constructs to the other two. This main­
tenance of relationships seemed to be  the only way of com­
muni cating their significance. The task of synthesizing is 
simplified by the nature of the prior discussions. The syn­
thesis of the three theory constructs may. be effected best 
by examining an old problem in terms of a unified the ory. 
This problem is the traditional means-ends controversy. 
It has been charged that relativistic philosophy is 
oriented toward ends at the expense ot the me ans. The prag­
matic justification,  it has been said,  is "Was the mission 
43Philip P. Wiener (ed . ) ,  Values in a Universe of 
Chance, Selected Writings 0£ Charles S. JliiFce �1839-11P:) 
Garden City: Doubleday anaCompany, Tnc. , 1958 , p. l • 
• 
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accomplished? " On the other hand, it has been charged that 
the positivists concentrate on the means at the exclusion of 
ends. This is a charge which the positivists freely acknowl­
edge. The experimentalists vigorously deny--which they have 
every justification for doing--that they neglect means . As 
a matter of fact, the means are wrapped up in the ends, a 
necessity when the individual is the focal point ot all be­
havior and activity. 
This entire question is part of a basic question 
raised in the analytic section ot this chapter . It is: "Are 
all acts of behavior, including scientific experimentation, 
founded on and directed by normative considerations, or must 
all normative considerations be eliminated from science? " 
Professor Raup, while emphasizing his own position 
in the matter, states the case for both sides admirably: 
• • • When a denoted goal is shown in its 
connection with the conditions which lead to it, 
this relationship is one that must be normatively 
established .  The goal is a construction in human 
choice and preference. The conditions which lead 
toward the realization of this goal are also 
formulations of choice and preference • • • •  
For many minds, the principal obstacle to this 
normative approach to nature is imbedded in a pre­
vailing and erroneous assumption regarding em­
pirical science that its t facts • identify natural 
objects as they exist independently or our think­
ing; that since the method tt establishing facts 
achieves this independence, this is the only 
dependable method o.f achieving knowledge o.f 
nature. 44  
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Those who prefer the latter view expresse d by Raup 
whereby the ".facts spe ak for themse lve s" would insist that 
assumptions are generalizations o.f singular facts. Hypothe­
ses would also have empirical re.ferents independent o.f the 
assumptions. The chie.f tools for the scientist with this 
orientation would be machines �or manipulating the data, 
testing variables, e tc. There seems to be some illogic in 
a theoretical structure where both the assumptions and the 
hypotheses have empirical referents. It is di.f.fieult to en­
vision a need for deducing hypotheses if the assumptions 
stand alone grounded in external reality. Induction is a 
very important part of science as is the correlation o.f 
variables, but such hardly seems to accomplish the aims of 
science, that o.f prediction and creation o.f new knowledges. 
There is no apparent direction to such a science. It can 
only be concluded that the scientist ' s  unexpressed values 
direct the science, a practice that has very serious impli­
cations. 
The re lativistic premises advanced throughout this 
study as they are refle cted in the ory construction are: 
( 1 )  assumptions are .free creatirn• of the human intellect 
44R. B. Raup, " The Community Criterion in Judgmental 
Practice, "  Studies in Philosophf and Education, I ( September, 
1960 ) ,  31 . 
186 
molded by his value frame of reference, and (2) hypotheses 
are testable only in relation to the assumptions. 
Since individuals ' percepts and values are influenced 
by past experiences it could be, and indeed has been, main­
tained that free creative assumptions are still generaliza­
tions from past atomistic experiences. There is, however, 
the additional element of purpose that removes implicit 
assumptions from the confines of a cause and effect science. 
It does not remove their formulation from the confines ot 
science! Rather, assumptions are never subjected to scien­
tific scrutiny until they a�e honestly admitted as a part 
of scientific investigation. The dogma of the deterministic 
philosophers of science that there is a realm of fact (scien­
tific) and a realm of human values (metaphysics ) condones 
opportunistic manipulations and irresponsibility. 
Bronowski defines our current situation a� a dangerous 
one brought about by irresponsibility: 
The civilized world is indeed, threatene d with 
destruction by the physical impact of science on 
our lives, and it is characteristic that we are 
threatened as much, for example, by overpopulation 
as by radioactive death. For what threatens us in 
both cases is not the seientificdiscovery, but our 
o'wnfailuretoliii'gllall the consequences honestry­
and without compromise's:- We are threatened by over­
population because we refuse to face honestly- -that 
is, to face actively--the need to control human 
re production. And we are threatened by atomic bombs 
because we refuse to face the' necessity for a new age 
of trust among nations. Somehow we think it remote 
from morality to face the facts ; somehow we 
think it possible to be good without being 
wise . 45 (italics mine) 
f 
Bronowski sums up his expose of our false sense of 
morals : 
We live in a technical age of plenty and are 
frightened because we try to control this abund­
ance by a morality which �huts its eyes to the 
consequences of our acts. 46 
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When ends , or normative purposes, are eliminated from 
scientific scrutiny, then me ans are without direction . A 
haven is provided for the mystic and an excuse for the 
scientist who has not the inc11
iia
tion nor courage to state 
his views. Rampsherger definea l the fir st role of the phil­
osopher of science as an exposer of hidden assumptions . 
The first task for the philosopher of science is 
to examine the actual historical development of 
science to discover what philosophical assumptions 
have been taken tor granted. · What views as to the 
nature of reality and our means of knowjng it has 
been tacitly or explicitly presupposed?�7 
A synthesized theory is one whereby implicit assump­
tions are made explicit. The assumptions must be logically 
interrelated and mutually supporting. Hypotheses must also 
45Jacob Bronowski, "A Moral for An Age of Plenty, " 
Adventure s of the Mind Series, Saturday Evening Post, CCXXXIII 
(November 12 , 1960 ) ,  72. 
York: 
46Ibid . 
47Albert G . · Rampsberger, Philosophy of Science ( New 
F .  S .  Crofts and Company� 1942), p .  3'7 
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be logically interrelated and mutually supporting as well as 
have a logical and consistent relationship to the assump­
tions. The testing of hypotheses is impossible except in 
relationship to the assumptions; the relationship of hypothe­
ses to empirical reality does not stand alone. In every act 
of intelligent behavior, we are literally testing hypotheses 
which were formulated as an anticipation ot the consequent. 
The consequences of purauing the act ot behavior must be 
borne by the individual himself who projected the hypothesis 
from his own s et of implicit normative assumptions. Such is 
equally true of the scientist; he cannot avoid his private 
responsibilities by declaring sc�ence a public responsibility. 
As Bridgman put it, " Science does not begin until my activi­
tie� begin. n48 
The process that I want to call scientific is 
a process  that involves the continual apprehension 
ot meaning, the constant appraisal ot signiticance, 
accompanied by a running act ot checking to be sure 
that I am doing what I want to do, and ot judging 
correctness  or incorrectnes s .  This checking and 
judging and accepting, that together constitute 
understanding, are done by me and can be done tor 
me by no one else. They are as  private as my 
toothache, and without them science is dead. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . • Always beyond the public level, waiting 
tor a deeper analysis, is the private level. lt 
is on the private level that I realize my 
48p. w. Bridgman , Retleciions ot A Physicist { New York: 
Philosophical Library , 1955) , P • 50 . 
essential isolation; here is my awful freedom 
that I can hardly tace. 49 
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Obviously this awful freedom which Bridgman found 
difficult to face has proven impossible for many scientists 
and lay citizens to face. A synthesized theory, whether it 
be a theory of physics, chemistry, medicine, educational ad­
ministration or the daily problems of mankind in mutual 
coexistence, has at the core ot it private normative values. 
The burden, and it is a burden, is for each of us to assume 
responsibility for exposing our values so that we may col­
lectively examine them intelligently ( scientifically ) .  We 
can no longer afford to hide behind the cloak ot scientific 
immunity. 
Reiser sums up the problem as follows: 
• • •  There is much said about science being 
more suited to the determination of. me ans rather 
than ends, to the study of facts rather than 
values, to the description of what is rather than 
what ought to be. It is surprising to find 
religionists and Logical Positivists agreeing 
with this conclusion, even though the motivations 
in e ach case are very different. 
Contrary to this view that 'facts' and ' values' 
are mutually exclusive, I hold that the realm of -
facts and the kingdom of values are ruled by a 
common sovereignty: we must learn to think 
compassionately and feel intelligently. That is 
49Ibid. , pp. 50, 75 . 
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to say, science is committed to a value-system . 5° 
A society, such as ours, that stakes its existence on 
an educated, intelligent citizenry has cause for being ill­
at-ease when theories of educational leadership purport to 
be divorced from the society ' s  value-system. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter the three constructs or theory, a 
set of assumptions, logical deductions, and a set of hypothe­
se s ,  were analysed individually to determine their nature and 
their role in the process  of theorizing. The three constructs 
were then synthesized to show their composite function in 
intelligent behavior and responsible scientific investiga­
tion . 
Theoretical as sumptions are free creations of the 
human intellect. They are implicit premises for every act of 
behavior and for every experiment of science . All as sump­
tions are rounded on metaphysical, normative considerations . 
At the core of them is the value frame of reference of each 
individual. These normative assumptions can become public 
only when individuals honestly make explicit that which is 
implicit, and subject them to intelligent (scientific) 
scrutiny. As sumptions do not n
i
ces sarily have empirical 
50o1iver L. Reiser, The
. f
nte,
ration of Human Knowl­
edge (Boston: Porter Sargent, 958 , PP • 6I'=62. 
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referents; the facts do not speak tor themselves. Communi­
cated facts are not pure facts but they are interpreted 
tacts. The individual cannot absolve himself ot responsi­
bility for his own assumptions. 
Logical deduction is the process ot interring relation­
ships primarily between the set ot assumptions and the set 
of hypotheses, but also interrelationships among assumptions 
and among hypotheses. Relationships between normative 
assumptions and testable hypotheses are effected by epistemic 
correlation; that is, the hypotheses are testable in terms 
ot the assumptions. Operational definitions ot all terms in 
a theoretical structure is impossible. There must be con­
cepts by postulation. Logical deductions are a part of each 
individual ' s intelligent behavior when he seeks to attain 
correspondence between his conception of the environment and 
the environment as he experiences it. Intelligent behavior 
requires rising above being a naive realist, a condition 
which Wolfgang Kohler said comes from childhood and persists 
with us most ot· the time. 51 Rather, we are interpreters 
from our value frame ot reference . Logical deductions are 
always anchored in human purpose. 
Hypotheses are logical deductions from the set ot 
51wolfgang Kohler, " The Mind-Body Problem, "  Dimensions 
of Mind, Sidney Hook, editor ( New York: New York University 
l're�1960 l-, P • 9. 
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assumptions .  They have the additional characteristic of 
being testable in terms of the assumptions. Hypotheses are 
con jectured solutions to problems which obstruct goal­
attainment. They are anticipations of th� consequent. Since 
hypotheses are deduced from normative assumptions, whether 
explicit or implicit, they must be tested in terms 0£ the 
assumptions. Hypotheses are projections from the indi­
vidual's value frame 0£ re£erence; their consequential re­
sults are his responsibility. 
A synthesized theory would not be concerned with 
either means or ends at the exclusion of the other. The 
means would be part and parcel of the ends.  A goal worth 
pursuing would be pursued with the same integrity as was 
used in selecting the goal for pursuit. The survival 0£ man­
kind is dependent on moral standards critically examined and 
utilized for insuring mutual coexistence. It is impossible 
to be good without being wi se . 
CHAPTER VI 
AXIOMATIC BASES FOR ·THEORIZING IN 
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
A .  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study, as designated in Chapter I,  
was : to offer a logical explanation of the process of theory 
construction in educational administration so that wide 
differences of opinion regarding administrative theory may be 
reduced . The existence of controversial issues among members 
of the profession concerned with the development or a theory 
or theories ot educational administration constituted the 
problem of the study. 
In the study, efforts were made to determine the nature 
ot and the purposes for theory. The .fundamental controver ­
sial issues among those who have investigated the structure 
of theories were identified. Philosophic and psychological 
bases of theory were examined, and the basic constructs of 
theory were identified, analyzed and synthesized. 
It is the purpose of this final chapter to ( 1 )  pull 
together the points of view advanced in the study as they 
tend to offer resolutions to the controversial issues, and 
(2 ) to advance some axiomatic bases tor theorizing, espe­
cially in educati onal administration. 
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The major controversial issues were identified around 
the questions of (1) the place of human values in a theo­
retical structure, ( 2) the free creative or the restrictive 
aspects of assumptions, ( 3 )  the definition of concepts, and 
(�) the validity of the "is-ought" dichotomy . Each of these 
questions is reviewed below in the light of argumentation ad­
vanced throughout the study. All of the issues basically are 
philosophical differences. Those who are oriented to a 
deterministic philosophy would be  sharply divided from those 
with relativistic orientations. These points of view were 
examined in the study noting the supporting research and 
logic of each. These points or view are reviewed prior to 
consideration of the individual issues . 
It is maintained by deterministic philosophers of 
science that there exists an external world independent of 
man's knowledge or it. Man's knowledge or this external 
world is true only as it approximates the external structure 
of reality. Logical positivism, a current instrument of 
determinism, advocates a separation of the world of value 
from the world of fact, the ought from the is, the ends from 
the means. Values, ends, purposes and all normative con­
siderations are said to be  in the realm or metaphysics, and 
are, thus, unscientific. Such a philosophy makes it possible 
tor man to compartmentalize his life, and, also, an escape 
from shouldering personal responsibility is furnished. It 
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is convenient to take the position, "Don't ask me, I just 
work here. Check the tacts. " Proponents of this point of 
view (determinism ) insist that man ' s values are to be  di-
vorced from all s cientific investigation. Efforts are made 
to eliminate all metaphysics from s cience. 
On the other hand, relativistic philosophers ot s cience 
maintain that the external world is me�ingful only through 
hum.an interpretation. Modern research in quantum mechanics  
would seem to otter a deterrent to those who still think of 
matter as the solid stutf ot r�ality . Research i� perceptual 
psychology seems to be conclusive that the individual chooses 
from his perceptual field those things to which he ascribes 
value. Meaning attributed to perceptual objects varies with 
the perceiver ' s  past experiences, values and purposes. 
Man, then, as a purposeful creature selects his goals 
and �dapts his methods tor goal attainment to the goals them­
selves. Both the goals and the methods are anchored in 
man ' s individual value frame of reference. According to the 
relativist, the above described procedure is equally appli­
cable to the scientist in the laboratory as to the lay person 
in any act of intelligent behavior. 
In determinism, meaning is vested in external reality. 
The individual becomes an ob server and a reporter. Whereas ,  
in relativism, meaning is vested in the values of the indi­
vidual. He is the formulator ot goals and he must  assume 
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full responsibility for their attainment. 
The position stated at the beginning ot this study 
and advanced throughout was one of relativism. Research and 
logic seem to support overwhelmingly the relativistic posi­
tion. Resolution or the controversial issues in the ory 
necessitate an understanding of their philosophical genesis.  
B. EFFORTS TOWARD RESOLUTION OF 
. ' 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 
1 .  Are theoretical structures free or human values? 
In the light of the above discussions, it is obvious 
that those people with deterministic orientations would in­
sist that theoretical structures, to be valid, must be free 
of human values. A theory or administration, they would say, 
must be usable equally by any administrator, in any organiza­
tion, at any time, and in any social setting or political 
ideology. Some would concede that values may be used as 
variables, but they are not a part of the theoretical struc­
ture. 
To the relativist, the validity of the theoretical 
structure would depend on the validity or the normative sys­
tem which supports the theory. 
Since theorie s are man-made they inevitably encompass 
human values, either explicitly or implicitly. Such, at 
least, was the thesis advanced in this study and which an 
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' examination of the process of theorizing seemed to support. 
2. Are assumptions generalizations of inductive 
facts? 
This issue could be phrased, "Are all assumptions 
empirically testable? " The determinist would answer the 
question in the affirmative, while the relativist would ve­
hemently decry such an assertion . The position of the deter­
minist on this issue would be obvious . With his faith in 
external reality and his aversion of metaphysics, he would 
have no recourse but to insist that assumptions are proposi­
tions built up from singular propositions with empirical 
referents. 
The relativist, on the other hand, would maintain 
that assumptions are free creations of the human intellect 
anchored in normative considerations. 
Assumptions, it appears, may be tested if subje cted 
to examination, but the test is based on more general assump­
tions which are not testable . In the final analysis , assump­
tions rest with the individual ' s  set of values ,  and he is 
responsible for them. It is urged that implicit assump­
tions be made explicit and subjected to rigorous examination. 
3 .  Are all concepts empirically definable? 
If it is conceded that there are implicit assumptions 
by postulation, then the propositions of these assumptions 
must be made up of concepts by postulation. Operational 
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concepts would be impossible tor an unobserved entity ; and 
efforts to use only operational concepts in a theory would 
result in (1 ) an infinite regress, (2 ) a theory which would 
omit implicit assumptions (and their relevance would be 
denied),  or ( 3) an unintelligent set of propositions based 
on the immediately apprehendable , with the theorist naively 
assuming he has made no interpretations. 
4. How valid is the "is-ought" dichotomy? 
Man, progressing through space and time, interprets 
the present from the past and he pro jects into the future 
from both. Actually, the present is only the link between 
the past and the future. Man ' s  specious present consists of 
the �' the is, and the ought. 
Perceptual research seems to shatter the validity of 
any is-ought dichotomy. Man interprets his environment (the 
"is" ) in terms of his purposes (the "ought" ). 
· It appears that man would be a victim of his environ-
ment if he were restricted to what is . For the scie ntist -- -
in the laboratory, the purpose tor his experimental work 
gives me aning to that which he is investigating. A theory of 
social behavior including educational administration must 
factor in the oughts of the subjects as well as those ot the 
investigator. 
In summary, the tenets ot a deterministic philosophy 
of science would be: (1 ) theories are value-free; 
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( 2 } assumptions are composite singular empirical tacts ; 
( 3 } all concepts must be operationally, or empirically, de­
finable; and ( 4 )  what is must be separated from what ought 
to be. Whereas, the tenets of a relativistic philosophy of 
science would be quite opposite. 
It does no good to say that one camp would have one 
view, and the other camp another view. It does make a 
difference what you believe1 To assume otherwise, would be 
to suppose that a man's beliefs make no difference in his 
social behavior. 
What difference does it make to the profession or 
educational administration whether its members are adher­
ents of determinism or relativism? 
Strict adherence to determinism would result in ig­
noring the purposes of educational administration, the pur­
poses of education, and the purposes of man as a social 
being. Research in educational administration would con­
sist of the researcher making observations within a school 
or school system and recording what he finds. He would 
never know or care what constituted an educational program 
adequate for attaining purposes of education ( whatever they 
may be ) ;  nor would he know or care if the administrator was 
doing an effective or ineffective job .  Research would be­
come a job for technicians and their data frequently would 
be trivia. 
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Progress in the profession of educational administra-
' 
tion, it seems, is  dependent on the extent to which educa-
tional administrator s contribute to the attainment of educa­
tional purposes. Educational purposes are, in the final anal ­
ysis, individual purposes of the members of society. Each 
member ot the profe s sion--social s cientist, practitioner, pro­
fessor, student--can afford to do no les s  than display maxi­
mum integrity in stating his assumptions and shouldering re­
sponsibility for improving the profession. Such effor ts 
require transcending the threshold of empiricism in research, 
preparation programs, and in administrative functions. 
C .  AXIOMATIC BASES 
It has been contended throughout this s tudy that the 
solid base of reality is man's value frame of reference. 
Axioms have traditionally been equated with that which is 
self-evident, such as the axioms or Euclidean geometry. It 
may appear that the use ot ax.ioms in a relativistic context 
is  inconsistent. Such would, indeed, be the case if the 
traditional definition of axioms were held. Research and 
thoughtful investigations by s cientists and philosophers 
alike, which were cited in this study, invalidate any claims 
for self-evident truths. Axiomatic bases are no more than 
axiological bases--that is, bases with value referents. 
However, there are no bases more solid than well-formulated 
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values. 
In conjunction with the reasoning advanced throughout 
this study, the statements below are advanced with equal 
fervor. The statements are intended to provide, to some ex­
tent, direction ror those (1) concerned with the structure 
of theory; (2) those concerned with constructing and/or 
using theories for research purposes, especially in educa­
tional administration ; and ( 3) those concerne d with im­
proving the profession of educational administration. There 
are implications also for those concerned with intelligent 
daily living. Had different assumptions been held, these 
statements would have been different. That is, the validity 
of the statements rests on the validity of the assumptions 
(postulations ) of the study and the logic or the argumenta-
tion. It will be noted that some of the statements are re-
statements of . the postulations of the study. The postula­
tions were not proven to be true or false, however their 
soundness was reinforced substantially by the research. 
1. Theory cannot be disassociated from the human 
process or theorizing. Any theory , whether for scientific 
investigation or for intelligent daily behavior, is the 
product or a human intellectual process . 
2. Everyone who behaves intelligently theorizes. 
The normal drives, such as . hunger, · sex, self-preservation, 
etc. , are inadequate to insure intelligent behavior . It is 
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erroneous to assume that only scientists theorize. Theor­
izing is required of all who anticipate the future. 
3 .  Theoriz ing begins from the individual's private 
frame of reterence--his values and his purposes. The per­
sonal reference point 0£ the theorist cannot be transcended. 
Theory becomes a public matter through mutual agreement on 
private values. No science can be stronger than the integ­
rity of the scientists who are willing to expose for exami­
nation their private values. 
4. Theorizing involves utilizing what !!.!! (the past ) 
for associating what is (the present) with what ought to be 
(the future). Stated another way, the purpose of theory 
is prediction- -projection into the future. The accumulation 
of new knowledges can come about in no other manner. 
5. All theorizing is premised on normative assump­
tions, either explicitly or implicitly. The more general 
assumptions cannot be empirically tested; rather, they are 
reinforced through the testing of logically derived hy­
potheses, if the testing has positive results. 
6 . The testing of hypotheses i s  always premised on 
the soundness  of the untested assumptions from which the 
hypotheses were deduced. 
7 .  All of the concepts of a theoretical structure can­
not be operationally defined. Assumptions by postulation ne­
cessitate concepts by postulation. Concepts by postulation 
203 
(unobserved entities )  and concepts by intuition ( the im­
mediately apprehendable ) must be epistemically corre lated. 
The validity or the operational concepts re sts on the valid­
ity of the concepts by postulation . 
8 . The research theorist in educational administra­
tion is called upon to make explicit those implicit assump­
tions which undergird his theory. There should be no doubt ,  
in the minds of those who would use a particular theory, 
about its consistency with sound social norms. 
9 . Profe ssors in preparation programs for educational 
administrators will do we ll to gear their programs toward im­
proving the theorizing competencies of practicing and/or 
potential educational administrators. Such a program will de­
mand of every participant an examination and refinement of 
his value frame of reference . The perpetuation of our 
socie ty demands educational programs with le adership who se 
integrity is above reproach. 
10. Everyone who theorizes must assume full responsi­
bility for the consequences of his theory or theorie s. The 
facts do not speak for themse lves; communicated facts are al­
ways facts which have been interprete d and conce ptualize d by 
the communicator . 
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